1. See, for a prominent display of that tendency. Read. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the Common Law Units of the British Commonwealth (1938), chap.II.

2. By “foreign judgments”, I do not include a judgment that is given in another province or State but within the same country. Different policy considerations may well apply to interprovincial or inter-State enforcement. See Swan, , “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A Statement of Principle”, in Springman, and Gertner, (Eds), Debtor-Creditor Law, Practice and Doctrine (1985). chap.16. According to the Canadian Supreme Court in Morgnard Investments LtdGoogle Scholar v. De Savoye (1990) 76 D.L.R. (4th) 256.210. it is a serious error to transpose the rules developed for the enforcement of foreign judgments to the enforcement of judgments from sister provinces.

3. See e.g. the theoretical explanations in Collins et al. Dicey & Morris on the Conflict of Laws (12th edn, 1993). Vol.1, pp.455–456Google Scholar: North, and Fawcett, . Cheshire & North's Private International Law (12th edn. 1992). p.346.Google Scholar

4. Schibsby v. Westenholz (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 155, 159 (words in brackets added). See also similar formulations in Kussellv. Smyth (1842) 9 M. & W. 810.818 and 819; Williams v. Jones (1845) 13 M. & W. 628: Codard v. Gray (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 139. 148–149.

5. See generally von Mehren and Trautman. “Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach” (1968) 81 Harv.L.R. 1601. 1603–1604; Casard. “Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose Law?” (1984) 70 Iowa L.R. 53, Part II.

6. For instance, it cannot be gainsaid that the concerns of international relations hinted at in the term “comity” are as much alive today as they were in the past, if not more.

7. Cap.264, 1985 rev. edn.

8. This is a general statement. For the details, see Ho, H. L.. “Problems of Jurisdiction and of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards in Singapore and Malaysia”, soon to be published in Teo et al..(Eds). Current Legal Issues in International Commercial Litigation.Google Scholar

9. Cf. Yntema, , “The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law” (1935) 33 Mich.L.R. 1129, 1142.Google Scholar

10. A strong proponent of this theory is Read. loc. cit. supra n.l.

11. On the distinction between the two theories, see Collins et al.. Dicey & Morris on the Conflict of Laws (11th edn. 1987). p.421.Google Scholar

12. Wolff recognised this long ago: Private International Law (2nd edn. 1950). p.251. Yntema is of like mind: see his review of Read. op. cit. supra n. 1, in (1940) 49 Yale L.J. 1134, 1349. See also Casard, op. cit. supra n.5, at p.58.Google Scholar

13. It may be argued that by instituting or participating in the trial at the foreign jurisdiction the parties have “impliedly agreed” to be bound by the foreign judgment. But in most cases the defendant cannot realistically be said to have agreed to have the dispute adjudicated in the foreign State. The implied agreement explanation is clearly inconsistent with the fact that the default nature of a foreign judgment does not. in most legal systems, affect its enforceability. See Lorenzen. “The Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad” (1919–1920) 29 Yale L.J. 188.190.

14. The idea is that a person in a foreign territory owes allegiance to its sovereign, which allegiance entails an obligation to respect the judgments given by the courts of the sovereign. in exchange for an obligation by the sovereign to ensure the personal safety and well-being of the foreigner during his stay. See Carrick v. Hancock (1895) 12 T.L.R. 59. This idea obviously cannot be taken too seriously. As the Court of Appeal noted in Adams v. Cape Industries [1990] 1 Ch. 433, 553. “the idea that… a foreign company of manufacturers, present in the United Kingdom for a few days only through having set up a stall at an exhibition, thereby incurred a duty of fealty to the King-Emperor is surely fanciful”. The Court also noted that the rights and duties acquired by a foreigner who is physically present in a country are not necessarily the same as those which apply to the local citizens and that they do not arise reciprocally with the sovereign.

15. These criticisms were powerfully made by Smit, “International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States” (1962) 44 U.C.L.A. L.R. 45.55.

