THE BRITISH-IRISH COUNCIL SPRINGS FROM AND IS PROVIDED FOR IN the Belfast Agreement signed on Good Friday 1998. Its coming into force depends upon the implementation of the Agreement. The Council is established, however, not by the 1998 Northern Ireland Act, which gives legislative expression to the bulk of this Agreement, but by an international treaty, the British–Irish Agreement, attached to the Belfast Agreement.

The Belfast Agreement together with the legislation providing for devolution to Scotland and Wales establishes a new constitutional settlement, both among the nations which form the United Kingdom, and also between those nations and the other nation in these islands, the Irish nation. The United Kingdom itself is, as a result of the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act, in the process of becoming a new union of nations, each with its own identity and institutions – a multi-national state, rather than, as many of the English have traditionally seen it, a homogeneous British nation containing a variety of different people.

This article considers the origins of the local government reform agenda of the 1997 to 2001 Labour government. The analysis identifies a wide range of factors including recurring themes in the debate about local government, market mechanisms, Labour Party politics, the traditions of the British state, the constitutional reform agenda and the international context. This study also develops the notion of shifting constraints to explain this process and the agenda of the current Labour administration.

The explanatory capacity of ideas has been contested on two grounds. First, ideas have been dismissed as epiphenomenal. Second, ideational explanations have been criticized for the limited importance that they ascribe to agency. This article examines the involvement of the European Commission in previously uncharted territory, namely the regulation of professional sport in Europe. It demonstrates that, in conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty created by the need to implement broad Treaty-based principles in new areas of socio-economic activity, ideas, first, act as road maps that direct the executive activity of the European Commission, legitimize it, and set limits to it by identifying the relevant deeply embedded conceptions of the nature of a given activity and by linking them to a wider, historically defined normative order. Second, ideas are also powerful political weapons used by political actors in their quest to advance their interests.

How is government affected by including populists in a governing coalition? We investigate if populist political parties behave ‘normally’ when they attain power, or if they govern differently from mainstream political parties. Empirically, we use survey data from 282 ministerial advisers from three cabinets in Norway. Our conclusion is that populists govern normally on some governance dimensions and exceptionally on others. Populists in office had ample professional experience, adhered to collegial decision making and thought the bureaucracy delivered quality and was politically responsive – on a par with the non-populists. However, populists differed from non-populist politicians in their contact patterns and their communicative concerns. That populists in this context belong to a party with a long history of parliamentary representation (Norway's Progress Party) suggests elements of exceptionalism are things one should expect to find in practically all populist parties that attain power.

This article examines the interaction between the respective party structures of the Australian Labor Party and the British Labour Party as a means of assessing the strategic options facing aspiring challengers for the party leadership. Noting the relative neglect within the scholarly literature of forced exits that occur and attempted forced exits that do not occur, this article takes as its case study the successful forced exits of Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard, and the failure to remove Gordon Brown. In doing so the article challenges the prevailing assumption that the likely success of leadership evictions are solely determined by the leadership procedures that parties adopt. Noting the significance of circumstances and party cultures, the article advances two scenarios through which eviction attempts can be understood: first, forced exits triggered through the activation of formal procedures (Rudd and Gillard); second, attempts to force an exit by informal pressures beyond the formal procedures which are overcome by the incumbent (Brown).

Strong institutionalized parties are often seen as vital for healthy democracies. The Indian case, therefore, represents a strange paradox: many parties are weak, corrupt and personalistic, yet democracy as a whole seems to be thriving, with increasing turnout and apparently strong popular support for democratic procedures and norms. This article explores some of the reasons for this strange outcome and suggests that the existing literature on party institutionalization might need some revision.

