The article examines the globalization of China's Buddhism. Such new modern values as science and progress, along with competition from Christianity stimulated a modern reform of Buddhism in China in the early twentieth century that was then carried abroad through emigration and other transnational movement. This paper examines the ongoing interactions among Buddhists across difference nation-state spaces that have constituted the spread of this Buddhism. We show how transnational networks of clergy and devotees are constituted through affiliations of kinship, loyalty and region. These, in turn, faciliate allocations of personnel, money, and legitimacy that have not only institutionalized Buddhism in Southeast Asian and North American overseas Chinese communities but also supported its revival in late twentieth century China.

China's emergence as a great power has been accompanied by the official rhetoric of the China Dream of Great Rejuvenation (weida fuxing 伟大复兴). Although there are conflicting views among academics and political elites about the exact content of the China Dream, one of its features is the nostalgia for China's past and its five-thousand-year-old civilization. Xi Jinping's current rhetoric of a China Dream of Great Rejuvenation uses a reinvented history as an asset for the future, linking China's natural progress as a global power with a selective re-reading of its millennial history. While much existing literature already discusses China's Great Rejuvenation, this article looks more specifically at the role of historical memory and deconstructs the key interconnected components that support Xi's rhetoric, namely, the chosen trauma, glory, and amnesia. The conclusion offers some general remarks about the effect of this rhetoric on China's domestic and foreign policy and some of the risks that accompany it. This article contributes to the debates on the influence of memory in International Relations (IR), showing how constructed memories of history can significantly impact both national identity and foreign policy.

This article describes the transformation of the Philippine currency system from a gold exchange standard to a dollar exchange standard during the first half of the twentieth century. During the American colonial period, Philippine foreign trade was closely bound to the United States. In terms of domestic investment, however, it was domestic Filipino or Spanish entrepreneurs and landowners who dominated primary commodity production in the Philippines, rather than American investors. How were both this US-dependent trade structure and the unique production structure of domestic primary commodities reflected in the management of the Philippine currency system? To answer this question, this article first discusses the introduction of the gold standard system in the Philippines in the early twentieth century. Second, the de facto conversion of the Philippine currency system from the gold standard to the dollar exchange standard in the 1920s is described, together with the mismanagement of the currency reserves and the debacle of the Philippine National Bank that functioned as the government depository of the currency reserves in the United States. Third, the formal introduction of the dollar exchange standard during the Great Depression is outlined, a clear example of the dependency of the Philippine currency system on the US in the 1930s.

Both the physical qualities of different types of money and the cultural values assigned to them contributed to the determination of their economic value. China began to import substantial quantities of silver coins from Europe as early as the sixteenth century, but it was around 1800 that a foreign coin, the so-called “Carolus peso” issued by the Spanish kings Carlos III and Carlos IV, became the basis of a new monetary standard in China, the yuan. In the nineteenth century the Carolus peso and imitations of it (mostly manufactured in China) served as the principal means of exchange, and the yuan as the standard unit of account, in the markets of South China. This paper analyzes the monetary conditions that led to the establishment of the Carolus peso as the monetary standard of South China with particular consideration of the distinctive “currency circuits” formed by regional variations in monetary circulation. Significant differences can be seen in the monetary regimes that prevailed in Jiangnan and Guangdong, the major commercial centers of the empire. While Guangdong reverted to a commodity money standard that allowed the use of a wide range of different types of physical monies, including “chopped” and broken foreign coins, in Jiangnan the Carolus peso became a unified, fiduciary monetary standard. This regional variation attests to the distinctive regional characteristics of market culture in late imperial China.

This article explores the role of Pan-Asian ideology in Japanese imperialism and how it is reflected in literary texts produced in Manchukuo. Through the analysis of Chinese and Japanese literary works this study examines the construction of ethnic identities and difference which was central to both Pan-Asian discourse and Manchukuo national identity. In both types of works the Japanese and Chinese characters use the concept of ethnicity or culture to reveal different realities of Manchukuo's ethnic politics. While the insoluble separation between the Japanese and the Chinese in Ushijima Haruko's “A Man Called Shuku” betrays the ethnic harmony proclaimed by the Manchukuo regime, Gu Ding's “A New Life” suggests a possibility of true harmony between the two ethnicities. Where the Japanese vice governor's distrust of his Chinese subordinate in Ushijima's story reflects the author's own fear and guilt about her privileged social position, the Chinese protagonist in Gu's story emphasizes the importance of Japanese modern medicine during a plague outbreak as well as his importance as a mediator between the colonizer and his countrymen in order to justify the author's association with Japanese imperialism.