16. Infra n.49.

17. It is instructive that in the leading case of Godard v. Gray, supra n.4, at p.148, Blackburn J's formulation of the obligation theory was preceded by an acknowledgement that: “It is not an admitted principle of the law of nations that a state is bound to enforce within its territories the judgment of a foreign tribunal.”

18. See Caffrey, International Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the LA WASIA Region: A Comparative Study of the Laws of Eleven Asian Countries Inter-se and with the EEC Countries (1985). p.42: Sack, . “Conflicts of Laws in the History of English Law”, in Reppy (Ed.). Law—A Century of Progress 1835–1935 (1937). pp.384–385Google Scholar: Read, op. cit. supra n.l. at pp.113–115.Google Scholar

19. As Borm-Reid, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments” (1954) 3 I.C.L.Q. 49, 53 has observed, “conclusiveness… originate[s] from … the conception that a foreign judgment creates a legal obligation which is itself a sufficient reason for its recognition”.

20. (1917)15 S.S.L.R.33.

21. Assuming that the Singapore court had jurisdiction.

22. That the Singapore provision which rendered void a gaming or wagering contract (i.e. s.7 of the Civil Law Ordinance) would have applied to the case was rejected by Woodward J in the Court of Appeal, but he extended his reasoning on the assumption of its applicability: supra n.20. at p.73.

23. Idem. p.76.

24. See generally Hinsley, Sovereignly (2nd edn, 1986)Google Scholar: Alan, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (1986); Wildhaber, . “Sovereignty and International Law”, in Macdonald, and Johnston, (Eds), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory (1986)Google Scholar: Steinberger, . “Sovereignty”, in Bernhardt, (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law (1987), Vol.10, pp.397–418; Philpott, “Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History” (1995) 48 J.Int. Affairs 353.Google Scholar

25. All Roman cities came under one emperor and we are told that one province would readily execute judgments rendered in another province: Lenhoff, “Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: A Historical-Critical Analysis” (1956) 14 Louisiana L.R. 465, 476–477; Caffrey, . op. cit. supra n.18, at p.40Google Scholar; Ehrenzweig, , A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1962), p. 161, n.2Google Scholar: John, Voet, Commentary on the Pandects (1829. Paris edn). trans, by Gane, (1955), Book I, Title 4. App. s.8. p.103Google Scholar; Lorenzen. “Huber's De Conflictu Legum” (1918–1919) 13 Ill.L.R. 375, 392. But this freedom of cross-provincial enforcement was probably not as general as it has been made out to be and was. in all likelihood, restricted to certain types of judgment: see e.g. Digest. Book XLII, title 1. s.15(l).

26. “According to the earlier writers.” noted Lorenzen. op. cit. supra n.13. at p.188. n.l, “foreign judgments could be executed without the necessity of a new action or proceeding. Their attitude was based upon the theory that the Roman law governed all civilized countries which imposed a natural duty to recognize and enforce such judgments The modern rule arose only with the development of the doctrine of the independence of the different states.”Google Scholar

27. On how European doctrines of international law, and the concept of sovereignty in particular, were imported into the Malay Peninsula, see Rubin. The International Personality of the Malay Peninsula (1974). esp. pp.55–64.Google Scholar

28. Which is unsurprising, given the history of the struggle. See e.g. Lockyer, Habsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470–1720 (1987).

29. On this distinction see e.g. Suganami. “Grotius and International Equality”, chap.7 in Bull. Kingsbury, and Roberts, (Eds). Hugo Grotius and International Relations (1990). at p.231.Google Scholar

30. So noted Max Huber in The Island of Palmas arbitration UNRlAA 2 829, 838 (1928): “Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.”

31. A freedom which is subject to international law. The subjection of a State to international law is in principle not a negation of its independence. As Anzilotti noted in his individual opinion in the Austro-Cerman Customs Regime case (1931) P.C.IJ. Ser.A/B. no.41 p.58. “the restrictions upon a State's liberty, whether arising out of ordinary international law or contractual engagements, do not as such in the least affect its independence”.

