A lecturer on the Alabama claims and the Geneva Tribunal of 1871–2, like a director of Hamlet, has to accept one inescapable fact: that everyone knows, broadly at least, how the story ends. There can be no reliance on suspense to sustain interest in the narrative. So I shall begin at the end.

Can a military occupation-and all the responsibilities of an occupying power as laid down in the laws of war—end at a single moment in time, and without the actual departure of the foreign military forces involved? This is the core question posed by the planned twin events of 28 June 2004 in Iraq: (1) the assumption of full authority by the sovereign Interim Government of Iraq, and(2) the proclaimed end of the US-led occupation of Iraq that had begun during the war of March-April 2003.

Following a dispute with his black neighbour, a white man in Virginia erects and ignites a crude home-made cross on the neighbouřs lawn. The white man is convicted under a law prohibiting intimidation by use of a burning cross.

The E-commerce Directive1 has introduced a country of origin rule2 for the provision of online services (‘information society services’). This means in principle that service providers are only subject to the rules of their country of origin or home country, ie the country where they are established. The country to which they are providing the services to, the country of destination, must refrain from applying its regulations. For regulators this means that they must not applytheir national regulations to services provided from another Member State3 (‘incoming services’).Likewise they must extend national regulation to services provided to residents in another MemberState (‘outgoing services’).

The ‘selling arrangement’ is a judicial device which removes national law from thescrutiny of European Community law relating to the free movement of goods. National provisions affecting the marketing of products may fall for consideration as ‘selling arrangements’ where the treatment of the domestic and imported goods has been even handed. Measures relating to the substance of the goods remain subject to Community law rules on the free movement of goods. The prime example of the selling arrangement is the advertisement, but in the years since creation, other areas of national activity with respect to the free movement of goods have been enveloped inthe selling arrangement. Certain measures which have related to the conduct of business may also fall for similar treatment as selling arrangements. A recent development would appear tomean that the concept of the selling arrangement may apply where the obligation imposed by the national measure has beenidentified as being general, as opposed to specific in nature. Were this to be so, the selling arrangement would have the potential to break free of the traditional boundaries established for itunder Criminal Proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard.1

Over the past 30 years, sub-state national societies in a number of developed liberal democracies—particularly Quebec, Catalonia, and Scotland within Canada, Spain, and the United Kingdom respectively—have both reasserted their national distinctiveness and demanded recognition of it in constitutional terms.1 This re-emergence of sub-state national sentiment within industrially advanced States, and the struggle for constitutional change which has accompanied it, are considered by many observers to be strangely incongruous at a time of economic and cultural ‘globalization’ where the power of the nation- State itself seems to be waning.2 Why do sub-state nations, the common refrain asks, seek statehood when the very concept of State sovereignty is losing its meaning? This article will argue, however, that the rise of sub-state nationalism even at a time when the resilience of State sovereignty is itself coming into question, is in fact not as paradoxical as it might at first appear, at least insofar as this process is taking place within developed democracies.3 It will be contended that the elaborate constitutional programmes which are now beingadvanced by sub-state nationalist movements for the reform of their respective host States are inmany respects informed by, and reflective of, wider transformations in the patterns of State sovereignty.

It was Oliver Wendell Holmes who used the words ‘clear and present danger’ in the judgment of the US Supreme Court in the Schenk case in 1919.1 The Court upheld the conviction of Charles Schenk, general secretary of the American Socialist Party, under the 1917 Espionage Act, which prohibited attempts to obstruct military recruitment. Schenk had distributed leaflets allegedly calculated to cause insubordination and obstruction among recruits. He argued that his conviction was incompatible with the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.

In 1769, by a nice coincidence, Captain James Cook made landfall in New Zealand, the first British mariner to do so, and William Blackstone published the final volume of his Commentaries on the Law of England. Blackstoněs discussion of the application of the law of Englandto newly acquired colonies is not completely coherent, but it does give a strong sense that much, if not all, of the common law did come to apply to many, if not all, of them.1 The Privy Council was reminded of this, with express reference to Blackstone, in November 2003 when it was asked to determine whether the rule in Smith v Selwyn,2 a decision of the English Court of Appeal given in 1914, was part of the law of Jamaica.3

Lord Goff formulated the first stage of his classic test in the Spiliada in the following terms: ‘the basic principle is that a stay will only be granted on the ground of forum non conveniens where the court is satisfied that there is some available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the action’ (emphasis added).

Vaughan Lowe has recently argued that the most important task of international lawyers at times of flux is to identify claims with precision.1 In order to accomplish this task with regard to the issue of use of force in Iraq, it seems necessary to review the main American and British arguments, including the formal legal arguments presented, as well as the relevant reactions of other States over a longer period of time. This will allow us to reveal patterns of argumentation, similarities, and differences in the American and British justifications as well as in the responses of the international community.