The paper presents a theory of the moral structure of international human rights. It proceeds by drawing on recent scholarship on the philosophy of national constitutional rights, which has shown that there is now an emerging global consensus on certain structural features of constitutional rights; in previous work I have summarized this under the label ‘the global model of constitutional rights’. Starting from the theory of rights underlying the global model, the paper asks what modifications, if any, are required to turn that theory into a suitable theory of international human rights. In particular, it examines the widely held view that international human rights are more minimalist than national constitutional rights. Discussing recent work by Ronald Dworkin (on political/constitutional versus human rights) and Joseph Raz (on legitimate authority versus national sovereignty), the paper concludes that it is not possible to make rights more minimalist than they already are under the global model. It follows that the moral structures of national constitutional rights and international human rights are identical. The final section of the paper examines some implications of this result, addressing the issues of the workability of the proposed conception of international human rights in practice, its point and purpose, and discussing the obligations of states to participate in international mechanisms for the protection of human rights.

There is a difference between the normative reasons for endorsing global constitutionalism and the conditions determining its emergence. This article addresses the latter issue. Specifically, the article claims that global constitutionalism rests on an underexplored shift in constitutional imagination. To account for this claim, the article is structured in several parts. It begins by clarifying the meaning of ‘constitutional imagination’. In so doing it builds on Kant’s concept of imagination (‘Einbildungskraft’) and in its reception by Hannah Arendt. The article then illustrates the significance of constitutional imagination by focusing on two major developments in constitutional thinking. The first development involves the shift away from a narrative reconstruction of constitutional authority; the second points to a cosmopolitanisation of constitutional imagination.

Beyond setting the stage, the Introduction makes three claims about the conceptual triangle of the rule of law, judicial authority and legitimacy. The first is that all three are essentially contested and interpretive concepts in the sense of Walter B. Gallie and Ronald Dworkin. In their expositions, the contested and interpretative nature of such concepts is nothing to be ‘solved’, rather the formulation of different conceptions and contestation about them are central functions of such concepts. The interpretive and essentially contested nature points us to the relevant ‘actors’ and to conflicts and trade-offs between contested competencies. Thus the second point is that arguments about the rule of law and judicial legitimacy are often a means of questioning or securing the authority of a particular actor or institution in relation to other actors and institutions. The final point is that transposing concepts from the domestic to the supranational is a constructive endeavour because it entails creating new conceptions and substituting old ones as well as legitimising new authorities and delegitimising old ones. Thus, this special issue also cautions against discourses that ultimately are more about legitimation than about legitimacy and more about new ways of ruling than the rule of law.

In their ground-breaking philosophical investigation of the ‘practice turn’ Lechner and Frost prompt a standpoint debate in international relations theory, which touches upon the relationship between practice theory and its subject matter. Lechner and Frost decidedly opt for an internal standpoint, which promises to understand a social practice in terms of the meaning-in-use of its participants. This article argues that the internalist promise will ultimately remain unfulfilled, however, for the aim of collapsing the distinction between the ‘language of action’ and ‘language of observation’ is epistemologically impossible. Taking such an ‘internal’ perspective not only underestimates the problem of the double hermeneutic. It also disregards the gap between theory and practice. Any social enquiry that fails to acknowledge this gap inevitably becomes externalist, for it misses to reflect on its own normative presuppositions. The way ahead is to address this gap reflexively by way of a triple hermeneutics that is bolstered by abductive reasoning.

This article looks at the continued calls for popular participation in UK constitution-making following the 2014 Scottish independence and 2016 Brexit referendums. In particular, it discusses the prospect of a UK constitutional convention being set up to deliberate upon and make recommendations concerning constitutional reform. The article proceeds by first mapping the arguments in favour of setting up such a body in a country with little but growing experience with direct democracy. It then analyses three difficulties surrounding a UK constitutional convention: deciding on a manageable mandate, identifying the political community or communities it is to represent and the method for selecting its membership, and defining the place of such a convention within the UK’s broader constitution-making mechanisms. The article highlights fundamental unknowns in need of clarification before such an instrument could be used while at the same time admitting the limitations of a constitutional convention as a panacea for all of the UK’s constitutional woes. In exploring these questions, the article shows how constitutional reform debates in the UK are no less complex than were those surrounding Scottish independence and have been further compounded by Brexit.

This article approaches current constitutional conservatism in Europe, focusing on the limits of equality rights regimes. These frameworks, it is argued, provide little leverage for positive discrimination to become articulated, let alone for them to be implemented by public policies. Equality regimes are further disentangled by means of a multidimensional reading of legal orders: particular attention is devoted to international human rights law (IHRL) and European Jus Commune that may inspire shifts in constitutional thinking at domestic levels. In that sense, equality frameworks steadily open up towards an inclusive understanding of human rights based on the transformative forces of international law. A pluralistic idea of those subjected to such regimes will be embraced, hence developing a clearer conception of rights holder categories and ultimately peoples affected in daily practice, particularly minorities. A dedicated focus is placed on ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic grounds. This may similarly concern intersectionalities and the complexities of overlapping grounds of discrimination. It is stressed that equality is best addressed by means of a multivariate approach to legal orders, their dynamics and ultimately virtuous effects of application.