32. According to Grotius's definition. “That power is called sovereign whose actions are not subject to the legal control of another”: De Jure Belli ac Pac Libri Tres (1625). Book 1. chap.3. s.7: trans, by Kelsey. 1964 Oceana reprint. Vol.2, at p.102. Related to the concept of sovereignty, in the sense of independence, is the doctrine of equality of States. The two are linked: to borrow the dictum, uttered in a different context, of the Roman jurist Paulus (quoted by Voet. op. cit. supra n.25. at s.7. p. 102): “An equal possesses no sovereignty or power of compulsion over an equal.”

33. This sort of sentiment probably explains the past French hostility to foreign judgments: Art.l 21 of a 1629 ordinance, the Code Michaud (which had ceased to be the law since the Napoleonic codification), requires that the action be relitigated in France. See Ehrenzweig. op. cit. supra n.25. at p.161, n.6; Nadelmann, “Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What to Do about It” (1957) 42 Iowa L.R. 236. 238, 242–244. That position remains in some countries. In the Netherlands foreign judgments cannot generally be enforced in the absence of a relevant treaty; the action has to be retried before a Dutch court: see Kollewijn, . American-Dutch Private International Law (2nd edn. 1961), chap.6. So too apparently in Norway. Austria, and Indonesia. See Gautama. “Problems Concerning Jurisdiction. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards in Indonesia”, soon to be published in Teo et al. op. cit. supra n.8.Google Scholar

34. Hence, de Vattel argues. “It is her province, or that of her sovereign to exercise justice in all the places under her jurisdiction.… Other nations ought to respect this right.… To undertake to examine the justice of a definitive sentence is an attack on the jurisdiction of him who has passed it”: The Law of Nations; or. Principles of the Law of Nature, applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns. Book 11, chap. VII. s.84: at p.l 65 of the Chitty translation of 1834.

35. Vide. Judicial Committee (Repeal) Act 1994. No.2 of 1994.

36. Cf. Alan, . op. cil. supra n.24. at pp.240–245.Google Scholar

37. That registration does not alter the foreign nature of the judgment was stressed by Lai J in Re Tan Patrick, ex p. Walter Peak Resorts Ltd (in receivership) [1994] 2 S.L.R. 728.733.

38. As Warren Khoo J observed in Re Cheah Theam Swee, ex p. Equiticorp Finance Group Lid & Anor [1996] 2 S.L.R. 76.82.

39. In as much as the terms of the judgment are not tampered with by the enforcing court although it may. of course, add costs. On the distinction between the direct and indirect sanction, cf. Westlake, . A Treatise on Private International Low (1859), pp.361–362.Google Scholar

40. This point was emphasised by those jurists who saw the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments as based upon comity. See e.g. Voet, op. cit. supra n.25. at s.7. p. 102.Google Scholar

41. USA v. Harden (1963)41 D.L.R. (2d) 721. esp. 725 (decision of the Supreme Court of Canada).

42. US v. Inkley [1989] 1 Q.B. 255.265.

43. Government of India v. Taylor [1955] A.C. 491.511: accepted by Lord Goff of Chieveley in In re Norway's Application (Nos.l & 2) (1990) 1 A.C. 723.807–808.

44. Raulin v. Fisher [1911] 2 K.B. 93; cf. AG of New Zealand v. Ortiz [1984] A.C. 1.

45. See generally Barry. “Comity” (1926) XII Virg.L.R. 353: Cheatham. “American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility” (1945) 58 Harv.L.R. 361, 373–378: MacAlister-Smith, . “Comity”, in Bernhardt, (Ed.). Encyclopedia of Public International Law (1984), Vol.7, pp.41–44Google Scholar: Mann, Foreign Affairs in English Courts (1986), chap.7; Lorenzen, loc. cit. supra n.25: Caffrey, . op. at. supra n.18. at pp.44–50.Google Scholar

46. On the relationship between foreign relations and conflict of laws in general, see Collins, “Foreign Relations and the Conflict of Laws” (1995–6) 6 K.C.L.J. 20. It is interesting to note that the law of enforcement of foreign judgments is treated in the American Institute's Third Restatement of the Law as part of the law of foreign relations: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987). Vol.1. Part IV, chap.8.

