CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP ON PRESIDENTIAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS FINDS that the distribution of power between presidents and assemblies can vary significantly from one presidential polity to the next, and can even change within the same presidential regime over a relatively short period of time. Presidents are shown to exercise different levels of control over the law-making process according to the de jure legislative powers at their disposal – initiation, veto, veto override, budgetary and decree powers– and their de facto partisan power – the level of disciplined party support that they command within assemblies. Different combinations of these powers can have strikingly different institutional, behavioural and policy effects. Indeed, such variation has led some analysts to question the usefulness of models of executive–legislative relations that are based solely on the traditional distinction between presidential and parliamentary political systems.

IN JUNE 1971, FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND WAS NARROWLY ELECTED, after a bitter contest, to the leadership of the French Socialist Party. By the end of 1973 he was in command of the party. There is nothing new about an ambitious politician taking over and attempting to transform an existing party. Mendts France in the 1950s and Servan-Schreiber, more recently, tried to reshape a weak and divided Radical Party. They failed as a result of their own tactlessness and because of the perverse obduracy of the party's opportunistic notables who saw little virtue in ideological purity and disciplined organization. Nor is there anything new about a party of the left being dominated by a strong personality. No study of the French Communist Party would be complete without an analysis of the commanding roles played by the tight-lipped Thorez, the jovial Waldeck-Rochet or the circumspect Marchais. The Socialist Party has been no less immune to the cult of personality; it would be impossible to write the history of the party without constant reference to the dynamism of Jaures, the moral persuasiveness of Blum and the organizational genius of Mollet, three men who dominated long periods of the party's history.

By the early 1990s, the core executive was established as the ‘new orthodoxy’ in the study of British government at the centre. Thirty years on, this article avers that its main assumptions are increasingly questionable in the light of more recent empirical evidence. The core executive approach may well have outlived its usefulness. This claim is derived from analysis of the Cameron premiership from 2010 to 2016. The focus is on how Whitehall reform radically altered the relationship between politicians and civil servants, reshaping prevailing public service bargains and rules of the game. Ministers identified mechanisms to rebuild political capacity, augmenting partisan control of the bureaucracy. They drew on resources from outside the core executive while politicians increased their sway over civil service appointments. As a result, officials felt they should be ‘responsive’ to ministers. The cumulative effect was to replace interpersonal and institutional resource dependency with a ‘them and us’ model. Consequently, the risk of policy disasters and fiascos grew.

The article sheds light on tutelary regimes, which have so far been left out in the discussion of contemporary authoritarian regimes. It uses a configurative approach to conceptualize tutelary regimes according to the three dimensions of tutelary interference, electoral competitiveness and civil liberties. Tutelary interference is conceived of as a spectrum of possible and not mutually exclusive roles which tutelary powers perform – depending on their position in the political system. Empirically, the article uses a case study of Myanmar's tutelary regime to illustrate how the armed forces’ institutionalized powers and prerogatives have helped the country evade substantial democracy. The results show a high degree of regime heterogeneity, with a functioning electoral regime in place but substantial weaknesses in civil liberties. Both are (partly) rooted in the tutelary interference of the military, which is pervasive. The military's position straitjackets the government; the military vetoes certain policies and structural reforms and guards the political system and its prerogatives from a position of strength. Politicians have so far not come up with successful strategies to bring the military under civil control.

The normalization of radical right (RR) politics fosters opportunities for RR parties, but can also facilitate intra-party conflicts over the ‘true’ version of the shared party ideology. Previous research has highlighted two factors that influence ideational change within RR parties: contextual conditions and the formal power of intra-party factions. Yet, surprisingly, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) progressively radicalized to the right and witnessed the increased influence of its extremist grouping Der Flügel, despite contextual normalization pressures and the grouping's lower formal power. Analysing three crucial conflicts within the AfD between 2013 and 2021, we show how intra-party competition additionally plays into nativist party radicalization. Flügel balanced contextual and ‘hard’ power disadvantages by fostering its ‘soft’ power as ‘the true party within the party’. Simultaneously, this power was cemented by more established AfD actors who used Flügel's ideas against other competitors for office. Our conclusions have important implications for comparative research on competition within and between RR parties.

