In the fifth week of NATO's 78–day aerial intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the FRY initiated proceedings in the International Court of Justice against ten of its member States which it accused of violating the principles of international law in relation to the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.1 NATO's action, known as Operation Allied Force, had commenced on the night of 24 March 1999 when cruise missiles were directed on Serbian targets located in the Kosovan capital of Pristina and in the Republic's capital of Belgrade.2 This robust application of armed force came on the eve of the 50th anniversary of NATO, an organisation which was established after the Second World War for the collective defence of its member States, and constituted the first offensive launched against another sovereign State in the organisation's entire history.

Why have attempts to bring development aspirations to bear on international law over a period of 50 years come to far less than any reasonable person would hope? The early claims for a New International Economic Order and permanent sovereignty by developing countries over their natural resources, efforts to delineate a body of international development law, followed by the affirmation of a human right to development, were all attempts to have economic justice reflected in international law. Figures on world poverty and inequality suggest that international law accommodated no such restructuring. This article explores why it is international law has failed the poor of the world, and what interests it has served in their stead.

This article seeks to explore the way in which the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) has interpreted and applied the principle of democracy. It examines first the democratization process upon which the EU has embarked since the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht and how that transformation was a positive reaction to those voices arguing that the EU suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’. Next, it is argued that the CJEU has understood the principle of democracy in a way which is respectful of the two sources of democratic legitimacy at EU level, namely the Member States and the peoples of Europe. Accordingly, that understanding of the principle of democracy is illustrated by some relevant examples taken from the case law of the CJEU and the European General Court (‘EGC’). Those examples show that the CJEU has strived to protect the prerogatives of the European Parliament, the only political institution of the EU whose members have, since 1979, been elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. Yet, they also show that the principle of democracy is not limited to protecting parliamentary prerogatives. That principle, like all EU constitutional principles, pervades the whole of EU law and, as such, must be read in light of societal changes. As democracy within the EU is not limited to the participation by the European Parliament in the legislative process but also encompasses other forms of governance, in particular rule-making by administrative agencies and the achievement of consensus by social partners, it is for the EU judiciary to make sure that those other forms of governance remain as democratic as possible. This can be achieved, inter alia, by making sure that they enjoy sufficient representation or are subject to parliamentary control. Furthermore, the CJEU and the EGC also take into account new mechanisms which seek to strengthen the principle of democracy, such as the principle of transparency. In so doing, they aim to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU by providing sufficient means for EU citizens to hold their representatives accountable. Finally, it is contended that the principle of democracy, as interpreted by the CJEU, draws inspiration from national democracies. In so doing, the CJEU strives to place national and supranational democracies in a mutually reinforcing relationship.

This article examines the establishment and work of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission with regard to its decision of 13 April 2002 concerning the delimitation of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia and subsequent events. Apart from an examination of the substantive decision of the Commission in the light of the law relating to territory, the article will discuss certain unusual features of the process, including mandating the Commission both to delimit and demarcate the boundary and the involvement of third parties. The delimitation decision is significant in a number of ways, including its views as to the applicable law, treaty interpretation and the subsequent conduct of the parties in relation to title. The long-running and difficult process of demarcation is noted, together with the important role played by the UN and other international actors.

The European Union (EU) is contemplating the adoption of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), which would extend its domestic carbon price to emissions that are produced outside its borders but are embodied into its imports of carbon-intensive commodities. In doing so, the EU is testing the boundaries of permissible unilateral action at the interface of international climate and trade law. However, the question of whether the proposed CBAM is compatible with these two multilateral legal regimes is yet to be addressed in an integrated manner. This article seeks to fill this gap in the scholarship and makes two main arguments. First, the CBAM as presently designed does not respect the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDRRC) and needs to be adjusted through two forms of differential treatment: a full exemption for least-developed countries and Small Island Developing States and the use of CBAM-generated revenue to support decarbonisation efforts in other affected developing countries. Secondly, this CBDRRC-based differentiation should be permissible under WTO law on the grounds that it does not amount to discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail.