47. Although in earlier times there were occasional statements by judges to the contrary effect: e.g. Kennedy v. Cassillis (1818) 2 Swan. 313.326, citing a case decided by Lord Nottingham. Re Cottington, in 1678. The idea also had some currency among the early civilian (in particular, Dutch) jurists, such as Huber and Paul and John Voets: some common lawyers (among whom the most well-known is perhaps Story, Commentaries on the Conflicts of Laws (3rd edn. 1846). pp.47–48. s.38) also found favour with it. Huber was the most categorical in insisting (in his famous third axiom) that comity imposes an international obligation (albeit subject to qualifications). As to how he arrived at this conclusion see Watson. “Aspects of Reception of Law” (1996) 44 A.J.Comp.L. 334, 342. In the well-known US case of Hilton v. Guyot (1895) 159 U.S. 113.163–164. the Supreme Court treated “comity” as more than mere courtesy or goodwill but less than a legal obligation. See the criticisms of this case infra.Google Scholar

48. We may also ignore, for present purposes, the jurisdiction formerly exercised by the Admiralty and Eccelesiastical Courts of England.

49. See e.g. Godard v. Gray, supra n.4, at p. 148Google Scholar: Smit, . op. cit. supra n. 15, at p.53. Stevenson has. however, suggested (not persuasively) that public international law does provide some general guidance in the field of enforcement of foreign judgments: “The Relationship of Private International Law to Public International Law” (1952) 52 Col.L.R. 561.586.Google Scholar

50. (1895) 159 U.S. 113, 163–164. In the Canadian Supreme Court case of Morguard v. Savoye. supra n.2, at p.268. comity was said to be “the deference and respect due by other states to the actions of a state legitimately taken within its territory”.

51. Von, Mehren and Trainman, , op. cit. supra n.5. at p. 1603.Google Scholar

52. Smits, . op. cit. supra n.15. at p.54.Google Scholar

53. In Wier's case (1607) I Rolle. Abridgment 530. pl. 12. as trans, and cited in Sack, op. cit. supra n.18. at p.382. the enforcement of foreign judgments was based on the notion that “the justice of one nation should be aiding to the justice of another nation”.

54. Peterson. “Res Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments” (1963) 24 Ohio State L.J. 291.305.

55. See e.g. Ralli v. Angullia. supra n.20. at p.65 (middle para.).

56. (1893) 2 S.S.L.R. 12. 16. This was an obiter dictum.

57. Ibid.

58. J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government (1954 reprint), p.382.Google Scholar

59. This was highlighted by Profs. McClean and Patchett at para.2.04 of their Further Report on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments and the Service of Process within the Commonwealth. Chap.2 of that report is reproduced as working paper 12 in Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments and the Service of Process within the Commonwealth—A Report of a Working Meeting held at Basseterre, Si Kilts (1978) published by the Commonwealth Secretariat.

60. Quilling. “The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments and Arbitral Awards: North-South Perspective” (1981) 11 GaJ.lnt. & Comp.L. 635.

61. (1876)1 S.S.L.R.3.

62. Idem, p.5.

63. Idem, p.6.

64. (1890)3 S.L.J.27.

65. Idem, pp.31.32.

66. Idem, p.32.

67. Idem, p.33.

68. This famous observation was made in The Abidin Dover [1984] 1 A.C. 398.411.

69. The typical sentiment supporting reprisal is that expressed by Prof. Niboyet before a French government commission created for the reform of the French Civil Code: “It appears to me to be equitable and logical not to execute judgments for the benefit of foreigners when our judgments are not executed in their country.” The relevant minutes of the meeting are reported by Nadelmann. “Reprisals against American Judgments?” (1952) 65 Harv.L.R. 1184, 1186. Earlier in the minutes (Idem, p. 1185) Niboyet was recorded as having described the reciprocity requirement as “a weapon in the hands of the Government to obtain respect abroad for French decisions”.

