We can observe some developments that indicate a further strengthening of human rights and the rule of law even after 2001. These developments are puzzling as they occurred despite largely unfavourable scope conditions. This article offers an account of these developments that focuses on dynamics endogenous to the law. These internal dynamics provide a causal mechanism that sets in once a certain threshold of legalization has been reached. We employ the Hartian notion of secondary rules which we think is an especially helpful conceptual tool to analyse the endogenous dynamics of legal systems. To the extent that law is programmed towards consistency, secondary rules become necessary in an environment of rapidly increasing legal density to govern the complexity resulting from this proliferation of norms. Upholding consistency is necessary to maintain the autonomy of law in a Luhmannian sense and the ‘morality’ of the legal system in a Fullerian sense. Our goal is to show this and at the same move beyond an argument of system or normative functionality by identifying causal mechanisms that can explain the law’s built-in drive towards secondary rules, and that are in accordance with broader social science theory. We use some insights from cognitive psychology to develop these causal mechanisms further. While testing these causal mechanisms would be beyond the scope of this paper, we hope to provide the conceptual tools for future empirical research on the dynamics of secondary rule-making and offer some empirical illustrations to demonstrate how dissonance reduction operates in practice.

This article considers the relationship between constitutions and political settlements and locates the special issue articles within this wider discussion. The article points to the apparently paradoxical connection between disillusionment with internationalised state-building techniques on one hand, and increased international faith in constitution-making as a state-building tool on the other. Using understandings of the relationship of the constitution to political settlement which draws on conventional constitutional theory, it argues that the current context of negotiated transitions requires constitution-making to be approached with an eye to the distinctive dilemmas of statecraft that pertain in contemporary transitions. The most central dilemma concerns how power-balances between political/military elites can be broadened to ensure the constitution’s capacity to fulfil its normative role in restraining power and delivering broader social inclusion. The pieces which make up this special issue draw together development and legal discourses. This article suggests how constitutional theory provides a resource for those seeking to promote constitutionalism as a tool for reaching political settlements capable of resolving conflict. It also argues that those who seek to rely on constitutions for conflict resolution need to understand this enterprise as just as political and fraught as all other institution-building efforts.

International institutions underpinning the ‘liberal international order’ are increasingly contested by established Western powers. This article contributes to a better understanding of this novel challenge ‘from within’. We conceptualize four types of contestation frames according to (1) whether contesting states attribute the source of grievances to specific practices or the underlying principles of an international institution; and (2) whether they present their own nation or the international community as the subject of grievances. Combining these two dimensions, we distinguish between globalist-reformist, nationalist-reformist, globalist-revisionist and nationalist-revisionist contestation frames. These contestation frames are consequential as they open up or shrink the discursive space for contested institutions’ re-legitimation. Drawing on the Trump Administration’s contestation of the World Bank, NATO, the UNHRC, and the WTO, we demonstrate that contestation frames and defenders’ responses varied greatly across institutions, ranging from accommodative deliberations about institutional reforms to principled rejection and the justification of the status quo.

The explosion in the literature on global constitutionalism in recent times has come at the cost of ever more, and more diverse, definitions of the concept of constitutionalism. The state of the current debate can therefore be characterised, conceptually speaking, as a ‘constitutional cacophony’. This cacophony is the inevitable result of the ‘problems of translation’ in importing the state-based concept of constitutionalism to the global level. This article attempts to counter suprastate constitutional scepticism borne of these problems of translation and resulting cacophony by revisiting the concept of constitutionalism itself through the lens of legitimacy. Arguing that legitimacy provides both a key element of the concept of constitutionalism as well as a common denominator for the application of constitutionalism both at the state and suprastate levels, it develops a conception of ‘constitutionalism as legitimacy’ as a way of vindicating the role of constitutionalism in the context of global governance. It presents constitutionalism as a discursive ‘mixed’ form of legitimacy entailing both factual and normative components involving a blend of liberalism and republicanism. These theories are then reworked into a framework of reasons for the legitimacy of an authority centring around its origins, its aims and its methods. Tracing the relationship between constitutionalism and legitimacy in this way brings harmony to the global constitutional cacophony and allows for a plausible ‘translation’ of the concept of constitutionalism between the state and suprastate levels allowing for an effective ‘mapping’ and ‘shaping’ of legitimacy in global governance which is illustrated by reference to the legitimacy crisis surrounding the United Nations Security Council’s ‘war on terror’.