The purpose of the present article is threefold. First, my ambition is to improve the analytical framework that is used to assess the legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights. The Court’s authority can neither be established nor refuted by a single master-argument. Instead, what we need is a careful balancing exercise and this piece aims to set out the main elements of the justificatory equation. Second, using this framework, I intend to put forward the outline of a coherent critique of the European human rights regime. Third, I hope that my article is able to shed light on why it is natural to expect more vocal criticism from the United Kingdom than from most other member states of the Council of Europe.

The article addresses the question of how to study global constitutional law by suggesting a material methodology. Drawing from previous studies of the notion of the material constitution, both from materialist and institutionalist types (Marx, Mortati, Poulantzas), the article proposes to look at the development of global constitutional law, in its many instantiations, in terms of its relation with the state. Accounts of the autonomy of global constitutional law are requalified in terms of relative autonomy. More specifically, global constitutional law is conceived as a legal construction functional to the transformation of the contemporary state. From the perspective of the material study of constitutional law, the state is still deemed to be the main unit of analysis, but, at the same time, state-centred accounts based on an exceptionalist understanding of sovereignty are rejected as reductive and, at times, inaccurate.

Since the early 2000s, regimes and institutions of global governance have undergone a paradigmatic shift in their relations with multinational corporations. The United Nations, in particular, has increasingly embraced big business as ‘partner’ in humanitarian response and development with the establishment of ‘global public–private partnerships’ (GP3s). This article situates this emerging mode of global governance within the recent academic discussions on Global Constitutionalism from a critical political economy perspective, focusing on the case of the UN Refugee Agency’s GP3s in refugee protection and assistance. Critically inquiring into GP3s not only as informal global constitutional arrangements but also as a set of political relations, this article asks: what is the constitutional and political nature of UNHCR–business partnerships? What impacts, if any, do they have on the agency? And, what does this mean for understanding global constitutionalism? The article argues that UNHCR partnerships are constituted as asymmetrical political relations in terms of their distributions of power, benefits, risks and commitments, that they are having neoliberal-oriented constitutive effects on the agency and that these constitutional dynamics challenge the more mainstream and liberal-based conceptualisations, analyses and promotion of current global constitutionalism processes.

Can courts really ‘build’ democracy in a state emerging from undemocratic rule? In contemporary thought, courts are perceived as central components in any political settlement aimed at achieving a functioning democratic order in a previously authoritarian state (this piece, unlike others in the special collection, does not specifically address post-conflict contexts). The past four decades have witnessed an increasing tendency in post-authoritarian states to place significant faith in courts as guardians of the new democratic dispensation – a trend replicated in contemporary democracy-building projects (e.g. Tunisia). Constitutional courts (including supreme courts) are expected not only to breathe life into the paper promises of the democratic constitutional text, but also, increasingly, to guard and build democracy itself by policing political adherence to emerging transnational norms of democratic governance. Outside the state, regional human rights courts have also been cast as democracy-builders, acting as a support, backup mechanism, and even surrogate for domestic courts. Yet, despite this ‘court obsession’, our understanding of courts as democracy-builders remains critically underdeveloped. This article argues that while it has been assumed that courts have a central role to play in democracy-building, this assumption is based on rather slim evidence and undermined by yawning gaps in existing research.

Women use a multiplicity of forms and methods to articulate harms and claim political spaces. Among these are manifestos.1 Women’s manifestos are concomitant with both political convulsion and the enduring, mundane inequalities faced by women; they play a key role in feminist attempts to achieve political and legal ends.2 Manifestos are overtly political acts of legal/political performance; they are in dialogue with each other, with counter and anti-manifestos, and with the legal-political infrastructures they inhabit.3 Manifestos seek to fracture traditional understanding and practices of law, often in the guise of claiming constituent power and political space.

When a constitutional court faces opposition from other branches of government or significant segments of the public, should it always hold fast to what it considers constitutionally right, even where this would potentially harm its status and perceived legitimacy? Or are constitutional compromises sometimes justified? Such ‘institutionally hard’ cases – those characterised by a sharp tension between constitutional principle and institutional prudence – pose a true dilemma for constitutionalism. This article advances a realistic, yet principled, liberal-constitutional approach to this dilemma, put forth in the vein of Rawlsian non-ideal theory. It addresses a troubling gap between, on the one hand, the idealising discourse of constitutional theory – which overlooks or downplays the actual social and political pressures that courts must confront – and, on the other, a growing political science literature which, in the name of ‘realism’, views judges solely as strategic actors, leaving no role for principled reasoning. What has stepped into the gap in normative theory is a vague notion of ‘judicial statesmanship’, which praises or criticises judges post hoc, on an intuitive basis, without any tangible prescriptive bite. Developing evaluative and prescriptive guidelines for institutionally-hard cases, a non-ideal theory of constitutional adjudication should construct principles that both reinforce the commitment to ideal constitutional principle, and properly situate constitutional courts within the real – contingent and often very non-ideal – social and political contexts in which they operate.