70. See Martiny, . report on Federal Republic of Germany, in Platto, and Horton, (Eds), Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Worldwide (2nd edn. 1993). pp.188–189. A similar requirement may be found in other countries, such as Japan (idem, p.55) and Spain (but this is subject to international treaty: Idem, pp.202–203).Google Scholar

71. Nadelmann. op. cit. supra n.33, at p.249, in a historical survey, notes: “On the European continent, the denial of conclusive effect to foreign judgments by the courts in France and elsewhere produced the usual reaction in such circumstances: retaliatory legislation against the country or countries involved. But the repercussions were not limited to that. In numerous countries, recognition of foreign judgments was put on a reciprocity basis for all foreign judgments. The era of‘reciprocity’ was started, it is still with us.” See also supra n.33.

72. For instance, in the old English Admiralty case of Hughs v. Cornelius (1683) Raym. 473 the recognition of a sentence of the French Admiralty Court was explained on the basis that: “we ought to give credit to it. or else they will not give credit to the sentences of our Court of Admiralty” (also reported in 2 Show.K.B. 232). This fear of reprisal is linked to the desire for international legal stability. So it was reasoned, in rhetorical fashion, in Kennedy v. Cassillis. supra n.47, at p.326: “what right has one kingdom to reverse the judgment of another? And how can we refuse to let a sentence take place till it be reversed? And what confusion would follow in Christendom, if they should serve us so abroad, and give no credit to our sentences.” See also Voet, op. cit. supra n.25. at s. 12. p.l 11. It was the same fear that prompted the birth in the US of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act in 1966: Homburger. “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments—A New Yorker Reflects on Uniform Acts” (1970) 18 AJ.Comp.L. 367.369–370.

73. Russian Republic v. Cibmrio (1923) 235 N.Y. 255.258 (statement made in the context not of enforcement of foreign judgment but of recognition of foreign legislation), cited in Barry, op. cit. supra n.45, at p.359. Cf. Re An Arbitration between Hainan Machinery Import and Export Corporation and Donald & McArthy Pie Ltd [1996] 1 S.L.R. 34. 46 where a similar sentiment is expressed in the context of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards: “As a nation which itself aspires to be an international arbitration centre, Singapore must recognise foreign awards if it expects its own awards to be recognised abroad.”

74. Cf. Peterson, , op. cit. supra n.54. at p.307: “Any rule which tends to restrict the conclusive effect of foreign adjudication in American courts … tends to diminish the chances for recognition of American judgments in foreign courts.…rules which favor the recognition of foreign judgments will promote increased finality for American judgments abroad.”Google Scholar

75. Fastiff, “The Proposed Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments: A Solution to Butch Reynolds's Jurisdiction and Enforcement Problems” (1995) 28 Cornell Int.LJ. 469, 471–473, who complains that “the US litigants have a severe disadvantage in the global legal system”, observes: “The US federal and state judiciaries will enforce any judgment that is valid and fair, but foreign countries are reticent to enforce US federal and state judgments. Thus, foreign plaintiffs easily have their judgments satisfied against US defendants, but US plaintiffs are often left with empty judgments.”

76. See ibid: Arthur von Mehren, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague Conference?” (1994) 57 L. and Contemp. Probs. 271; Lowenfeld. “Thoughts about a Multinational Judgments Convention: A Reaction to the von Mehren Report” (1994) 57 L. and Contemp. Probs. 289.

77. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations” (1986) 40 Int. Organisation I. The term “specific reciprocity” is his: Idem, pp.8–10.

78. On “reciprocity” see Lenhoff. loc. cit. supra n.25, and “Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea” (1954) 49 N.W.L.R. 619 (Part I). 752 (Part II): Nadelmann, loc. cit. supra n.69.

