This article is part of my series of articles that deal with the Western and Chinese commercial disputes from the 1880s until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. In contrast to my previous articles, it deals with commercial disputes between American mercantile firms and Chinese trading merchants in the early twentieth century by examining the unpublished Shanghai American consular archives at NARA II (National Archives and Records Administration), College Park, Maryland. Together with correspondence in the North-China Herald (NCH), these archives can be materials for revealing the peculiar behavior of the proprietors of Chinese partnership (joint-share, or hegu 合股) firms. They cooperated with American mercantile firms so long as the assets of American mercantile firms could guarantee their commercial profits. Whenever they were aware that American mercantile firms could no longer guarantee the safety of their commercial assets, they did not hesitate in breaching commercial contracts by means of various tactics. Seen from the American side, it was nothing but a betrayal. Following typical cases in the records, this article reveals the process by which these commercial disputes escalated to such a level that leaders of Chinese mercantile people demanded reforms to the commercial court system at the end of the 1910s.

This essay is an attempt to think through the three revolutions, using Tocqueville's theory of “democracy” as a key. For Tocqueville, democracy is a society with “the equality of conditions” – in other words, a society that has no hereditary status system. In this sense, Chinese society since the Song Dynasty has been “democracy” as Tocqueville himself pointed out repeatedly. In his understanding, contemporary China was a “democratic society” and its form of government was highly centralized “despotism”; in sum, it was “democratic despotism.” Tocqueville was warning against the possible Sinification of America and Europe. Moreover, he thinks what the French Revolution brought about were mainly “the equality of conditions” and the establishment of centralized state power. The Meiji Revolution also realized these two things because it had not been “democratic” and the polity had been federal. On the other hand, in China, both had been actualized since the tenth century. Therefore, the Chinese Revolution which ended up with the establishment of the communist rule is very different from the other two revolutions.

The “Paika Rebellion” of 1817 in Orissa, India has been depicted by colonial officers as a local disturbance caused by the dissatisfaction of one powerful individual deprived of traditional privileges who instigated the pāikas. The nationalist reconstruction has depicted the event as a popular freedom movement involving various castes and classes of Orissan society. This has culminated in a current move to declare the “Paika Rebellion” the First Indian War of Independence. I would like to suggest a third perspective, which focuses on the heterogeneities and linkages of the Rebellion. It is important to note that the “Paika Rebellion” was a meeting point of plural genealogies: “tribal” revolts to protect autonomy, “peasant” resistance to secure livelihood, restorative attempts by the traditional landed class, and ruling class efforts to defend and expand authority. Appreciating the plural genealogies of the Rebellion leads to more perceptive understandings of the heterogeneous characteristics of popular movements and their aftermaths in modern India. Lastly, in order to go beyond colonial and dominant-caste centred perspectives, I propose that we name it the “Orissa Uprising of 1817”.