A study of the site of Kharakhorum suggests it was a large city with an extensive population. The rulers however did not live here permanently but in seasonal palaces in the environs of the city. I have identified the Spring and Winter Palaces and been able to narrow down the possible sites of the Summer and Autumn Palaces. The Spring Palace (the Qarshi-“Sūrī” of Juvainī, the Gegenchaghan of Rashīd al-Dīn and the Jiajianchahan-dian of Saolin-cheng of the Yuan shi) is located at the site known as Doityn Balgas, and the Winter Palace (the Ong-khin of the Rashīd al-Dīn) I consider to be at the Shaazan-khot site. The sites of the Summer and Autumn Palaces are uncertain at this point. Judging from the location of the Spring and Winter Palaces, it is clear that the emperors moved over a distance of 450 km each year and a reconstruction of the migration route shows that the emperor had a domain of 14,000 square km. This area can be called the peri-urban area of Kharakhorum, the political, economic, and cultural centre of the Mongol empire.

This paper explores the ocean produce trade that connected maritime East and Southeast Asia between 1780 and 1860. The essay explicitly concentrates on two “arenas” of action where politics, commerce, and the trade in sea produce combined in powerful ways: the Straits of Melaka, and the waters of Northern Borneo. In both of these regions, the collection of marine goods became big business. More importantly, however, the organized funneling of these objects helped keep disparate political projects alive and running. This was the case in the Straits of Melaka, where the collection of such bounty supplied one rationale for British expansion in Penang (1786) and Singapore (1819), in the decades on either side of the turn of the nineteenth century. In Northern Borneo, the collection of these commodities from shallow local seas was also tied to empire-building, in this case via the Sultanate of Sulu. Sulu used North Borneo's waters as a vast collecting-ground for sea-produce to be shipped to China. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, North Borneo's coasts became a major source for these products geared toward international trade, linking East and Southeast Asia in increasingly vigorous ways.

Historians of Southeast Asia have begun to consider the history of women and gender relatively recently, even though the complementary relationship between men and women has long been cited as a regional characteristic. In the last twenty years or so the field has witnessed some important advances, most notably in the study of the twentieth century but also in the preceding periods as well. Generalizations advanced in the past are now being refined through a number of new case studies. The second half of this essay, surveying recent publications primarily in English, focuses on pre-twentieth century history, identifying the areas where research has been most productive and suggesting lines of inquiry that might be profitable in the future.

From the mid-1990s, the Japanese government has promoted the creation of a “gender-equal society,” but since about 2000 this example of “state feminism” has faced a severe backlash. This article addresses the following questions about the phenomenon of Japanese state feminism, its history and its consequence: (1) How did the government policy for a “gender equal society” come into existence, and what explains its remarkably progressive nature? (2) What was the impact of the involvement of feminist scholars on policy-making? (3) What was the initial response to the policy? (4) What was the background of the backlash, who were the people and organizations involved, and what were the main arguments? (5) What has been the response to the backlash? (6) What are the connections and differences between the present controversy and the collaboration between feminism and the state in previous moments in Japanese history?

This article focuses on recent revisionist scholarship demonstrating that China's maritime history in the period 1500 to 1630 is no longer a case of ‘missed opportunity’, a viewpoint fostered by earlier writing dominated by state-centric and land-focused models. To challenge this perspective, this study first reviews analyses demonstrating the far-reaching commercial networks between Ming China and localities in Southeast and Northeast Asia, and then considers the impact of the metaphor of Fernand Braudel's ‘Asian Mediterranean’ and his ideas about ‘world economy’ on the study of East Asian seafaring history. Secondly, this investigation reveals the dimensions of Chinese trade networks which the mid-Ming government officially sanctioned, as well as the extent to which literati from the southern provinces challenged the state's involvement in overseas commerce of trade and exchange. Finally, the article assesses how modern historians have studied late Ming maritime defense policies as security along the littoral lapsed.