The article attempts to illuminate how the concept of accountability is diversely shaped and signified in the theoretical legal discourse. It engages in a threefold mapping review: (i) it portrays, according to the basic divide between the angles ‘within the state’ and ‘beyond the state’, the geographical and functional contexts in which real-world political accountability mechanisms exist and interact; (ii) it interprets an influential legitimating discourse that is being used as a benchmark to appraise institutions and political processes beyond the state – the Global Administrative Law project (GAL); (iii) it highlights how this sort of accountability discourse is tied with demands for legitimacy in global governance that cannot be detached from the old political ideals. Largely oriented towards due process, I argue that the GAL project, in order to maintain a normative appeal, should not ignore larger political ideals, however controversial they might be. Otherwise, it remains a manipulable and hence unreliable cause to be endorsed.

Many recent arguments for trans-state and global democracy would offer broad leeway on constitutionalized right standards to states, and few formal mechanisms for individuals to challenge domestic rights rejections beyond the state. Such a stance, it is shown here, tends to be rooted in implicit presumptions of domestic consensus. Challenges are offered to this and related presumptions in accounts of cosmopolitan democracy, as well as global variants of liberal nationalism and political liberalism. An alternative, primarily instrumental approach to trans-state and global democracy is detailed. It would give emphasis to ways in which formal suprastate participation, complemented by challenge mechanisms for individuals, could play a crucial role in helping to strengthen individual rights protections within states. The case for adopting such an approach is reinforced through attention to the efforts of a persistent domestic democratic minority – Dalits in India – to reach out to the global human rights regime for help in pressuring their own state to better protect rights against exclusion and subjugation.

In this editorial, we consider the ways in which liberal constitutionalism is challenged by and presents challenges to the climate crisis facing the world. Over recent decades, efforts to mitigate the climate crisis have generated a new set of norms for states and non-state actors, including regulatory norms (emission standards, carbon regulations), organising principles (common but differentiated responsibility) and fundamental norms (climate justice, intergenerational rights, human rights). However, like all norms, these remain contested. Particularly in light of their global reach, their specific behavioural implications and interpretations and the related obligations to act remain debatable and the overwhelming institutionalization of the neoliberal market economy makes clear and effective responses to climate change virtually impossible within liberal societies.

This article seeks to confront the contemporary condition in which cosmopolitan law – meant to resonate as something citizens across borders author and live together – instead is increasingly a source of detachment, confusion, and alienation. Taking the European Union’s twin crises of democratic legitimacy and social solidarity as its starting point, the article offers a critique of existing approaches to supranational constitutionalism that are insufficiently responsive to this disenchantment. The article’s purpose, in turn, is to present perspectives from philosophy and legal theory that might promisingly recast, in this new cosmopolitan frame, our thinking about law as a mode of social integration. Specifically, the article’s central claim is that time – as a seldom-examined, yet essential dimension of law – is closely linked to law’s cosmopolitan potential and, concurrently, to the motivational resources for cosmopolitan solidarity. It is through a sensitivity to time – our awareness of the past passing into the present in anticipation of a future – that citizens can meaningfully hold together cosmopolitan law’s dual, ostensibly divergent hopes: shared commitment and self-decentring plurality. Drawing on Seyla Benhabib’s ‘democratic iterations’ and its roots in the work of Jacques Derrida and Robert Cover, the article elaborates the following two concepts: ‘cosmopolitan promise-making’, a diachronic form of cosmopolitan political agency; and ‘cosmopolitan legal narrative’, a set of plural, evolving constitutional interpretations open to mutual engagement over time. These concepts, in temporalizing our understanding of political identity and constitutional law, together serve to underwrite a cosmopolitan legal order without also thinning solidarity’s social and democratic foundations. The article concludes with a critique of the contemporary role of European courts and a concrete vision for the cosmopolitan development of EU jurisprudence. Reinterpreting Article 4(2) TEU as the right to constitutional narrative, the article advances new modalities and normative aspirations for constitutional interpretation beyond the nation-state.

The article has sought to clarify the phenomenon of constitutional transfer through an analysis of the introduction and implementation of the individual complaint procedure in Turkey. Individual access to constitutional courts has recently attained prominence as an effective tool of human rights protection and it is viewed as an example of the broader phenomenon of transfer of constitutional ideas from a point of origin to a new host environment. Critically applying the IKEA theory of constitutional transfer to the Turkish experience of the individual application to the Constitutional Court, we argue that the transfer process involves more than a simple interaction between the promoter and the importer, both of whom have converging as well as diverging expectations. The Turkish experience has proved a useful case to demonstrate the dynamic and multifaceted nature of the process of constitutional transfers. The Venice Commission, the European Court of Human Rights, the Turkish Constitutional Court and the Turkish Government all have important stakes in the success of the transfer to realise their own policy objectives.