In December 2007, the international community adopted the Bali Action Plan which launched a process to reach an ‘agreed outcome’ on long-term cooperative action on climate change, with a scheduled end in Copenhagen, December 2009. The term ‘an agreed outcome’ suggests a lack of agreement on both the legal form that the likely outcome of this process could take, and the level of ambition that it should reflect. This lack of agreement continues to haunt the process. There are a range of legal form options for a new climate instrument—from a set of Conference of Parties decisions to a legally binding instrument, either to replace or supplement the Kyoto Protocol—and the choice between them for States is predicated primarily on political and strategic considerations. Nevertheless the legal status, procedural requirements, symbolic signalling effects and regime-building characteristics of different legal form options will play an important role in determining the legal form of the Copenhagen ‘agreed outcome’. This article identifies and explores the range of legal form options available to States in the negotiation process, and outlines the political and strategic considerations at play and will ultimately govern choice of legal form. This article argues that one of the most significant factors hindering substantive progress on a post-2012 climate agreement is what is characterized here as the ‘post-Kyoto stress disorder’, a lack of trust amongst some developing countries that industrialized countries will, given current and past form, honour their commitments, and/or take the lead in the new climate agreement. This article makes the case that post-Kyoto stress disorder will likely prevent certain legal form options from acquiring traction in the process and favour others.

While the public nature of investment treaty arbitration has been increasingly recognized, its procedures are modelled on those of international commercial arbitration. This creates a gap between (public) substance and (private) procedure in investment treaty arbitration. Against this background, this article examines the increasing acceptance of amicus curiae submissions in investment treaty arbitration. It argues that investment treaty arbitration tribunals should make effective use of amicus curiae submissions in order to include neglected perspectives of the issues raised in arbitration, which may bridge this public/private gap.

The study of what has become known as transnational commercial law is fraught with hazards. What do we mean by transnational commercial law? Is it the same as the lex mercatoria or something broader? What are its sources? Can we identify general principles of commercial law and, separately, uncodified international trade usage? If so, what happens to these principles when they become embodied in convention or contractually incorporated uniform rules? Do they disappear, maintain a parallel existence in their original form or change their shape to match the convention or rules? And how far do conventions and rules either evidence pre-existing principles and usages or influence the creation of new ones?

Party autonomy is the basic principle for international contracts. By making a ‘choice of law’, the parties to a contract can agree amongst themselves which law is to regulate their contractual relationship. In international transactions, the law of the parties' choice replaces the law that would otherwise have governed the contract, including the mandatory rules (ius cogens) of the latter law. Article 3 of the 1980 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (hereafter: the ‘Rome Convention’) fully recognises this principle of party autonomy. Under Article 3 the parties are free to choose whichever law they deem appropriate to govern their contractual relationship. It is not even necessary for the transaction to display some connection with the chosen law.

The aim of this article is to provide an overview of the European Court of Justice's (‘ECJ’) past and present contribution— both procedurally and substantively—to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. While it is too early to speculate what the ECJ's contribution to this area will be under the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, the latter's modifications to the ECJ's jurisdiction merit close attention. After describing how the procedural limitations that were imposed on the ECJ's jurisdiction by ex Title IV of Part Three of the EC Treaty and by ex Title VI of the old EU Treaty have been almost entirely eliminated by the Treaty of Lisbon, this article posits that not only does the latter Treaty improve significantly the judicial protection of private individuals, but it also facilitates the dialogue between the Union and the national judiciaries in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Next, the article briefly explores the special ECJ procedures which may be followed in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in cases where time is of the essence. There, it is argued that, when having recourse to these procedures, the ECJ strives to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, swift judging and, on the other hand, the preservation of a qualitative and fair judicial procedure. As to substantive issues, drawing on examples from the fields of judicial cooperation in civil matters, asylum and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, it is argued that the ECJ's contribution to this area is largely grounded in the protection of fundamental rights. Finally, a brief conclusion supports the contention that the ECJ's contribution to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has favoured a ‘mutual borrowing’ of concepts and principles as between this area and other fields in relation to which the EU has competences, such as the internal market and competition. The Treaty of Lisbon having entered into force, an unprecedented level of coordination between different areas of EU law on both the procedural and substantive levels is to take place. Respect for fundamental rights will definitely be a unifying factor binding them all together.

