Once upon a time, a Professor of European Institutions, at least if a lawyer by training, could simply assert that the European Communities are based on the rule of law, that they create institutions with autonomous powers, which are able to issue legislation binding as law throughout every member State of the Community, and that they create courts which have power to exercise judicial control over a complex network of relationships between the Community institutions, the member States and private citizens. While these statements are still true, however, they must now be laced in a rather more complex context. Furthermore, there is a contrast between on the one hand the intensification (to borrow a word from the Common Agricultural Policy) of certain fundamenta s of the EC legal order in the recent case law of the European Court, and on the other hand attempts by member States to escape this through non-EC forms of cooperation in the framework of the European Union, the development of the idea that not all the rules of the EC Treaty apply to all the member States, and the entry by the majority of the member States into a separate Treaty, the Schengen Agreement, dealing with matters which might be thought to fall under the EC Treaty or the Home Affairs and Justice pillar of the Treaty on European Union—all of which might generically be referred to as variable geometry. In the other direction, it may be observed that large amounts of substantive

As a method for resolving commercial disputes which have connections with two or more countries, arbitration has been given a tremendous boost this century by two developments at the international level. The New York Convention of 1958—which was first implemented in England and Wales by the Arbitration Act 1975—introduced a regime which went a long way toward ensuring that arbitration agreements are respected and that arbitral awards are easily enforceable. The Convention has been hugely successful in that it has been ratified by upwards of 90 States, including all the countries of Western Europe (with the exception of Iceland) and nearly all countries which are significant commercial centres. More indirect has been the influence of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which was adopted by UNCITRAL in 1985. Although the Model Law, which seeks to encourage States to modernise their arbitration laws, has not been enacted by a very large number of countries, it has had a significant impact in that it has set an agenda for reform—even for those countries which have decided not to enact it. The Model Law has become “a yardstick by which to judge the quality of… existing arbitration legislation and to improve it”.

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a one-superpower world have brought about what one may call the resurrection of the Security Council and a reactivation of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Powers of a coercive nature vested by the Charter in the Security Council which for decades seemed like a dead letter have been rediscovered since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Security Council, which until then had been deadlocked through the threat or use of the veto, has now come alive. Up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 the Security Council had passed 659 resolutions in its 45 years of existence. In the six years since then it has passed over 400 resolutions. What is more important, however, is that mandatory sanctions, which until 1990 had been ordered only twice—the comprehensive sanctions on Rhodesia and arms embargo on South Africa—have since been used by the Security Council in relation to at least eleven countries. This new and increased activity of the Security Council has provoked debate in recent years as to whether the Council is subject to any limitations when it is acting to maintain or restore international peace and security. The problem has shifted from one of trying to get the Council to work as it was intended, to one of trying to control the work of the Council. In particular there has been renewed interest in the question whether there is any room for judicial control, by the International Court of Justice, of decisions made by the political organs of the United Nations.

Lord Casey's sad testament to an organisation which was perceived as “on the way to becoming not much more than a paper connection” is hardly encouraging to someone intent on studying the institution. It would appear that the Commonwealth of Nations as a contemporary discussion point is even less fashionable today than it was 30 years ago. It has recently been written that in our generation those few individuals with an opinion about the Commonwealth view it as an “anachronistic organization whose retirement to the pages of history is long overdue”. The situation of an Australian attempting to write about the Commonwealth is confused by the need to distinguish it from the “Commonwealth of Australia” by such adjectives as the “British” Commonwealth or the “Commonwealth of Nations”.

The history of clashes over extraterritorial jurisdiction between the United States of America and other States in the Americas, Europe and elsewhere is a long one. That history is commonly traced back to the antitrust claims arising from the Alcoa case in 1945, in which the “effects” doctrine was advanced in the peculiar and objectionable form in which it is applied, not simply to acts which constitute elements of a single offence but which occur in different jurisdictions but, rather, to the economic repercussions of acts in one State which are felt in another. The conflict persisted into the 1950s, with the clashes over US regulation of the international shipping and paper industries. In the 1960s and 1970s there were further clashes in relation to the extraterritorial application of US competition laws, notably in disputes over shipping regulation and the notorious Uranium Antitrust litigation, in which US laws were applied to penalise the extraterritorial conduct of non-US companies, conducted with the approval of their national governments, at a time when those companies were barred by US law from trading in the United States. It was that litigation which was in large measure responsible for the adoption in the United Kingdom of the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, which significantly extended the powers which the British government had asserted in the 1952 Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act to defend British interests against US extraterritorial claims.

