Over The Past Two Generations The United States Has Undergone a series of remarkable transformations. It has helped to defeat global communism, led a revolution in information technology that is fuelling unprecedented prosperity, invented life-saving treatments for diseases from AIDS to cancer, and made great strides in reversing discriminatory practices and promoting equal rights for all citizens. But during these same decades the United States also has undergone a less sanguine transformation: its citizens have become remarkably less civic, less politically engaged, less socially connected, less trusting, and less committed to the common good. At the dawn of the millennium Americans are fast becoming a loose aggregation of disengaged observers, rather than a community of connected participants.

To Grasp Fully The Nature And Significance Of The Economic policies at the heart of dominant political projects, those policies have to be studied in the round. They have to be grasped as complex totalities which touch all aspects of the political agenda; and they have to be seen as constructed and contested wholes, whose contradictions, internal inconsistencies and conceptual limits are as vital to their trajectory as are their axioms, theories and content. Academically and professionally, the study of policy in this rounded way is often a more difficult task to complete than might be expected, in part because of the powerful divisions within and between the intellectual disciplines which comprise the social sciences.

‘If A Majority Of People In Northern Ireland Ever Voted To become part of a United Ireland what would you do?’ At first sight the question may seem plucked from the realms of constitutional fantasy. A united Ireland seems an unlikely prospect, at least in anything but the long term. Even proponents of unity predict a 15–20 year wait. Yet the 1998 Good Friday Agreement empowers the people of Northern Ireland to decide their own constitutional future. As a result questions on Northern Ireland's future constitutional status, and public reactions to possible changes in that status, are relevant to current political debate.

It is important to note that the principle of consent is not a new constitutional invention. It has had a long association with Northern Ireland. It is argued that the peace process and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement have refocused attention on the long-standing consent principle. While consent was part of the constitutional furniture it was often overlooked during the Troubles.

This article re-examines consent in the light of the peace process. It draws on evidence from the 1998 and 1999/2000 Northern Ireland Life and Times surveys, as well as a number of in-depth interviews with senior politicians and policy-makers involved in the peace process and the negotiations on a political settlement. First it considers the changing significance of the consent principle to Northern Ireland's constitutional status, arguing that the principle has assumed a renewed immediacy. Secondly, the article reports the findings of the two most recent Northern Ireland Life and Times surveys in relation to constitutional preferences. While public attitudes towards a unitary Ireland or continued Union within the United Kingdom have been surveyed regularly, as far as the authors are aware no previous survey has asked whether people would accept or oppose constitutional change if it was supported by a majority of Northern Ireland's citizens. In other words, no survey has gauged the level of public acceptance of the consent principle. The key question is: would unionists be prepared to come quietly if a majority of Northern Ireland's citizens voted to accept a united Ireland?

Soon After The Democratic Candidate For President Of The United States in 2000, Al Gore, conceded defeat to George W. Bush, he engaged in a heated exchange with President Bill Clinton over why he had lost the election. Gore argued that Clinton's sexual escapades, and public qualms about other character issues, notwithstanding strong approval ratings for the job he was doing as president, had contributed significantly to Gore's defeat. Clinton retorted that Gore blew an ideal chance to run on the record of the Clinton administration and fumbled a perfect opportunity to become president. However, the Clinton record proves ambiguous at best. Indeed, the aftertaste has carried strongly over to his first hundred days out of office. The dubious pardons, ‘conversion’ of public property from the White House and rental rates at prime Manhattan locations have grabbed more headlines and provided more grist for talk shows, it often seems, than negative coverage of George W. Bush. Indeed, in terms of negatives, we run the risk of seeing Clinton's first hundred days out of office eclipse Bush's first hundred days in the presidency.

The Date 2 July 2000 Represented A True Watershed In Mexican politics. For the first time in post-revolutionary Mexico an opposition candidate won the presidential elections. Since 1988, opposition parties on the left and right have slowly eroded the stranglehold on electoral politics of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (the PRI), which has been in power since 1929. Vicente Fox Quesada's victory heralds the end of an era; or does it? A dominant theme in analyses of Mexican politics over the past twenty years has been the tension between continuity and change. In this article I argue that Fox's victory is an important, indeed essential, component of Mexico's slow democratization process; but it does not represent democracy in itself. There are three areas where the longer-term outcome of these elections will be measured: first there is the willingness of Fox to carry out further necessary reforms, particularly in the areas of judicial and fiscal reform. To date he has signalled that these will be important policies of his administration but we must wait for the results. Secondly, even where he is willing to deepen democratic reforms, one must ask to what extent will he be able to do so, both in terms of generating enough support within his own party and in overcoming resistance from the PRI, which still controls significant resources and retains a majority in the senate. And thirdly, it must be noted that Fox displayed some worrying tendencies towards populism in his presidential campaign which serve as a sobering reminder that his own democratic practices may be questionable.

During Its First Two Years Or So In Office The Blair Government gave great prominence to its programme of constitutional reform. But more recently its priorities appeared to shift back to more familiar issues. As the election approached social and economic policies were brought to the top of the political agenda, and for the most part opposition parties too have been content to follow suit. All this ref lects the familiar belief that both politicians and most of the electorate in Britain are more interested in ‘bread-and-butter’ issues and the aspirations fuelling them than in constitutional arguments and abstractions. Nor is this view at all surprising. The British constitution is an elusive and ambiguous matter and its history has been one of continuous, often imperceptible, institutional adaptation rather than one marked by periodic formal amendment and revision. As a result the constitution as a whole has usually been taken for granted. It has been assumed to be sound in essentials, though no doubt capable of improvement here and there in response to serious political or social pressures.