In recent years, there has been a surge of private investment in space resources and the enactment of domestic legislation aimed at protecting property rights over the resources to be extracted. This article argues that the unilateral exploitation of space resources is not prohibited by the principle of non-appropriation and is consistent with the freedom of use for common benefit and interests, with the caveat that it does not exclude others from exploitation or exacerbate inequality among States. It also argues that a laissez-faire approach would be detrimental to the orderly, sustainable and safe exploitation and use of space resources and calls for the establishment of an international regulatory regime consisting of rules concerning international coordination, benefits sharing and environmental protection.

This article looks at the origins, purposes and conflicts of national interests and policies that were the primary influences in shaping the substance of the Arms Trade Treaty, which came into force at the end of 2014. It then proceeds to a more legally focussed analysis and, having identified several important issues which have had to remain undiscussed, concentrates on detailed examination and evaluation of the most important provisions of substance. These are firstly the scope of the Treaty—defining the equipment or materiel covered (Article 2). There follows analysis of the provisions which contain the obligations on exporting States, ranging from absolute prohibitions (Article 6) to ‘export assessments’ (Article 7), which in practice will be the most frequently applicable. The paper concludes by identifying several valuable provisions in the Treaty whilst also highlighting several significant weaknesses and omissions. It contends that evaluation of the Treaty's likely contribution to controlling the recognized evils of the arms trade is premature at this stage and, further, that efforts towards that end must focus on the practice and law of domestic administrative implementation, rather than international law.

This article aims to review EU competition rules by undertaking a historical purposive interpretation of the drafting process of the Treaty of Rome. It reveals new insights based on a consideration of several historical archives starting with the Schuman plan, the Founding Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome. Questions of contemporary relevance are explored, relating to the goals of competition law, the historical distinction between ‘object’ and ‘effect’ under Article 101 TFEU, the possibility of an enforcement gap under Article 102 TFEU, the relationship between unfair competition and the prohibition of discrimination and, finally, the broader meaning of competitive distortions.

Critical to analysing the recent synthesis of criminal trial procedures is an understanding of the internationalisation of criminal law and procedure.1 As well as the creation of international tribunals2 to investigate and try crimes of world significance, there is emerging an international jurisprudence on criminal law (and procedural hybrids to support and develop this) which require integrated analysis.3

Collective redress mechanisms for consumer claims seek both to allow legal systems to accommodate mass litigation without being overwhelmed and to enable litigation to be viable where individual claims would not be economic. The article maps a number of recent reforms and reform proposals relating to consumer collective redress at national level and comments on EU developments. It notes that there is insufficient recognition of the differences between schemes geared at managing mass litigation as opposed to those aimed at facilitating otherwise non-viable claims. There are however signs that a European style of collective redress procedure is developing, which emphasize the role of public authorities and consumer organizations as gatekeepers to collective redress. The EU is unlikely to be able to impose collective redress procedures on national civil procedures, but the EU could prompt Member States to reflect on the need for national reforms. There may be limited scope for an EU mechanism to address the problem of individually non-viable consumer claims. This would however have to address certain fundamental issues such as the opt-out mechanism, cy-près distribution and funding if consumer organizations are to be encouraged to bring such actions. At a legal doctrinal level, it is interesting to note the influence of comparative studies on policy development within Member States as well as at the EU level.