This paper explores the link between globalization, as the source of contemporary crises in representation, and the academic crisis in Asian Studies. The situation of Japanese Studies in Australia is used as a case study to illustrate these links. I argue that traditional area studies, as a colonial structure rooted in the (Cold) War, has become anachronistic. It is suggested that one strategy through which conventional area studies may be reconfigured and revitalized is by more fully and warmly embracing those movements or networks such as cultural studies that can be seen as responses to global changes.

This article examines the triangular relationship among the Chinese community of northern Vietnam, the North Vietnamese government, and China, focusing in particular on how the relationship affected the ethnic and national identities of Chinese residents in North Vietnam between 1954 and 1978. Scrutiny of the two important issues of citizenship and the Chinese school system reveals that North Vietnamese leaders adopted lenient policies toward Chinese residents mainly because they saw the relationship between the Vietnamese state and the Chinese community as part and parcel of North Vietnam's relationship with China. These policies ultimately contributed to a delay in the assimilation of Chinese residents, and by the end of the 1970s they still had not completed the transformation from well-treated sojourners into citizens of Vietnam. Though many Chinese residents embraced a status of privileged outsider, others willingly participated on Vietnam's behalf in the war against America. After reunification, the desire to clarify loyalty, i.e. to “purify” the nation-state, led the Vietnamese government to initiate an aggressive process of forced assimilation. This policy, and the deterioration of relations between Vietnam and China in the late 1970s, triggered an exodus of Chinese residents.

The language of shared heritage for humanity holds a central position within UNESCO's World Heritage. However, the “Sites of Japan's Meiji Industrial Revolution” as World Heritage is primarily Japan's national project for globalizing a glorious historical narrative of Meiji Japan. While this national nostalgia matches the contemporary political discourse of overcoming domestic and international challenges in twenty-first century Japan, it also encourages people to forget alternative perspectives related to Korean memories of forced labor, colonialism, and war. Ministry officials and cultural council members expressed concerns over possible critical reactions from South Korea, but the Japanese government accelerated its campaign for UNESCO's World Heritage designation and achieved its objective in 2015. Why did the Japanese government take this step despite the alarming voices within Japan? This paper uncovers the process in which Japan's industrial heritage was constructed and promoted as World Heritage. It points to the role of Japanese and Western heritage experts in a newly established committee outside the conventional procedure for Japan's World Heritage nomination and concludes that Japan's heritage diplomacy pushes alternative historical narratives into oblivion.

The 1950s in Japan are usually considered to be marked by pacifism or a “victim consciousness” related to World War II, together with a rejection of war and of the military. Yet attention to the popular press and other sources designed to reflect and appeal to a mass audience, rather than magazines carrying debates among intellectuals, shows that throughout the 1950s the recent war was a much more dynamic issue than typically has been recognized, and that former soldiers were far from universally reviled. Connections with the war, in turn, remained an integral part of the evolving sense of nation in Japan. This article examines the vitality of the war as a major and direct theme in political, social and cultural discourse in the 1950s, focusing on soldiers' involvement in politics, issues relating to Class B and C war criminals, films about the war, and the emergence of a new cultural hero in the form of Kaji, the soldier who is the central figure in the novel and film The Human Condition.

Based on published sources as well as information gathered through observations and interviews, this article intends to provide a general account of the adaptation of the Vietnamese refugees in China since the late 1970s. The description and analysis are focused on three aspects of the social-political life of this community, namely, its initial resettlement, its subsequent division, dispersion and stratification, and the process, problems and prospects of its assimilation. The article argues that whereas Western countries adopted the International Refugee Regime – primarily a European product – in resettling the Vietnamese refugees, China's resettlement policies reflected her experience in handling the returned overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. Although the relocation temporarily reduced all migrants to refugees, the diverse nature of the migrant community, the different local conditions in China, as well as China's official policies contributed to the reemergence of social-economic stratification among the migrants, and this was accompanied by their geographic dispersion. Though assimilation has been going on ever since they entered China, the migrants have managed to maintain their group identity, which, however, is not sustainable.

