The “eclectic method” in NT textual criticism is one of several disguises for the broad and basic problem of the “canons of criticism” or of the “criteria for originality” as applied to the various readings in the NT textual tradition, and in a real sense eclectic methodology—in its several forms as currently practised—is as much a symptom of basic problems in the discipline as it is a proposed and widely applied solution to those problems. By the same token, perhaps every methodological approach and even every discussion of methodology in NT textual criticism could be described as symptomatic of the problems; yet the eclectic method seems in a particularly pointed way to veil the problems of the discipline, for by its very nature it tries in one way or another to utilize all available approaches to textual problems, and in a single given case of seeking the original text it often wishes to apply to the problem several established text-critical criteria, even if these criteria have the appearance of being mutually exclusive or contradictory.

The account of Paul's sea journey from Caesarea to Rome, and of the shipwreck off Malta, is probably the “dramatic center” of Acts. It is the moving bridge between the mysterious scene of Christian origins and the awesome power of the Roman forum, and it is an adventure recounted with much more than Luke's usual amount of detail. The task of commenting on the passages in question (27:1-28:16) presents certain difficulties, since it is hard to decide whether Luke is being more litterateur than historian, or whether he is virtually reproducing a document rather than relating the events in his own way. Some scholars contend that the journey narrative has all the ingredients of a Hellenistic romance, while others hold that both the realism and the presence of “we passages” confirm its essential historicity. To complicate matters, there remains the possibility that Luke appropriated a travel story which was originally not about Paul at all, but about someone else who voyaged in the same direction. While these difficulties have encouraged a swell of critical exegesis, however, another problem has had the quite opposite effect.

In 1 Corinthians the apostle Paul is attempting to straighten out some people in his newly founded community who, by virtue of their possession of wisdom, were claiming a special spiritual status. Apparently they designated themselves as pneumatikoi in contrast with the psychikoi, or those of lesser religious achievement. By a careful reading of Paul's arguments in 1 Corinthians we can discern some of their key religious terminology and principles. On the basis of pertinent parallels to these terms and principles, especially in Hellenistic philosophical sources and Hellenistic Jewish texts, it is then possible to draw certain conclusions regarding the religious viewpoint of these Corinthians.

In the West, the best known Armenian Canon lists are those transmitted by Mechitar of Ayrivank˓, an Armenian savant of the thirteenth century (1222-1307 C.E.). The translation of these lists, which was first publicised in Europe by Theodor Zahn, has been reprinted in various works.

Much scholarly research has been devoted to the question: What issues divide gnostic Christians from the “ecclesiastical” Christians who are their contemporaries? Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons (c. 160 A.D.), whose writings constitute a major source for the investigation of gnosticism, defines the issues in terms of differences in doctrine. Irenaeus admits that the question is a difficult one, since the gnostic doctrines he intends to “expose and refute” are so similar to orthodox teaching that, he says, most Christians cannot differentiate between the two. Irenaeus insists, nevertheless, that the differences are crucial, since gnostic doctrines are false, spurious forms of genuine Christian teaching. Therefore he writes five volumes—The Exposure and Overthrow of Falsely-So-Called Gnosis—to help his fellow churchmen make this discrimination.

The classic debate between Erasmus and Luther over the role of the human will in conversion is only the most famous of several Reformation era disputes over several related soteriological and anthropological issues. As Reformation developed into Orthodoxy, Calvinists and Lutherans went to battle over the doctrines of double predestination and the perseverance of the saints. The debate over God's eternal decree remained a point of irritation between the two confessions throughout the early modern period even though within each confession differences on these doctrines surfaced during the course of the seventeenth century.

Ever since the Boston Church cast out Anne Hutchinson in 1638, the fact of her having “made a Lye” has stood without question. But why she told “soe horrible an Untruth and falshood,” or what it meant to her to do so, has not always been so clear. Part of the problem is an irony so deeply imbedded in the lie itself that it almost escapes notice: when Mrs. Hutchinson denied that she had held the erroneous opinions which countless people had heard her openly proclaim, she was inadvertently saying something about the relationship between thinking and speaking—something about language itself. That “something,” though neither she nor her adversaries could fully grasp or articulate it, was felt to be so subversive that the mere presence of its perpetrator in the community was deemed utterly intolerable: a dishonor to Jesus Christ and a “sine agaynst God” (385).

Recent scholarship on Jonathan Edwards has been quite attentive to his view that the true apprehension of reality is achieved through an integrated act of aesthetic perception in which the whole personality of the knower is engaged. It has also been suggested that Edwards viewed the mind as making an active contribution to perception itself. What has been lacking however, is a systematic explication of what Edwards believed to be the psychological mechanism of the mind's active role in experience. No doubt this lack is due, at least in part, to the fact that Edwards nowhere sets out whole a theory of mental activity. We believe, however, that operating in his system of thought is a very forward-looking conception of the creative process involved in aesthetic perception and in experience in general. We also believe that it is possible to piece together at least the principal aspects of that conception on the basis of Edwards's own discussions found at various places in his works. An understanding of that theory would not only help us in gaining a greater appreciation of Edwards's place in the history of modern aesthetics and epistemology; it may also throw some further light upon a number of interpretative issues emerging out of recent discussions of Edwards's thought. For example: Is it accurate to describe Edwards's “sense of the heart” as a “sixth sense”? Is Edwards a “mystic”? In exactly what sense did Edwards go beyond Locke? This essay aims to make a contribution toward the reconstruction of Edwards's theory of mental activity and its role in experience with a special emphasis upon its role in the perception of beauty. Our focus is on psychology, although some of the broader philosophical and theological underpinnings and ramifications will be discussed also.

In 1912, Ernst Troeltsch published a memorial review article for William James entitled “Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion.” This article which deals with James' The Varieties of Religious Experience is still the clearest succinct statement of James' position within the context of the general problems of Western philosophies of religion.