Legislatures in parliamentary systems are frequently seen as weak policy actors, and this is nowhere more true than of the British Westminster parliament. But real-world changes, and recent research, suggest that Westminster’s influence is significant and growing. This raises new questions about which non-government actors are influential, and we explore this through analysing 4,361 amendments proposed to 12 government bills. Assessing non-government amendment ‘success’ presents challenges, however, since many such proposals are clearly not sincere attempts at legislative change. We thus make two substantive contributions. First, we quantitatively assess the influence of different groups at Westminster, showing both non-government influence and cross-party working to be more extensive than traditionally assumed. Second, we link predictions about opposition and backbench parliamentarians’ motivations to the legislative amendment process, proposing a typology of motivations for such amendments, with wider application. Overall, we argue that understanding non-government parliamentarians’ diverse motivations shows that they ‘fail’ far less often than commonly assumed.

ONE CONTINUING CHARACTERISTIC OF GERMAN POLITICAL STYLE IS A ‘politics of fear’ which is propagated by both Left and Right. The Extra Parliamentary Opposition's anxieties about the neo-fascist potential in the political system are complemented by the campaign of the Springer press against totalitarian extremists of the Left. Fear is of course not necessarily unfounded in a regime which at its foundation was regarded as only ‘provisional’ and which has had every reason to fear its enemies after its experience of reactionary conservatism and Nazism and now of developments in the German Democratic Republic. The Federal Republic has been under considerable pressure since its inception to protect itself more successfully than its Weimar predecessor against its enemies. Unfortunately a ‘militant democracy’ can easily become an illiberal democracy, more concerned with its own stability than with political development.

WESTERN SOCIAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT IS NO LONGER A subject of interest only to welfare specialists and their students. Economic ill-fortune has had at least this one, positive effect. More — and more variegated — questions are being asked about relationships between public/social policy practice2 and economic performance, both within and between Western countries. However, the very fact that social scientists are now tackling this subject in broader fashion and from a variety of disciplinary and ideological erspectives, has served to highlight inconsistencies in the use of such supposedly standard terms as ‘social policy’, ‘social spending’ and ’welfare state’.

ONE OF THE VERY RARE OVERVIEWS OF OPPOSITION IN THE ARAB states was published by Professor Lisa Anderson in 1987. The very title set the tone: ‘Lawless Government and Illegal Opposition’ (emphases mine), as well as the opening quotation, ‘A government which is not beholden to any law ceases to be legitimate’, by the famous Sayyid Qutb, one of the prophets of radical Islam (as it came to be named) who was executed by Nasser's government. Opposition was meant to combat a tyrant (a lawless government meaning an unjust government, unjust because disregarding the laws and the religious Law) and to restore Justice, Law and Order. Admittedly, Professor Anderson's purpose was much broader: she would stress the close relationship between the exercise of political power, and particularly the modern state as the organizational framework of political life (the independent variable, so to speak) and, on the other hand, opposition as a response or reaction to the state and the government.

ON I DECEMBER 1966 THE BUNDESTAG ELECTED THE CHRISTIAN democrat leader Kurt Georg Kiesinger as head of a government formed by Christian democrats (CDU) and social democrats (SPD), by a majority of 340 (out of 496) members. The liberals (FDP), with 49 members, were pushed aside into opposition. For the first time since 1930 the social democrats entered a German central government, not as the result of an electoral victory but at the conclusion of an inner Crisis within the hitherto existing majority. The CDU whose prestige was badly damaged by this crisis continued to provide the chancellor. This helps to explain why some 60 members of the coalescing parties voted against the candidate. Public opinion oscillated between feelings of relief because of the end of a period of insecurity, and feelings of discomfort in view of an experiment which seemed unorthodox and hazardous. The disputes around the grosse Koalition (great coalition) thus revealed the ambiguity of conceptions of parliamentary government as they had developed since the establishment of the Federal Republic.

It will soon be forty years since Lenin decided, to ‘put the lid on opposition’, as he expressed it himself at the dramatic Tenth Congress of his party in March 1921. Much has happened since then, both in the Soviet Union and in the countries which have by imitation adopted the same pattern of one-party government. It is therefore worth reflecting on the reasons which led Lenin to adopt this drastic policy; and to pause to enquire into the results which have flowed from his action—whether he intended them or not.

The bolsheviks took power in 1917 without having (as on so many other vital questions) formulated any precise theory about their future policy towards those who disagreed with them. There was a general acceptance of the need to deal sternly with ‘enemies’ – indeed no revolutionary government could hope to survive for long if it did not do something of the kind.