This article provides a new conceptual and empirical analysis of party system nationalization, based on four different measurements. Unlike previous nationalization studies, these measurements conceptualize party system nationalization on the basis of electoral performance in national (general or federal) and sub-national (state) elections. After introducing these measurements we apply them to 16 general and 351 state elections in India, the world’s largest democracy with strong sub-national governments. By incorporating state election results we are able to demonstrate that: (1) the pattern of denationalization in India has been more gradual than assumed in previous studies of party system nationalization; (2) denationalization in recent decades results less from dual voting (vote shifting between state and federal elections) than from the growing divergence among state party systems (in state and federal elections); (3) the 2014 general election result, although potentially transformative in the long run, provides more evidence of continuity than change in the short run.

FROM 1967 UNTIL THE REFERENDUM, THE DEBATE ON THE COMMON Market in Britain produced a vast amount of literature devoted to the economic, political and social ramifications of joining. The main economic issues debated were the cost of entry and its effect on Britain's balance of payments, prices and the standard of living. The other problems centred around the tax system, including VAT, the flow of capital, unemployment, technological development, the value of the pound, the Community's agricultural policy, its regional policy, the volume of exports and labour mobility. In the social field the main concern was the standard of the social services, especially the National Health Service. In the political field debate centred around the undemocratic and bureaucratic nature of the EEC decision-making system; Britain's sovereignty, especially as regards the ability of Parliament to pursue independent economic, social and foreign policies; the connections between Britain and the Cornmon wealth, EFTA, the USA, Eastern Europe and developing countries. In addition the Treaty of Rome itself and the ideological, social and political nature of the Communities were debated.

BRITISH POLITICAL SCIENTISTS HAVE RECENTLY AWAKENED from their pragmatic slumbers to discover a dragon loose among them: the dragon of evaluation. The University Grants Committee has just been grading the quality of research in university departments, and some have been found ‘below average’. (To be merely ‘average’ hardly seems much better.) How were these gradings arrived at? We do not know, but we do know that among the documents available to the committee was a paper by Ivor Crewe analysing the publications record of all British departments of politics over a six-year period from January 1978. (It will be published in Political Studies next year.) Professor Crewe's paper reveals, to no one's surprise, that there are immense differences in publication rate both between individuals and between different departments; his revelation will not enhance his popularity. But it is clear that these events are just the beginning. The dragon of evaluation is on the loose and there's no St George in sight.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INHABITANTS OF GREATER Kabylia and their Arabic-speaking compatriots constitutes one of the fundamental issues of contemporary Algerian politics. This relationship has been neither accurately conceived nor adequately taken into account in the existing literature on modern Algeria. The growth of popular Berberism in Kabylia, articulating widespread opposition to the government's Arabization policy and the demand for official recognition of the Berber language, went unnoticed by outside observers until 1980. It had been visible since at least 1974, but could not be accommodated by prevailing conceptions either of Berber society in general or of Kabyle history in particular.

THE STATE, IN THE STRONGEST MEANING OF THE WORD, IS NOT indispensable to the functioning of civil society. Indeed society can often so organize itself as to prevent the emergence of a state intent on establishing itself as an absolute power. The very existence of the state itself, the consequence of particular sociohistorical processes, upsets the whole of the social system which is henceforth ordered around it. The relationships between the nobility, the bourgeoisie, the working class or, today, the middle classes, differ profoundly according to whether these groups were confronted by a strongly institutionalized state or a centre which exercised essentially co-ordinating functions. Still today the political systems which have simultaneously a centre and a state (France) can be distinguished from those which have a weak state without a real centre (Italy) or a centre without a genuine state (Great Britain, the United States) or neither centre nor state (Switzerland). In the first two cases, in varying degrees, the state dominates and manages civil society; in the two latter, civil society manages itself. It is therefore possible to distinguish societies in which the state attempts to dominate the social system by endowing itself with a strong bureaucracy (ideal type: France; paralle development: Prussia, Spain, Italy) from those in which the organization of civil society makes it impossible for a powerful state and a powerful dominating bureaucracy to emerge (ideal type: Great Britain; parallel development: the United States and the consociational democracies like Switzerland). Without claiming to retrace methodically the history of each of these states or of their political centres, I should like to sketch a broad outline of their evolution with the object of showing that the different relations by which the many governing groups are linked together within the different social systems depend sometimes on the formation of the state and sometimes on the simple formation of a political centre.

