Candida auris infections continue to occur across the United States and abroad, and healthcare facilities that care for vulnerable populations must improve their readiness to respond to this emerging organism. We aimed to identify and better understand challenges faced and lessons learned by those healthcare facilities who have experienced C. auris cases and outbreaks to better prepare those who have yet to experience or respond to this pathogen.

Semi-structured qualitative interviews.

Health departments, long-term care facilities, acute-care hospitals, and healthcare organizations in New York, Illinois, and California.

Infectious disease physicians and nurses, clinical and environmental services, hospital leadership, hospital epidemiology, infection preventionists, emergency management, and laboratory scientists who had experiences either preparing for or responding to C. auris cases or outbreaks.

In total, 25 interviews were conducted with 84 participants. Interviews were coded using NVivo qualitative coding software by 2 separate researchers. Emergent themes were then iteratively discussed among the research team.

Key themes included surveillance and laboratory capacity, inter- and intrafacility communication, infection prevention and control, environmental cleaning and disinfection, clinical management of cases, and media concerns and stigma.

Many of the operational challenges noted in this research are not unique to C. auris, and the ways in which we address future outbreaks should be informed by previous experiences and lessons learned, including the recent outbreaks of C. auris in the United States.

In response to the 2013–2016 Ebola virus disease outbreak, the US government designated certain healthcare institutions as Ebola treatment centers (ETCs) to better prepare for future emerging infectious disease outbreaks. This study investigated ETC experiences and critical care policies for patients with viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF).

A 58-item questionnaire elicited information on policies for 9 critical care interventions, factors that limited care provision, and innovations developed to deliver care.

The questionnaire was sent to 82 ETCs.

We analyzed ordinal and categorical data pertaining to the ETC characteristics and descriptive data about their policies and perceived challenges. Statistical analyses assessed whether ETCs with experience caring for VHF patients were more likely to have critical care policies than those that did not.

Of the 27 ETCs who responded, 17 (63%) were included. Among them, 8 (47%) reported experience caring for persons under investigation or confirmed cases of VHF. Most felt ready to provide intubation, chest compressions, and renal replacement therapy to these patients. The factors most cited for limiting care were staff safety and clinical futility. Innovations developed to better provide care included increased simulation training and alternative technologies for procedures and communication.

There were broad similarities in critical care policies and limitations among institutions. There were several interventions, namely ECMO and cricothyrotomy, which few institutions felt ready to provide. Future studies could identify obstacles to providing these interventions and explore policy changes after increased experience with novel infectious diseases, such as COVID-19.

We quantitatively assessed the fit failure rate of N95 respirators according to the number of donning/doffing and hours worn.

Experimental study.

A tertiary-care referral center in South Korea.

In total, 10 infection control practitioners participated in the fit test.

The first experiment comprised 4 consecutive 1-hour donnings and fit tests between each donning. The second experiment comprised 2 consecutive 3-hour donnings and fit tests between each donning. The final experiment comprised fit tests after an 1-hour donning or a 2-hour donning.

For 1-hour donnings, 60%, 70%, and 90% of the participants had fit failures after 2, 3, and 4 consecutive donnings, respectively. For 3-hour donnings, 50% had fit failure after the first donning and 70% had failures after 2 consecutive donnings. All participants passed the fit test after refitting whenever fit failure occurred. The final experiment showed that 50% had fit failure after a single use of 1 hour, and 30% had fit failure after a single use of 2 hours.

High fit-failure rates were recorded after repeated donning and extended use of N95 respirators. Caution is needed for reuse (≥1 time) and extended use (≥1 hour) of N95 respirators in high-risk settings such as those involving aerosol-generating procedures. Although adequate refitting may recover the fit factor, the use of clean gloves and strict hand hygiene afterward should be ensured when touching the outer surfaces of N95 respirators for refitting.

Due to shortages of N95 respirators during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, it is necessary to estimate the number of N95s required for healthcare workers (HCWs) to inform manufacturing targets and resource allocation.

We developed a model to determine the number of N95 respirators needed for HCWs both in a single acute-care hospital and the United States.

For an acute-care hospital with 400 all-cause monthly admissions, the number of N95 respirators needed to manage COVID-19 patients admitted during a month ranges from 113 (95% interpercentile range [IPR], 50–229) if 0.5% of admissions are COVID-19 patients to 22,101 (95% IPR, 5,904–25,881) if 100% of admissions are COVID-19 patients (assuming single use per respirator, and 10 encounters between HCWs and each COVID-19 patient per day). The number of N95s needed decreases to a range of 22 (95% IPR, 10–43) to 4,445 (95% IPR, 1,975–8,684) if each N95 is used for 5 patient encounters. Varying monthly all-cause admissions to 2,000 requires 6,645–13,404 respirators with a 60% COVID-19 admission prevalence, 10 HCW–patient encounters, and reusing N95s 5–10 times. Nationally, the number of N95 respirators needed over the course of the pandemic ranges from 86 million (95% IPR, 37.1–200.6 million) to 1.6 billion (95% IPR, 0.7–3.6 billion) as 5%–90% of the population is exposed (single-use). This number ranges from 17.4 million (95% IPR, 7.3–41 million) to 312.3 million (95% IPR, 131.5–737.3 million) using each respirator for 5 encounters.

