THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE PATTERN OF SIMILARITIES AND differences in Britain and France with regard to public service charterism: that strand of recent public service reform designed to reconstruct relations between the state and the citizen on the basis of new or revitalized principles of public service, epitomized by the Citizen's Charter (1991) in Britain and the Charte des Services Publics (1992) in France. Despite the appearance of increasing convergence in the rhetoric of public management reform in the two countries during the 1990s, especially during the incumbency of centre-left governments in the latter part of the decade, there is evidence of continuing divergence in the philosophy and practice of public service charterism. This article argues that variation is a function of the existence of country-specific public service regimes, embodying different ideals of citizenship, which have shaped the emergence and implementation of charter policy in Britain and France.

OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS, ECOLOGY HAS MADE ITS ENTRANCE INTO politics. At first the main concern was with pollution; but soon it broadened, and today the watchword is energy. In both cases the underlying phenomenon is that of economic growth. Not that all growth is incompatible with ecological balance; but over the last few decades normally there was a conflict, and industrial and urban growth in particular have led to a significant deterioration of the environment. Hence the importance of the controversy surrounding industrialization and economic growth, which has taken on an increasing importance in the politics of several Western European countries.

The organization of primaries in which all party members can participate is increasingly used by political parties to select their leader. We focus here on one of the consequences of these procedures – participation rates. Based on general participation theories (mobilization theory, instrumental motivation theory and learning theory) in combination with insights into the introduction and functioning of leadership primaries, we expect that the first time a party organizes leadership primaries, participation rates will be high, but that they will decline gradually afterwards. We have focused on direct member votes for the selection of party leaders in Belgium, Israel and Canada. Our results show that participation rates are not influenced by how many times such a contest is held in a party (only first-time participation tends to be higher), but mainly by how competitive the contest is.

Comparing bank rescue schemes in France and Germany during the banking crisis of 2008–9, this article argues that collective inaction is a little-studied aspect in the exercise of power in business–government relations. Contrary to studies that focus on lobbying, structural power or the influence of beliefs, the comparison highlights that governments depend on contributions from the financial industry during crisis management. In the negotiations to design bank support schemes, some countries, such as France, succeeded in engaging their financial sector collectively. Such public–private burden-sharing arrangements alleviate the public budget and increase mutual surveillance between banks during government support. In other countries, such as Germany, a collectively organized industry response failed, which forced the government to design an entirely public support scheme. The German government reacted to this perceived imbalance by imposing tighter banking regulation to avoid a repetition of the impotence it experienced in 2008.

Social democracy is in a state of change and flux, and the electoral fortunes of many centre-left political parties are poor. This article offers an analysis of the current trajectory of the centre left, by detailing a systematic mapping of policy change across the family of social democratic political parties. Many of the parties, especially in the 1990s, took a ‘third way’ turn, or a shift to what has been called the ‘new social democracy’. Yet, the ‘third way’ label is a poor descriptor to capture the changing policy profile and dynamics of the family of mainstream centre-left political parties. In Adam Przeworski's view, there have been four main waves of social democracy. We employ the ‘wave’ frame to examine if there is an emergent, fifth, breaking wave of social democracy. Overall, we find that social democratic parties have moved beyond the ‘third way’; they are shifting leftwards, but they are a new kind of ‘left’ from that of previous decades.

The article starts by locating both the author and men in relation to feminism as an identity, which cuts across the public–private divide. It then attempts to illuminate the meaning of ‘being feminist’ by addressing three, tightly interwoven, issues. First is the question: what is the ‘woman’ who is the subject of feminism? The second section discusses the nature of feminism in its various guises, focusing mainly on feminism in Britain since the late 1960s. It engages with the notions of ‘post-feminism’, ‘global sisterhood’ and a ‘third wave’. Finally, the article analyses critically feminism's uneasy relationship with identity politics.

This article is made up of two main parts. The first part points out two different definitions of cabinet – that is, functional and legal definitions. It also highlights the strong points and the shortcomings of both, proposing at the same time a new definition more suitable for a comparative analysis. In doing this, it puts forward some useful criteria with a view to establishing what a minister actually is, what a cabinet is and how it is made up. The second part provides an overview of the structures of governments in 38 countries, from core to junior ministers, on this basis.

