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The European Union in Nice: A Minimalist Approach to a Historic Challenge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Karlheinz Neunreither
Karlheinz Neunreither*
Affiliation:
University of Heidelberg
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Extract

In Early December 2000 The Political Leaders Of The European Union (EU) met in Nice in order to decide on the treaty adaptations needed before the enlargement envisaged for the next decade. The overall goal was to render the EU more efficient and its decision making more transparent. The outcome of this important event was widely considered as disappointing. Some observers even came to the conclusion that there were no leaders of the EU as such, but only rather narrow-minded, egotistical national leaders who did not – with minor exceptions – care about the ‘common good’ at all. Never had it become so evident, in the opinion of some, that the European perspective had been fading away for many years, and that it was being replaced by national considerations which are often short-sighted and limited to the horizon of the next national elections. One of the classical theories on European integration, neo-functionalism, measures the progress of integration in terms of the Europeanization of its political elites. From this perspective, the top decision-makers seem to be on a downward trend. Is it then a case for the opposite theory, that of intergovernmentalism, which claims that national interests continue to be in the centre of EU decision-making and that tough bargaining is of its very nature?

Type
Original Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 36 , Issue 2 , April 2001 , pp. 184 - 208
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 2001

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References

1 To say this means to accept the present interpretation. Formally, seats in the Commission were not linked at all with individual member states.

2 The final Nice documents only take a future 27-member EU as a base for calculations. The 28 member option (including Turkey) which was still in the preparatory files, has been dropped. Turkey with its 64 million inhabitants would be entitled to as many council votes as France or the UK, and slightly more MEPs, a nightmare for many. With the exception of Slovenia, the possible evolution in former Yugoslavia is also not included. There at least four more future candidates exist. Albania should also be kept in mind. So even without opening a Pandora’s box of possible candidates farther east, the EU may well count 33 members or so in a not too distant future.

3 There is a contradiction between the Nice texts on the threshold and on enlargement, the latter one implying even a possible threshold of 74.78%. This will have to be clarified. In order to simplify, we will not mention here the complicated transition schemes both for voting in the Council and membership in the EP, but only the final figures for an EU of 27.

4 While irregularities concerning the distribution of votes in the Council were corrected at the last minute, this was not the case in relation to seats in the EP. Here, two obvious cases of discrimination exist: the Czech Republic and Hungary are given only 20 seats each, while present members of the same size in population (Greece, Belgium, Portugal) will have 22 seats each (see Table). This will have to be corrected before adhesion of the countries concerned. It underlines the lack of attention paid to the EP as compared to the Council and is certainly no evidence of the overall quality of the conference.

5 For a more detailed analysis see Neunreither, K. and Wiener, A. (eds), European Integration After Amsterdam: Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 140.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 This will depend on the future size of the Commission. If it were limited to 14 members, in an EU-28 all would have to leave after one term in order to be replaced by 14 new ones from other countries. If the size was 20, eight would come in and 12 could stay for a second term. This is due to the principle of rotation whereby no country may have two terms more than any other. As the above example shows, if you want a minimum of continuity in the Commission, you have to opt for a larger size.

7 The term ‘convention method’ refers to the formula which was applied for the Charter of Fundamental Rights. A special body, composed of 62 members, was set up for this purpose: fifteen representing the member governments, one the Commission, sixteen MEPs and 30 members of national parliaments. The working method of this ‘convention’, which included public hearings, is seen in contrast to the rather closed classical diplomatic formula of treaty revision.