Kant is regarded as one of the most influential cosmopolitan thinkers. Indeed his legacy still influences the contemporary legal and philosophical debate on this issue. But what is the Kantian conception of cosmopolitan law? In which terms does it arise out of his notion of a ‘right to visit’? How does it contribute to the construction of a ‘cosmopolitan constitution’? In this article the view is advanced that Kant was a legal constructivist. The argument assumes also that within Kant’s view of an ‘original community of interaction’, the justification of a cosmopolitan notion of authority allows exercises of freedom under a general scheme of right. Kant’s ‘cosmopolitan constitution’ depends therefore upon such rationale, as well as on the jurisdictional link that the right to visit determines in allowing individuals with the possibility to have a ‘place on earth’.

The rise of patriarchal populist leaders over the past decade has fortified a long-standing campaign by conservative governments and advocacy groups to undermine women’s international human rights. Their efforts have increasingly focused on revising language as a means to challenge and weaken the international norms and organizations essential to women’s and girls’ equality and health. Through our textual analysis of UN records, governmental and nongovernmental publications, media coverage of disputes over language, and background interviews with activists, we identify and delineate the significance of this ‘norm spoiling’ strategy and trace its expansion during the Trump administration. We find that women’s rights challengers have pursued three distinct spoiling tactics based in language: controlling what women’s rights advocates can say through policies such as the United States’ ‘global gag rule’; altering the meaning of women’s rights by reframing them as an attack on other rights, such as religious freedom; and deleting foundational words, such as ‘gender’ and ‘sexual and reproductive health and rights’, from international agreements. The role of language in today’s patriarchal populism goes beyond populist leaders’ speeches, rallies and tweets. Their governments and allies systematically control, alter or delete words central to women’s rights.

This article gives an overview of two competing paradigms in the practice of judicial organs for the resolution of norm conflicts, namely the paradigm of a human rights based hierarchy versus the paradigm of systemic integration or conflict avoidance. Judicial practice indicates that norm conflicts typically manifest themselves between human rights obligations on the one hand and other categories of international obligations on the other. Do judicial organs resolve such norm conflicts in a manner that favours human rights obligations? If so, this would support the view in the literature that the international legal order is increasingly operating within a paradigm of hierarchy, with human rights at its apex. The article addresses this question based on the results of a study conducted by 10 authors who have analysed the practice of domestic, regional, supranational and international courts in dealing with norm conflicts between human rights, on the one hand and the other sub-regimes of public international law mentioned above, on the other (de Wet and Vidmar 2011). The article argues that judicial practice reveals no clear or consistent patterns of a human rights based hierarchy in international law can currently be induced from the manner in which courts resolve norm conflicts in international law. Instead, courts avoid resolving norm conflicts within a paradigm of hierarchy and instead remain within a paradigm of systemic integration that is aimed at maximizing the accommodation of competing sub-regimes of public international law.

The United Nations treaty bodies were established to monitor the implementation of human rights by states parties. Through ‘General Comments’ – legally non-binding clarifications of treaty obligations – they have also influenced the development of international human rights law – for example, on the right to life and climate impacts. We address this phenomenon by establishing a twofold argument. First, we argue that General Comments are used by the committees to informally shape international law. They deliberately act as human rights law-makers, knowing that international institutions, organizations and professionals in their network will subsequently refer to such instruments. Second, we argue that treaty bodies not only rely on their network once they have adopted their outcome, but the experts’ personal networks also shape the drafting process of General Comments. We develop and illustrate an analytical framework with two case studies of General Comments on the human right to water and the torture prohibition. The analysis demonstrates the need for external knowledge of both technical and legal aspects of the norms being interpreted. By addressing pressing human rights challenges, expert committees can shape the law in times of stagnation and resist contestation even from powerful states.