In Early December 2000 The Political Leaders Of The European Union (EU) met in Nice in order to decide on the treaty adaptations needed before the enlargement envisaged for the next decade. The overall goal was to render the EU more efficient and its decision making more transparent. The outcome of this important event was widely considered as disappointing. Some observers even came to the conclusion that there were no leaders of the EU as such, but only rather narrow-minded, egotistical national leaders who did not – with minor exceptions – care about the ‘common good’ at all. Never had it become so evident, in the opinion of some, that the European perspective had been fading away for many years, and that it was being replaced by national considerations which are often short-sighted and limited to the horizon of the next national elections. One of the classical theories on European integration, neo-functionalism, measures the progress of integration in terms of the Europeanization of its political elites. From this perspective, the top decision-makers seem to be on a downward trend. Is it then a case for the opposite theory, that of intergovernmentalism, which claims that national interests continue to be in the centre of EU decision-making and that tough bargaining is of its very nature?

As Recent Demilitarization And Democratic Trends World-Wide have shown, the exit of a dictator of the calibre of Abacha (1993–98) in Nigeria may foster a strong desire among successors for transition to a more democratic order. As in Chile after General Augusto Pinochet, and in Spain after Franco, General Abdulsalam Abubakar, who succeeded General Sani Abacha, presided in Nigeria over a programme of transition to civilian rule. This culminated in the election of General Olusegun Obasanjo (retired) in February 1999, and his subsequent official take-over of government in May 1999. However, since new democracies often revert to dictatorships, the new government faces daunting challenges in Nigeria's search for democracy and political stability.

España Va Bien. ‘Things Are Going Well In Spain.’ With This Simple yet somewhat unoriginal slogan, the incumbent conservative Partido Popular (PP) swept to victory by absolute majority in the 12 March 2000 general election in Spain. The PP's astounding victory may be attributed to several factors. First, its own well-organized campaign was based upon a strong leadership, something the two main leftist parties lacked. As the experience of the former centrist party, Unión Centro Democrático (UCD) shows, party leadership does matter. Secondly, leadership charisma, so important in the 1993 election when the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) managed to be re-elected despite worryingly high unemployment figures and a wave of political scandals, seemed to matter little or nothing in the March 2000 election. Effective management skills and strong leadership seem to have replaced populist charisma as a way to attract the average Spanish voter.

On 13 May 2001, Italy Elected To Power A Centre-Right Coalition headed by the media magnate Silvio Berlusconi. Forza Italia, the political party founded by Berlusconi in 1994 when he first decided to enter politics, became the most widely supported political force in the country with almost 30 per cent of the popular vote. Forza Italia's success was partly a result of its ability to ‘cannibalize’ the votes of two of its smaller coalition partners, the Biancofiore, an electoral coalition between the Christian Democratic Centre (CCD) and the United Christian Democrats (CDU), and the Northern League (Lega Nord), both of whom saw their share of the vote fall sharply. The other party in Berlusconi's ‘House of Freedoms’ coalition, the National Alliance (AN), the formerly neo-fascist party that now sees itself as a pillar of the democratic right, held steady in electoral terms but remains very much a junior partner in the coalition.

During The Years Immediately Following The Fall Of The Ceausescu regime in 1989, Romania fulfilled the requirements of an ‘electoral democracy’. Free and reasonably fair elections regularly produced parliaments (1990, 1992) and governments dominated by the communist successor parties run by Ion Iliescu, a member of the old nomenklatura. Once elected, these institutions operated in principle within the framework of procedural democracy, but in practice often broke the rules and norms accepted in the West as characteristic of liberal democracy. When this occurred public opinion was either too weak, or divided, or simply too indifferent to demand more accountability. Further impoverishment of the poorest citizens due to mismanagement of the economy and rampant corruption contributed to the demise of the post-communist regime in 1996, which in turn led to the hope that with electoral democracy established, the development of democratic institutions and government accountability would follow.

In The Early 1970S, Dankwart Rustow Stressed The Centrality of national identity as a background condition for democratization. A recently emerging body of literature has raised this important issue again, opening it up for further discussion. Mark Thompson, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, for example, have highlighted the centrality of the national identity question (they use the term ‘stateness’) in their recent work. Henry Bienen and Jeffrey Herbst see the emergence of a sense of national identity as a prerequisite for democratization in Africa, thus confirming Rustow's idea of sequence. Ilter Turan supports Rustow's view on the role of national identity in his analysis of the cases of Iraq and the Central Asian republics, while James Putzel uses the macro variable of the national identity question to explain why democratic politics is more difficult in Indonesia, which faces the risk of disintegration, and in the ethnically-divided Malaysia, with its weak national identity, than in the Philippines where disintegration is not an issue.

There Exists An Extensive Literature On The Political Economy of external liberalization in emerging markets. However, the remarkable progress of Estonia and Latvia in external liberalization has not yet been addressed systematically in the academic literature from a political economy angle. This article aims not only to make a contribution to fill this gap in the literature by focusing on trade policy reform, but also to address three other issues.