What explains variation in the inclusion of women in authoritarian cabinets? We theorize that leaders of electoral autocracies are affected by changing international norms of democracy and women's rights to appoint women ministers. We propose two hypotheses. First, increasing dependence on aid from democratic donors encourages leaders of electoral autocracies to appoint more women ministers. Second, electoral autocrats uprooting democratic traits appoint more women ministers to minimize the reputational costs of their autocratization. Using data from authoritarian regimes in 38 African countries between 1973 and 2013, we find that increases in aid from democracies are associated with modest increases in women's share of cabinet seats. As our theory suggests, this relationship holds only in electoral autocracies in more recent years when norms of gender equality have been strongest. Conversely, we find no evidence that autocratization periods are associated with increases in women's cabinet share. Additionally, we show that supply-side factors and the politics of multi-ethnic coalition building appear to explain differences in women's cabinet seat share in autocracies.

As they become more successful, populist radical right parties face a tension between keeping their nativist credentials and moderating their appeal to gain new voters. We argue that differentiating party messages to core supporters and the wider electorate allows parties to pursue both goals. We outline and empirically illustrate the previously underexplored phenomenon of selective messaging based on the communication strategy of the Hungarian Jobbik party throughout its lifespan (2006–19) in partisan outlets, press releases and Facebook. Using a dictionary approach, we map the co-evolution of populist and nativist mobilization under conditions of supply- and demand-side changes. Our results show the decline and transformation of Jobbik's nativist appeal, and an increasing reliance on populism. The trend is not uniform; Jobbik relies on nativism as a function of targeting party identifiers or the general electorate in specific media outlets. Our findings show the importance of mapping parties’ programmatic appeal across platforms and over time.

This article reviews recent attempts to develop multi-method social scientific frameworks. The article starts by discussing the ontological and epistemological foundations underlying case studies and variance-based approaches, differentiating approaches into bottom-up, case-based and top-down, variance-based approaches. Case-based approaches aim to learn how a causal process works within a case, whereas variance-based approaches assess mean causal effects across a set of cases. However, because of the different fundamental assumptions, it is very difficult for in-depth studies of individual cases to communicate meaningfully with claims about mean causal effects across a large set of cases. The conclusions discuss the broader challenges this distinction has for the study of comparative politics more broadly.

THERE ARE CERTAIN PREDICTABLE HIGH POINTS IN THE political calendar. Local elections, the Queen's speech and the Budget are pencilled in at each party's headquarters and the media devote acres of newsprint and hours of broadcasting time to each. Yet none of these compare in duration to the season of party conferences, which last for the best part of a month. For political commentators and activists they are the political equivalent of an Olympic games for sports fans and competitors.

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING WAS fashionable in the 1960s at a time when the French model had become extremely popular in Western Europe. However, analyses of planning experience were then generally inhibited by a preoccupation with descriptions of the formal planning procedures rather than with any serious attempt to assess anything but the economic consequences of planning. (Andrew Shonfield's classic study of Modern Capitalism was a conspicuous exception to this criticism.) Attention was focused on plans as official documents rather than upon a set of planning practices that might be only remotely related to any formal statement of public policy. Planning was viewed too much from the forecasting end rather than the implementation end and the rationality of objectives became more of a preoccupation than the practical problems of translating them into reality. A normative model of efficient decision-making was all too often assumed to be readily transposable because of a wholly unrealistic notion of the ways in which organizations work.

Some studies suggest that market-based economic development with state policies based on the rule of law are essential in stabilizing democracy and protecting civil and political rights. This article explores a possible association between weak civil and political rights, democratic instability and the delay in a state-regulated market development under the rule of law in Turkey. Despite its experience with democratic institutions since the 1950s, Turkey can be characterized as an ‘illiberal’ democracy because of its poor record on human rights. The lack of a relatively autonomous and competitive market economy may be explained by clientelist and inegalitarian forms of state intervention. These in turn contribute to the perpetuation of low income levels, a clientelist rent-seeking political and economic culture and unstable and illiberal democracy.