What, if anything, can constitutions do to resist democratic backsliding? The collapse of the Weimar Republic has led scholars of comparative politics to conclude that constitutional forms and institutions can do little to resist the breakdown of democracy and the rise of autocracy. This paper offers a constitutionalist response. The outlines of that answer can be found in decades-old policy documents produced by a set of German émigré scholars during and in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War: Franz Neumann, Herbert Marcuse, and Otto Kirchheimer. The secret reports root constitutional stability in the creation of a framework for bounded partisan pluralist contestation among political parties that track the principal social and economic cleavages, and that is rooted within, and does not seek to overthrow, the underlying political economy. Second, the secret reports highlight the importance of constitutional design in creating a constitutional infrastructure for bounded pluralistic political contestation, especially with respect to the role of political parties. Third, the secret reports suggest a counter-narrative of the German Basic Law as creating a framework for political contestation that reinforces constitutional stability instead of undermining it.

Scholars have proposed a number of different ways to improve global accountability, but none has adequately addressed how individuals who commit widespread or systematic nonviolent wrongs can be held to account. I argue that for moral reasons individuals should be held accountable for nonviolent crimes against humanity and that an existing legal institution, the International Criminal Court (ICC), has the authority to prosecute such crimes. The ICC’s prosecutor should start exercising this legal authority because widespread or systematic nonviolent harms can be just as morally wrong as violent ones. What matters on my account is the gravity of a wrong, not whether it was committed violently or nonviolently. I situate these arguments in contemporary discussions of accountability, and provide evidence that individuals can cause widespread or systematic nonviolent harms that meet the legal definition of a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute, the ICC’s foundational document.

This article provides a normative account of sovereign rights to natural resources on the basis of moral principles which underlie its international legal structure – the right to self-determination and human rights. The first part locates the emergence of the system of sovereign rights to natural resources in the process of the decolonisation and justifies it as a correction of historical injustice of violent appropriation of natural resources. The second part identifies the key moral component and justificatory principle of the system of sovereign rights to natural resources – the right to self-determination. I outline a justice-based interpretation of the right to self-determination and show why rights to natural resources are its corollary. The last part connects rights to self-determination and rights to natural resources to human rights and shows how human rights define the permissible scope of rights to natural resources in two dimensions – the dimension of political legitimacy of the exercise of resource rights and the dimension of the distribution of resource benefits.

The article discusses the concept of popular sovereignty over natural resources and its possible applicability to a broader account of natural resource justice based on a moral interpretation of international law. Leif Wenar’s recent proposal to entrench popular resource sovereignty as a counterclaim to illegitimate uses of natural resources by corrupt and authoritarian regimes serves as the starting point for the discussion of the possible meaning of popular resource sovereignty and its role in an account of natural resource justice. Three key aspects of Wenar’s conception are in focus: 1) the framing of popular resource sovereignty within the current system of sovereign territoriality, 2) the notion of collective ownership of natural resources as the content of popular resource sovereignty, and 3) civil and political rights as the key set of norms determining the conditions of legitimate exercise of resource sovereignty. The article argues that collective sovereignty claims over natural resources can neither be framed exclusively through boundaries of current sovereign states, nor understood in terms of full and unlimited property rights. Concerning civil and political rights, I argue we need to move past the liberal conception of legitimacy toward a more comprehensive human rights-based conception of justice serving as a standard for assessment of legitimacy of both sovereign and non-sovereign entities which have rights over natural resources.

The current debate measuring the trade-offs between democracy and judicial review is unable to analyse the influence of courts in post-conflict states. However, a court with authority over constitutional review is commonplace in new constitutions, including those that have been drafted (or revised) as part of a political settlement. This article suggests that judicial institutions are as important as political institutions in sustaining a political settlement. As this article sets out, the parties to a peace process are required to make numerous compromises to negotiate new (or revised) institutional arrangements. Several cases are considered which illustrate how domestic constitutional courts were asked to mediate between tensions inside the political settlement. In all of the examples, the courts interpreted peace to be the most important constitutional value, or the primary purpose of the constitution. The judiciary played a role in maintaining the constitutional link to the elite pacts of the peace agreement, while acknowledging that the link should not preserve elite pacts permanently or without limit. The article argues, first, that these cases constitute evidence of an emergent global ‘peace jurisprudence’ based on purposive interpretation and a principle of proportionality that protects the foundations of the political settlement, and, second, questions the extent to which international courts are willing or able to adopt this jurisprudence.