We quantified the number of N95 respirators needed for a given acute-care hospital and nationally during the COVID-19 pandemic under varying conditions.

Understanding the extent of aerosol-based transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is important for tailoring interventions for control of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Multiple studies have reported the detection of SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid in air samples, but only one study has successfully recovered viable virus, although it is limited by its small sample size.

We aimed to determine the extent of shedding of viable SARS-CoV-2 in respiratory aerosols from COVID-19 patients.

In this observational air sampling study, air samples from airborne-infection isolation rooms (AIIRs) and a community isolation facility (CIF) housing COVID-19 patients were collected using a water vapor condensation method into liquid collection media. Samples were tested for presence of SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid using quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction (qRT-PCR), and qRT-PCR-positive samples were tested for viability using viral culture.

Samples from 6 (50%) of the 12 sampling cycles in hospital rooms were positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA, including aerosols ranging from <1 µm to >4 µm in diameter. Of 9 samples from the CIF, 1 was positive via qRT-PCR. Viral RNA concentrations ranged from 179 to 2,738 ORF1ab gene copies per cubic meter of air. Virus cultures were negative after 4 blind passages.

Although SARS-CoV-2 is readily captured in aerosols, virus culture remains challenging despite optimized sampling methodologies to preserve virus viability. Further studies on aerosol-based transmission and control of SARS-CoV-2 are needed.

We sought to contain a healthcare-associated coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak, to evaluate contributory factors, and to prevent future outbreaks.

Quasi-experimental cluster-control outbreak evaluation.

All patients and staff on the outbreak ward (case cluster), and randomly selected patients and staff on COVID-19 wards (positive control cluster) and a non-COVID-19 wards (negative control cluster) underwent reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing. Hand hygiene and personal protective equipment (PPE) compliance, detection of environmental SARS-COV-2 RNA, patient behavior, and SARS-CoV-2 IgG antibody prevalence were assessed.

In total, 145 staff and 26 patients were exposed, resulting in 24 secondary cases. Also, 4 of 14 (29%) staff and 7 of 10 (70%) patients were asymptomatic or presymptomatic. There was no difference in mean cycle threshold between asymptomatic or presymptomatic versus symptomatic individuals. None of 32 randomly selected staff from the control wards tested positive. Environmental RNA detection levels were higher on the COVID-19 ward than on the negative control ward (OR, 19.98; 95% CI, 2.63–906.38; P < .001). RNA levels on the COVID-19 ward (where there were no outbreaks) and the outbreak ward were similar (OR, 2.38; P = .18). Mean monthly hand hygiene compliance, based on 20,146 observations (over preceding year), was lower on the outbreak ward (P < .006). Compared to both control wards, the proportion of staff with detectable antibodies was higher on the outbreak ward (OR, 3.78; 95% CI, 1.01–14.25; P = .008).

Staff seroconversion was more likely during a short-term outbreak than from sustained duty on a COVID-19 ward. Environmental contamination and PPE use were similar on the outbreak and control wards. Patient noncompliance, decreased hand hygiene, and asymptomatic or presymptomatic transmission were more frequent on the outbreak ward.

Widespread testing for severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is necessary to curb the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), but testing is undermined when the only option is a nasopharyngeal swab. Self-collected swab techniques can overcome many of the disadvantages of a nasopharyngeal swab, but they require evaluation.

Three self-collected non-nasopharyngeal swab techniques (saline gargle, oral swab and combined oral-anterior nasal swab) were compared to a nasopharyngeal swab for SARS-CoV-2 detection at multiple COVID-19 assessment centers in Toronto, Canada. The performance characteristics of each test were assessed.

The adjusted sensitivity of the saline gargle was 0.90 (95% CI 0.86-0.94), the oral swab was 0.82 (95% CI, 0.72–0.89) and the combined oral–anterior nasal swab was 0.87 (95% CI, 0.77–0.93) compared to a nasopharyngeal swab, which demonstrated a sensitivity of ˜90% when all positive tests were the reference standard. The median cycle threshold values for the SARS-CoV-2 E-gene for concordant and discordant saline gargle specimens were 17 and 31 (P < .001), for the oral swabs these values were 17 and 28 (P < .001), and for oral–anterior nasal swabs these values were 18 and 31 (P = .007).

Self-collected saline gargle and an oral–anterior nasal swab have a similar sensitivity to a nasopharyngeal swab for the detection of SARS-CoV-2. These alternative collection techniques are cheap and can eliminate barriers to testing, particularly in underserved populations.

We aimed to identify a threshold number of Clostridioides difficile infections (CDI) for acute-care hospitals (ACHs) to notify public health agencies of outbreaks and we aimed to determine whether thresholds can be used with existing surveillance strategies to further infection reduction goals.

Descriptive analysis of laboratory-identified CDI reported to the National Healthcare Safety Network by Colorado and Tennessee ACH inpatient units in 2018.