In this article, we triangulate qualitative data regarding the framing of the pandemic and the strategic decisions taken by Spain's new populist radical right-wing party, VOX, with a quantitative analysis of aggregate polling data and individual-level survey responses to answer three questions: how has VOX framed the politics of the pandemic? What actions has VOX taken in response to COVID-19? Have the events of the COVID-19 crisis affected VOX's electoral chances? We argue that VOX's response to the pandemic has focused on augmenting the antagonistic relationship between itself and the political establishment, especially the left-wing government. Strategically, VOX has sought to leverage the health crisis to engage in legislative manoeuvres aiming, without success, to position itself as the primary party-in-waiting for right-wing voters. We also demonstrate that VOX has proven to be resilient against the potential for electoral decline that was widely prophesied at the beginning of the pandemic.

This study focuses on the principal rules of government formation as well as on the deviant cases. On a party level, over 1,000 cases and approximately 250 government formations in 17 West European countries during the second half of the twentieth-century are analysed. By means of regression analyses, the study explores the effects of the size of the parties, other party characteristics, as well as characteristics in the party system on the choice of premier party and coalition party respectively. The results show that the choice of premier party to a great extent is decided by the size of the party and the position as median party. The choice of coalition party, however, is a far more complex process. Favourable and unfavourable conditions are defined, and the deviant cases are identified, compared and analysed with respect to the choice of PM party and the choice of coalition party respectively. The study shows that the deviant cases are not disparate. On the contrary, the deviant cases form a set of rules of their own.

This study uses the case study of a ‘transitioning’ country, Turkey, in exploring institutional endurance and change. In this context it uses the framework of Arend Lijphart's majority and consensus democracy in order to uncover patterns of institutional evolution and persistence which have implications for the nature of its democratic transition. This is achieved through a step-by-step exploration of the key dimensions of democracy discussed by Lijphart. This empirical study seeks to demonstrate that despite the introduction of anti-majoritarian institutions in 1961, Turkey has never consolidated consensus democracy. Instead, since 1982 the trend has been a move towards a system more in line with the majoritarian regime established under the 1924 constitution. As such, the study offers a useful case study of the dynamics of political transformation in the face of institutional persistence, suggesting a need for tracing the history if we are to identify institutional patterns in contrast to the more generalized democratization frameworks.

Do the class backgrounds of legislators shape their views and actions relating to inequality and economic policy? Building on findings about ‘white-collar government’ in the US, this article examines the relationship between legislators’ class and their attitudes and self-reported behaviour in advanced democracies, drawing on survey data from 15 countries including 73 national and subnational parliaments in Europe and Israel. I find that legislators from business backgrounds are more likely to support income inequality and small government, as well as less likely to consult with labour groups, than those from working-class and other backgrounds. These results are buttressed by analysis of an additional cross-national survey of European legislative candidates’ attitudes, which replicates key findings. Given the skewed class makeup of legislatures in advanced democracies, these findings may be relevant to our understanding of widespread economic and political inequalities that are increasingly salient in many countries.

THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO the continuing debate on the manner in which power is exercised in Western-style democracies from a democratic–elite — or what I prefer to term a demo–elite — perspective. This is to be done through a theoretical exposition placing this perspective in the spectrum of the main theories on the same topic, with special reference to the classical democratic–elite theories of Max Weber, Gaetano Mosca, Joseph Schumpeter, and Raymond Aron, and the contemporary pluralistelitist theories of Robert Dahl and Giovanni Sartori.

Politics in Latin America continued to be about democracy after the democratic transitions in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. An old concern – securing the minimal standard of democracy that had served as the goal of democratic transitions – remained relevant. But a new concern – the attainment of more than a minimal democracy – transformed politics about democracy. Actors who supported and opposed neoliberalism – the key axis of ideological conflict – advocated and resisted political changes in the name of different models of democracy. And the conflict over which model of democracy would prevail shaped Latin America’s post-transition trajectories, determining how democracy developed and, in turn, whether democracy endured.