In this article, I argue against the claim that the practice of the European Court of Human Rights cannot be reconciled with the democratic-procedural standards by which state parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, decide about the content and scope of human rights norms. First, I suggest drawing the attention to the neglected balancing exercise of the review process, in which the Court has to determine whether a violation is nevertheless ‘necessary in a democratic society’. Second, I shed light on the role that ‘pluralism’ plays in the balancing (with particular emphasis on Articles 8–11). Third, I argue that Thomas Christiano’s egalitarian argument for democracy can best illuminate the Court’s reliance on pluralism.

This article examines the reasons for different constitutional approaches to platform governance across the Atlantic. By adopting a comparative perspective under the lens of digital constitutionalism, it analyses the move from converging to diverging strategies of the United States and the European Union to address platform governance. From a liberal approach inspired by the US framework at the end of the last century, the European Union has moved towards a constitutional democratic strategy as demonstrated, for instance, by the launch of the Digital Services Act. On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States has reacted to the consolidation of platform governance by maintaining a liberal approach based on a vertical paradigm driven by the First Amendment. Given these democratic and liberal approaches, this article explains how the different constitutional premises of the United States and the European Union have produced diverging responses to the power of online platforms, thus underlining different expressions of digital constitutionalism across the Atlantic. The first section of the article introduces the rise of digital constitutionalism as the primary research angle to study the trans-Atlantic approaches to platform governance. The second section compares the European and US responses to the rise of platform powers. The third section focuses on the implications of these different constitutional strategies on a global scale.

This introduction sets the stage for the special issue on the ‘ideologies of global constitutionalism’. It describes the competing approaches for conceptualising and analysing global constitutionalism. It then turns to highlight the overlooked ideologies underlying global constitutionalism through a thematic exposition of the articles in the special issue. In particular, the introduction questions the conventional link between global constitutionalism and neo-liberalism, explores a materialist analysis of global constitutionalism, analyses the validity of the liberal global constitutionalist paradigm for non-liberal regimes, and discusses the potential for the abuse of that liberal paradigm through the migration of constitutional doctrine.

The article develops a Kantian account of constitutional justice: the explication of those structural features of a legal system whose purpose is to optimise a polity’s capacity to achieve a Rightful condition. The People, in enacting a rights-based constitution, have placed their freedom in trust. Rights ground a system of reciprocal freedom among individuals, while conferring on officials the authority to make and enforce law, subject to constraints laid down by the Universal Principle of Right [UPR]. A constitutional court, the trustee of the regime, supervises the rights-regarding acts of all other officials, assesses the reasons officials give when they take decisions that burden rights, and invalidates those acts when reasons given to justify such burdens fail to meet the demands of the UPR. Although some rights will be expressed in absolute terms, most will be qualified by a limitation clause. In adjudicating qualified rights, the court can do no better than to adopt the proportionality principle. The UPR, operationalised through proportionality analysis, lays down a basic criterion for the legitimacy of all law. Because Public, International, and Cosmopolitan Right share certain micro-foundations in common, we can extend the analysis to transnational systems of rights protection.

Individual relationships between Mainland China and Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan are considered confusing for some because China’s rising international power is not resulting in stronger calls for a shared identity based on ‘Chinese pride’ or historical links. Instead, China’s economic growth appears to be provoking increasingly stronger calls for autonomy or independence. In this article I discuss why Beijing’s self-described peace and development policy is failing to procure positive responses in those four regions, with a primary focus on the failed use of narrowly-defined Westphalian thinking to understand relevant issues. I argue that the reason for this failure is the tension between the individualist ontology underlying modern international politics (as expressed in terms of Westphalian sovereignty) and the relational ontology underpinning a traditional Chinese politics built upon a tianxia (‘all-under-heaven’) world view. This tension has become conspicuous in the context of China’s recent rise and Beijing’s growing confidence in contesting Western power. The Chinese leadership’s reliance on arguments involving historical connections with Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and calls for autonomy or independence from citizens living in those four areas, are examples of this contestation.