On 2 November 1994 the Human Rights Committee adopted General Comment No.24(52) relating to reservations made on ratification or accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is addressed to States party to the Covenant and indicates the manner in which reservations to Covenant guarantees will be treated. The fact that the Committee has issued a general comment on the topic of reservations is clear expression of the Committee's concerns regarding the number and scope of reservations which have been made. In its view these threaten to undermine the effective implementation of the Covenant as well as impair the performance of the Committee in respect of the subject matter to which the reservations apply. Though not as seriously afflicted by reservations as some other human rights treaties, most notably the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Covenant has nonetheless been the object of some sweeping reservations to which few objections have been made. There is the concern that the integrity of the Covenant may have been sacrificed in order to ensure widespread participation. “Indeed”, suggests Higgins, “one might almost say that there is a collusion to allow penetrating and disturbing reservations to go unchallenged.”

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted by the 18th Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity in Nairobi in 1981, which came into force in 1986, provided for a single commission with a wide range of powers in respect of the rights in the Charter. This was as a result of an initiative for an African regional mechanism for the protection of human rights by African jurists and subsequent conferences in the 1960s and 1970s, many of which were organised by the United Nations. In these debates several possibilities were raised for the form that such a body should take: from a proposal for several commissions, given the disparate and diverse cultural and political nature of African States a court, a specialised commission within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), to a single commission. Not only was its structure contentious but also its functions, in particular whether these should include a protective as well as a promotional mandate and what such protective powers should be.

In a previous issue of this Quarterly Colin Warbrick gave an exposition of the British Order in Council (The United Nations (International Tribunal) (Former Yugoslavia) Order 1996) which implements Security Council Resolution 827. This note gives an alternative view of the scope and legality of that Order.

Why. it may be said, should anyone want to raise objection to the Order in Council implementing Resolution 827 when it merely introduced a procedure which ensures war criminals (whether Serb, Croat, or Bosnian) seeking refuge in Britain are promptly handed over to face justice?

The answer is that, whilst the immediate purpose of the Order in Council may be unobjectionable, the means by which it has been achieved are out of proportion to that purpose, and open the door to further unconsidered transfers of national powers.

There is a tendency to divide legal development into historical stages, to say how wrong and befuddled we were in the past and to describe how we came finally to see the light. This inclination is particularly evident in the area of enforcement of judgments given by courts of foreign countries (in this article the term “foreign judgments” is confined to such judgments). Before the turn of this century, the main bases for enforcement were the concept of “comity” and the doctrine of “sovereignty”. These were criticised by later generations of lawyers who were uncomfortable with the vagueness of the terms and who could not agree on what they meant and how they should be used. In modern times positivist bases have been substituted in their place. So we had the “vested rights” theory, which did not last long as it was soon overshadowed by the “obligation” rationalisation. Most writers accept and, in their account of the theory of the law in this area, do not attempt to go beyond these words of Blackburn J: “The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction over the defendant imposes a duty or obligation on him to pay the sum for which judgment is given, which the courts in [the country of enforcement] are bound to enforce.”

An earlier note in this series' gave an account of the normalisation of relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina and the establishment of co-operative arrangements relating to fisheries in 1990. The present note focuses on the establishment of co-operative arrangements for seabed resources in 1995. It also gives a brief account of the extension of maritime jurisdiction around South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands in 1993. First, in order to set the co-operative arrangements for seabed resources in context, a brief recapitulation of the cooperative arrangements for fisheries and their operation in practice since 1990 will be given. The map appended to the article illustrates and enlarges on the text.