Threshold levels of ≥2, ≥3, and ≥4 CDI events per calendar month per unit (unit month) were assessed to identify units that would trigger facility reporting to public health. Values meeting thresholds were defined as alerts. Recurrent alerts were defined as alerts from units meeting the threshold ≥2 times within 12 months. The presence of alerts was compared to the number of excess infections to identify high-burden facilities.

At an alert threshold of ≥2 CDI events per unit month, 204 alerts occurred among 43 Colorado ACHs and 290 among 78 Tennessee ACHs. At a threshold of ≥3, there were 59 and 61 alerts, and at a threshold of ≥4, there were 17 and 10 alerts in Colorado and Tennessee, respectively. In both Colorado and Tennessee, at a threshold of ≥3 nearly 50% of alerts were recurrent, and facilities with at least one alert in 2018 accounted for ∼85% of the statewide excess infections.

An alert threshold of ≥3 CDI events per unit month is feasible for rapid identification of outbreaks in ACHs. This threshold can facilitate earlier assessments and interventions in high-burden facilities.

To determine whether a hospital-wide universal gloving program resulted in increased hand hygiene compliance and reduced inpatient Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI) rates.

We carried out a multiple-year before-and-after quasi-experimental quality improvement study. Gloving and hand hygiene compliance data as well as hospital-acquired infection rates were prospectively collected from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2017, by secret monitors.

The University of Rochester Strong Memorial Hospital, an 849-bed quaternary-care teaching hospital.

All adult inpatients with the exception of patients in the obstetrics unit.

A hospital-wide universal gloving protocol was initiated on January 1, 2016.

Hand hygiene compliance increased from 68% in 2015 reaching an average of 88% by 2017 (P < .0002). A 10% increase in gloving per unit was associated with a 1.13-fold increase in the odds of hand hygiene (95% credible interval, 1.12–1.14). The rates of CDI decreased from 1.05 infections per 1,000 patient days in 2015 to 0.74 in 2017 (P < .04).

A universal gloving initiative was associated with a statistically significant increase in both gloving and hand hygiene compliance. CDI rates decreased during this intervention.

The purpose of this study was to describe the recent trends of invasive and noninvasive β-hemolytic Streptococcus cultures in the Veterans’ Affairs (VA) cohort from 2009 to 2018.

Retrospective cohort study from January 1, 2009, to January 1, 2019.

Veterans’ Affairs medical centers.

All patients aged 18 years and older with cultures positive for β-hemolytic Streptococcus at a VA facility were included in the study.

Data were retrieved from the VA Corporate Data Warehouse using structure query language through the SQL Server Management Studio software.

Between 2009 and 2018, there were 40,625 patients with cultures with β-hemolytic Streptococcus. The median age was 64 years (interquartile range [IQR], 55–71) and the median Charlson comorbidity index was 4 (IQR, 2–7). Distributions for each type of β-hemolytic Streptococcus based on site of culture are provided. The 30-day all-cause mortality rate from all invasive β-hemolytic Streptococcus cases was 2.3%, and the 90-day all-cause mortality rate was 4.4%. The 30- and 90-day all-cause mortality rates for Streptococcus cases were higher for group A (3.9% and 6.1% respectively) and for groups C and G combined (3.2% and 6.1%, respectively) than for group B (2.0% and 4.0%, respectively).

Trends of cultures for invasive and noninvasive β-hemolytic Streptococcus suggest an association with disease and mortality. The burden associated with β-hemolytic Streptococcus infections should not be underestimated.

To assess the effectiveness and acceptability of antimicrobial stewardship-focused implementation strategies on inpatient fluoroquinolones.

Stewardship champions at 15 hospitals were surveyed regarding the use and acceptability of strategies to improve fluoroquinolone prescribing. Antibiotic days of therapy (DOT) per 1,000 days present (DP) for sites with and without prospective audit and feedback (PAF) and/or prior approval were compared.

Among all of the sites, 60% had PAF or prior approval implemented for fluoroquinolones. Compared to sites using neither strategy (64.2 ± 34.4 DOT/DP), fluoroquinolone prescribing rates were lower for sites that employed PAF and/or prior approval (35.5 ± 9.8; P = .03) and decreased from 2017 to 2018 (P < .001). This decrease occurred without an increase in advanced-generation cephalosporins. Total antibiotic rates were 13% lower for sites with PAF and/or prior approval, but this difference did not reach statistical significance (P = .20). Sites reporting that PAF and/or prior approval were “completely” accepted had lower fluoroquinolone rates than sites where it was “moderately” accepted (34.2 ± 5.7 vs 48.7 ± 4.5; P < .01). Sites reported that clinical pathways and/or local guidelines (93%), prior approval (93%), and order forms (80%) “would” or “may” be effective in improving fluoroquinolone use. Although most sites (73%) indicated that requiring infectious disease consults would or may be effective in improving fluoroquinolones, 87% perceived implementation to be difficult.

PAF and prior approval implementation strategies focused on fluoroquinolones were associated with significantly lower fluoroquinolone prescribing rates and nonsignificant decreases in total antibiotic use, suggesting limited evidence for class substitution. The association of acceptability of strategies with lower rates highlights the importance of culture. These results may indicate increased acceptability of implementation strategies and/or sensitivity to FDA warnings.