The religious Orders are, together with the Catholic Church, the oldest political institutions in the West and the only ones to have developed without any break in continuity. St Benedict, the ‘Father of Europe’, founded his first monastery when the Angles, Jutes and Saxons were invading Britain. The Benedictine rule still exacts obedience from thousands today. The Camaldolese and the Vallombrosians existed before the battle of Hastings, the Carthusians date from the same time (1084): both live today by the same rule, according to the same constitutions, clothed in the same habit as their distant predecessors. Exactly one hundred years before Magna Carta, the system of supranational parliamentary assembly was in operation – a system which still governs the monks of citeaux and which, in one form or another, has served as a model for all the religious institutes which have followed.

Experiments are now common in political science. They are an excellent methodological tool to estimate the causal effect of a treatment on an outcome. In this article, I review the use of lab experiments in political science. After a brief report on their popularity and advantages, I distinguish two ideal-types (economics-based and psychology-based) and outline the main lines of division between them. In the final section, I discuss the main challenges that lab experimentalists are facing today.

The majority view within political science is that populism is best understood as a (thin) ideology. We problematize the ideational approach by broadening the scope of analysis, linking populism to the rise of long-term generalized anti-political sentiments, against interpretations that tend to tie the populist wave to conjunctural factors related to recent crises. We argue that the essence of populism lies at the intersection of the ‘material constitution’ of advanced industrial democracies (that is, how macroeconomic governance relates to democratic decision-making) and the feelings of societal alienation that are at the heart of anti-political sentiments. We show the peculiar coexistence of economic turbulence, heralded by the crisis of the cartel party and of the neoliberal economic consensus, and an appeal to a post-democratic ‘virtual politics’ of performed but ineffectual popular sovereignty. The policies of the populist coalition governing Italy in 2018–19 provide a key case to test the relevance of our arguments.

TO DISCUSS ‘OPPOSITION’ IN A ONE-PARTY SYSTEM, AND IN PARTICULAR in a communist one, might seem on first thought to involve a contradiction in terms. Communist governments have normally been regarded in the West as systems without opposition except in the form of illegal resistance by sections of the population to the regimes themselves. Yet Leonard Schapiro, in his foreword to the first issue of the journal, Government and Opposition, expressed the view that both government and opposition are always and at all times present (or potentially present) in every political order and referred to ‘the tentative process of loyal dissent’ becoming apparent in one-party states. A striking feature of many of the communist states since the death of Stalin has in fact been the emergence of political tendencies that can only be called ‘oppositional’, in the form either of resisting policies enacted or offered by the ruling party, or of proposing alternative courses of action. The observation of these tendencies by Western scholars, and the analysis of the experience of noncommunist states in Africa and Asia, have led to a re-examimtion of the nature of one-party states in general, and to the recognition that not only has opposition never been totally absent from communist systems, but that it has assumed more vigorous and varied forms in recent years.

AS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BECOMES AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT public policy issue facing both the country and its political leaders, the degree to which Britain can or should harmonize its welfare, employment and taxation policies with those of other EU members will receive progressively more attention. In this context and with the evident importance of opinion poll popularity for the main political parties’ pursuit of electoral success, public opinion on issues concerning welfare, taxation and redistribution is likely to have considerable bearing on the viability of Britain's incorporation of the legislation and practices endorsed in other EU member states. Nonetheless, even a cursory examination of evidence on the public's attitude on questions relating to these changes suggests integration is unlikely to follow a smoothly negotiated path. Responses to a recent British Social Attitudes survey, for example, show that, while holding mixed attitudes towards the idea of European integration and only mildly negative attitudes to EU inf hence over policies concerning pollution, immigration and defence, the British public are strongly opposed to EU influence over taxation and, to some degree, employment policy. Even among those people who endorsed the general aim of European integration, only a minority – in the case of taxation, a very small minority – found the idea of Europeanlevel decision-making acceptable.