79. As the English Court of Appeal noted in Adams v. Cape, supra n.14, at p.552, the “courts have never thought it necessary to investigate what reciprocal rights of enforcement are conceded by the foreign country”.Google Scholar

80. Cf. Société Coopérative Sidmetat v. Titan International Ltd [1966] 1 Q.B. 828. According to the headnote the court decided that the UK Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 is not based on the principle of reciprocity. But what the judgment had actually decided was that the jurisdictional grounds provided in the Act.are exhaustive. The court rejected the argument put forward on behalf of the judgment debtor that the English court ought to recognise a judgment of a Belgian court if the English court would claim equivalent jurisdiction for itself had the position of the two countries been reversed. (On this point see also Schibsby, supra n.4, at p. 159.) This case does not deny that, in deciding whether the Act should be extended to the judgments from a particular country, the primary consideration is whether that country is as liberal in enforcing English judgments.

81. Cap.264.1985 rev. edn, s.5(l).

82. Cap.265, 1985 rev. edn, s.3(l). This Act is presently “dormant”: it has not yet been extended to any country.

83. Revised 1972, Act 99. s.3(2).

84. In Singapore: s.12. Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. In Malaysia: s.9. Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958: this provision has been applied to Australia: Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments (Application of Section 9) Order 1994, PU(A)73. which took effect from 27 June 1993.

85. Homburger. op. cit. supra n.72. at pp.384.390. The danger of this approach is “that it may be thought to invite decision of particular cases on the basis of political bias rather than on the merits”: Peterson, loc. cit. supra n.54. This point is nicely illustrated, albeit in the context of enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, in the Malaysian case of Harris Adacom Corporation v. Perkom Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 M.L J. 504. The business debt was conceded but the award debtor sought to resist enforcement, inter alia, on the ground of public policy. In Malaysia trade with Israel is prohibited and it was alleged (but ultimately not proved) that the plaintiff was controlled by an Israeli company.

86. Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Committee Report 1932 (Cmnd 4213), reprinted in Butterworths Jurisdiction, Foreign Judgments and Awards Handbook (1994), pp.356et seq.Google Scholar

87. Idem, p.366 and also p.359. Similarly, Greer LJ noted in Yukon Consolidated Gold Corporation v. Clark [1938] 2 K.B. 241, 253: “It was … fully appreciated by those who thought about foreign judgments, that British judgments were never enforced as of right in foreign countries, and that was believed, and rightly believed, to operate as an injustice to this country. Whereas we enforced foreign judgments by means of action in this country, foreign countries refused to enforce the judgments obtained in this country, and it was to deal with that situation that the statute of 1933 was passed.”

88. Report, Idem, p.367.

89. Caffrey, , op. cit. supra n.18, at pp.41, 49, 58, has brought these considerations to the forefront of his analysis.Google Scholar

90. Interdependence, as a matter of fact, is reflected e.g. in the increase in influence and power of international (especially trade) organisations and the closer integration of the EU.

91. For instance, many environmental problems call for international solutions: Wild- haber, óp. cit. supra n.24, at p.444.

92. Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations” (1993) 47 Int. Organisation 139.

93. As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Morguard, supra n.2, at p.270: “The business community operates in a world economy and we correctly speak of a world community even in the face of decentralised political and legal power. Accommodating the flow of wealth, skills and people across state lines has now become imperative.”Google Scholar

94. This conflict is noted by Wildhaber, op. cit. supra n.24, at p.440: “The legal orders of the sovereign states are anchored to defined territories. The territoriality of these legal orders conflicts strangely with the transterritoriality of the economy and the multinational corporations… and a host of other factors.” The challenge of the future is how we should go about in the “unbundling of territoriality”: Ruggie. loc. cit. supra n.92.Google Scholar

95. And this interest is sometimes reflected in the judgments. See e.g. the approach taken by Wood, JC in Rawan Tin Mining, supra n.64, at p.32Google Scholar, and by Sproule J in Ho Hong Bank Ltd v. Ho Kai Neo & Anor [1932] M.LJ. 76. The growth of England's foreign trade in the 17th century accentuated the need for legal protection, at home, of its traders' claims and this was what prompted English judges to recognise and enforce foreign judgments: Sack. op. cit. supra n.18, at pp.381–382; Holdsworth, , History of English Law (1938 reprint), Vol.XI, pp.269–270.Google Scholar

96. Quilling, op. cit. supra n.60. at p.642. gives other examples: failure to give effect to foreign judgments may lead to loss of credit or imposition of economic sanctions or may affect aid applications.