THE PUBLIC REACTION OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND commentators to the suspension of the electoral process in Algeria following President Chadli's resignation on 11 January was profoundly mixed. Relief at the fact that Algeria was not about to become ‘a second Iran’ very quickly gave way to disapproval of the manner in which this prospect had been conjured away at the last moment, as numerous leader writers in London and Paris and no doubt elsewhere indulged themselves in vigorous criticism of what they had not hesitated to call a ‘military coup’.

Sweden used to be one of the most restrictive countries in the Organisation of Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) in terms of labour immigration policy. This was drastically changed in 2008 when a very liberal immigration law was passed. Why did one of the most restrictive labour immigration countries suddenly become one of the most liberal ones? The article argues that it is necessary to consider labour market institutions and their consequences for labour migration. These factors will influence the preferences, strategies and chances of success for various policy actors. A decline in union power and corporatism in Sweden had important consequences for its labour immigration. Following this decline, employers and centre-right parties became more active and adopted more liberal policy positions than previously. The article analyses policy developments since the 1960s and draws on official documents, position statements, party manifestos, media coverage and original elite interviews.

Preserving Northern Ireland's peace process in the midst of a war against international terrorism has presented the British government with a series of dilemmas at the level of political rhetoric, policy-making and legislation. The peace process demands adherence to human rights standards to provide a foundation for the new political dispensation, while an implication of the necessity for a war against terrorism is that restrictions on liberty are justifiable in the name of security against the backdrop of the existence of an emergency. These conflicting conceptions for addressing political violence at the national and international level are addressed.

A Discussion of Last Autumn's Debate over Candidate selection in the British Labour Party and a consideration of the party's links with the trade unions may seem inappropriately provincial in an international journal of comparative politics. However, when viewed as an example of the continued search for political relevance by socialist parties in opposition, the issues raised by Labour's struggle to modernize take on more general interest. During long periods in the wilderness parties characteristically try to revive their fortunes by reforming organizational structures, ideological platforms and electoral strategies. For Labour, this started under the leadership of Neil Kinnock and continued with John Smith. The party has moved cautiously towards the centre ground, streamlined its election machine, modernized its communication strategy, and produced a more unified and moderate image. Labour's reforms of its relationship with the union movement are clearly part of this general attempt to reverse its electoral fortunes.

While debates about far-right populism often concentrate on Central and Eastern Europe, research on these parties predominantly focuses on Western countries. Addressing this remarkable gap, this article revisits the ‘protest voting’ explanation for electoral support for the far right. Using European Social Survey data (2002–16) from 22 countries, we show that political dissatisfaction is a stronger explanatory factor when far-right parties are in opposition, but is a less important determinant of electoral support when they are in government. Previous findings based on Western Europe – which similarly showed that the anti-elite hypothesis is less relevant when far-right parties join government coalitions – travel well to post-communist European countries. In Hungary and Poland, we even find that far-right voters have become less distrustful of national political institutions than the rest of the electorate. Our conclusion implies that anti-elite populism is context-dependent and has limited use for understanding successes of leaders such as Wilders, Salvini and Orbán.

This article explores legislative voting behaviour in the regional party system where electoral competition is based primarily on geographic divisions instead of national public policies. An analysis of roll-call votes in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea from 2000 to 2008 reveals that in the regionalized context, legislative voting unity is high because legislators are disciplined to receive endorsement from their regional champion party. Those legislators are far more disciplined when voting on pork legislation. Nonetheless, as the socioeconomic status of constituents rises and the constituents thus care more about policy than pork, then opposition legislators tend to vote against their parties more often. Conversely, governing-party members are more disciplined to pass bills where voters often desire policy over pork. This study suggests a powerful interaction between party affiliations and voter demands as a dominant electoral strategic tool in the regional party system.

During Recent Years, Analysts of World Politics Have noted increasing tensions and conflicts between the countries of the OECD area. As the process of globalization is extending to include several new sectors of domestic economies, multilateralism is deteriorating and perhaps, in some sectors, reaching breaking-point. Globalization, widely acknowledged as a powerful engine for the growth of the world economy during the 1970s and 1980s is now splitting up into trading blocs and much more limited minilateralism. This contribution aims at analysing the extent to which policy-making could be improved so that it can address and deal with the effects of globalization and turbulence on domestic and international environments.