Relying on Vietnamese internal government documents now available to scholars for consultation in the No. 3 Vietnam National Archive in Hanoi, this article examines the linkage between the escalated Sino-Vietnamese territorial dispute and the increased Vietnamese mistreatment of Chinese residents and experts in northern Vietnam from 1974 to 1978 owing to state-sponsored Vietnamese anti-China/irredentist nationalism. During this period, Vietnamese leaders were seeking to forge national unity, solidify popular loyalty to the state, and mobilize domestic resources to defend the Vietnamese “fatherland” against the threat of Chinese territorial expansion. Specifically, this article demonstrates how these policies encouraged mistreatment of Chinese residents and experts, and created a climate of fear and paranoia within the Chinese community which caused the widespread flight of Chinese from northern Vietnam in 1977–1978.

After more than four decades since its reunification since 1975, Vietnam has achieved remarkable results in social and economic development. With the rapid speed of recent modernization, society has loosened numerous old values related to the family and promoted individual freedoms. Marriage and family affairs, including divorce, have modernized with liberal characteristics. The paper examines the trends of divorce and reasons for divorce using statistical data from the Vietnam People's Supreme Court and from the government's annual population statistics. The analysis compiled and analysed a database of every divorce case at six urban and rural districts in Can Tho province. The analysis highlights changes in the reasons for divorce in the South in comparison with previous divorce studies in the North of Vietnam, discussed in relation to modernization, individualism and gender equality. The analysis is supported by interview data with thirty male and female divorcees.

In the face of a complex external situation, the migrant Yunnanese in northern Thailand have undergone repeated moves since the 1950s, and the narratives of their lived experiences disclose an ongoing negotiation of their inner self with the external social world across time and space. The feeling of “dwelling in displacement” is the fundamental basis of their narrated stories and this constructs particular discourses on “home away from home”. The primary aim of this paper is to analyze their conceptualizations of home and the intertwining of their various migration patterns. It seeks to see how they are shaped by external structural forces on the one hand, and their reaction to them with their interstitial agency on the other. Moreover, by probing their diasporic consciousness linked to the longue durée of Yunnanese mobility, the paper attempts to accentuate the different layers of their perceptions of time and place, and to illuminate their interplay.

Litigation masters (songshi), who flourished in traditional China, have long been associated in the minds of the public with questionable legal behaviour, taking advantage of the lack of legal know-how of plaintiffs. Though they existed outside the law and their existence was constantly castigated by the authorities, they played a very important role in society. This article examine the reality of what it meant for ordinary people to go to law, in an attempt to reassess how the litigation system actually worked, as opposed to how it was described ideally by the state. It first looks at litigation procedures and the trial process, and concludes that the Chinese were extremely litigious, challenging the notion that people preferred to resolve disputes by mediation rather than by going to court. Court procedures were complicated and costs high, and not all plaints submitted to the court were accepted. To ensure that the correct forms were followed, expert help was necessary, and this help often took the form of the litigation master. He acted as proxy for litigants, for he was unable to appear in court in person, and he played a vital role in negotiating with the lower court functionaries whose support was vital for the success of a case. He also wrote plaints in a form acceptable to the courts, and coached litigants in their presentation. The litigation master was often a former civil service examination candidate, and so trained in the kind of writing skills the court required. Failed students often had to choose between becoming a private secretary to a magistrate or a litigation master, and there was a continuum between the two. Thus it was the examination system itself that fostered litigation masters. Because the state refused to recognize litigiousness, it also had to refuse to recognize the lawful existence of litigation masters. Nevertheless they met an important social need.

In ancient and medieval south India, from about the fifth century, the term nādu denoted a micro-region which was important as the basic unit of agricultural production. The agricultural community formed in the nādu was called nāttār or nāttavar, literally meaning the people of the nādu. Initially it was exclusively composed of the Vellāla peasantry, but from the eleventh century there began to appear in Tamil inscriptions the term periyanādu meaning “big nādu” to denote a supra-nādu assembly. In this paper we examine the meaning of the emergence of this and other similar supra-local and/or multi-community organizations.

The Chola dynasty, which had ruled south India for about four hundred years, disappeared in the latter half of the thirteenth century. The succeeding Pandyan dynasty was put down in its turn by the invasion of the Delhi Sultan's army at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Therefore, the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in south India were a period of political turmoil, during when, nevertheless, foreign trade was carried out vigorously in the Indian Ocean. Merchants and artisans joined peasants in the activities of the periyanādu, generating a new state and social formation that became explicitly visible in the fifteenth century under Vijayanagar rule.