97. As Sack, op. cit. supra n.18, at p.381, noted, “the economic and financial relations of England with foreign countries were growing, and they needed legal protection in England”.Google Scholar

98. See para.l of the Report, op. cit. supra n.86, at pp.331et seq.Google Scholar

99. See P. Jenard, Council Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (1979) OJ. C59/1, 3 (5 Mar.).

100. McClean and Patchett, op. cit. supra n.59, at chap.2. para.2.01. See the similar view expressed by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee in its report Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, p.9.

101. Supra n.56.

102. Idem p.13.

103. The difference between English and American views on the issue is reflected in the exchange between Lowe, “Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980” (1981) 75 AJ.I.L. 257, and Lowenfeld “Sovereignty. Jurisdiction, and Reasonableness: A Reply to A. V. Lowe” (1981) 75 A.J.I.L. 629.

104. Reese, “The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad” (1950) 50 Col.L.R. 783. 784; Caffrey, , op. cit. supra n.18, at pp.60–61Google Scholar; Yntema, . op. cii. supra n.9, at pp.1145–1146.Google Scholar

105. The leading judicial statement on this point is that of Roberts J in Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men‘s Ass’n (1931) 283 U.S. 522.525: “Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties.” This is also the policy that is identified in the Second Restatement of the Law (1946), Conflict of Laws 2d, Vol.1, comment on s.98, p.298.

106. Casard, , op. cit. supra n.5, at p.59Google Scholar; Swan, . op. cit. supra n.2. at chap. 16. p.692.Google Scholar

107. Peterson, , op. cit. supra n.54. at p.306.Google Scholar

108. Cf. Morguard, supra n.2; Briggs. “Foreign Judgments: More Surprises” (1992) 109 L.Q.R. 549, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (1993), pp.259–260.Google Scholar

109. Supra n.81.s.3(5).

110. Supra n.83. s.7. There is a similar provision in the Singapore Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, supra n.82, s.7.

111. But ironically, on a literal reading of the relevant provisions, he may be allowed to relitigate the original cause of action: Marasinghe. “The Recognition and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments” (1985) 12 Jurnal Undang Undang 197, 206. This is odd. From the policy viewpoint relitigation is likely to take up more judicial resources than bringing an action on the foreign judgment, and hence the reason for excluding it is stronger.

112. But the Malaysian Federal Court has held that a foreign custody order is not conclusive: Mahabir Prasad v. Mahabir Prasad [1981] 2 M.L.J. 326.

113. Ralli v. Angullia, supra n.20, at p.65, approving of Dicey's formulation. Woodward J identified these possible bases for this doctrine of conclusiveness: the doctrine of estoppel or res judicata or because the enforcement court would not sit as a Court of Appeal from the foreign court (idem. p.67). See also Rawan Tin Mining, supra n.64, at p.29; Munigappa Chettiar v. Krishnappa Chetiiar & Others (1940) 9 M.LJ. 200, 204. There are some dicta which suggest that a foreign judgment would not be enforced in Singapore if it contains a manifest error on its face: Kader Nina Merican v. Kader Meydin (1876) 1 S.S.L.R. 3. 6; Ralli. idem. p. 102.Google Scholar

114. Anthinarayana Mudaliar v. Ajit Singh (1953) 19 M.L.J. 229.230.

115. Muttiah v. Chang Kiam Ho (1933) 2 M.L.J. 239.239–240: Ralli v. Angullia. supra n.20. at p.37. Cf. Ho Hong Bank, supra n.95, at p.82.

116. Op. cit. supra n. 15, at p.62. Prof. Smit further argues that our interests in finality would vary according to the type of foreign judgment. For example, finality is especially important in relation to judgments on personal status since, on that matter, our interest in certainty and stability is great.