Through the analytical framework of ‘transnational constitutional engagement’, this article examines the dynamically developing practices of the South Korean Constitutional Court as it engages with international and foreign elements, both within and beyond constitutional adjudication processes. Diverse underlying factors and orientations in varied contexts, and the complex interactions between them, are responsible for shaping the modes of a local constitutional actor’s engagement with the transnational. In the vertical aspect, the court adopts international human rights law as a substantive standard of constitutional review through a version of cosmopolitan constitutional interpretation, while it has nevertheless exhibited ambiguity and incoherency in concrete applications. The horizontal aspects of transnational engagement include the court’s practice of referencing foreign law and cases in constitutional adjudication. The vibrancy and the evolving patterns of its citation practice reflect the court’s growing self-perception vis-à-vis the world – although limitations remain, such as geographical asymmetries among referenced jurisdictions. The court has also been enthusiastic in interacting with various transnational counterparts beyond adjudication processes, demonstrating eminent leadership in regional network-building among constitutional courts in Asia. With both cosmopolitan aspirations and nationalist ambitions playing a role in their shaping, the modes of transnational constitutional engagement are not to be generalized, but require contextualization, and the relevant practices should be subject to constant evaluations for their contribution in producing sound and effective concretizations of the values of global constitutionalism.

This article addresses the problématique of giving voice to homegrown traditions of constitutionalism in individual African countries. The scholarly discussion is combined with an applied concern about whether this could instil a wider grassroots embrace of the country’s constitution, thereby consolidating constitutionalism and ensuring longevity. The investigation is carried through the lens of two sub-categories of the concept of constitutional identity: a representative one that reflects a country’s particular political, social and cultural makeup, and an aspirational one that sets goals and ideals. The challenge, in both scholarly and applied terms, is how to ensure that a constitution instils a sense of public ownership by becoming more representative of a country’s underlying makeup while also giving voice to modern aspirations to protect and promote individual human rights, and in doing so, also becoming self-sustaining as the foundational basic law guiding future generations. Attention is paid not only to the forms of constitutions but also to their function in both reaching ideals (in the positive sense of success) and staving off pitfalls (in the negative sense of success). The article also discusses whether these are best achieved through gradual terms over time or through the sudden big bang of mega reforms.

Focusing on the expanding realm of international adjudication, this article approaches justice from the domain of the empirical and shows – through a careful, interview-based case study analysis in the WTO context – that justice in the international context is not only a contested concept, but also a multifaceted one, deeply embedded in notions such as the rule of law, fairness, equality, transformation, and cooperation. Whereas in the past, the primary, if not the sole role of international courts was that of settling disputes, in their modern legalised reincarnation these empowered international institutions have come to be seen primarily as enforcement mechanisms. Mechanisms that have been put in place by states in order to give effect to their originally negotiated commitments, and to hold states (or other entities) accountable for the international rules agreed-upon. Within this common enforcement-centred discourse of international courts, in turn, the natural tendency has so far been to think of ‘justice’ mainly through its ‘legal’ or ‘rule of law’ dimension. This article challenges this enforcement-centred discourse. Focusing on the vibrant WTO dispute settlement system (DSS) and its operation throughout the perennial EC–Bananas dispute, the article argues that the current enforcement-oriented debate of international courts, and the WTO DSS in particular, is lacking in several aspects. First, it brushes aside other important roles served by the DSS, and consequently overshadows the manifold social outcomes – beyond rule-compliance – produced by this system. Second, the prevalent rule-enforcement discourse further works in turn as to mask the multiple challenges of justice encapsulated in international disputes reaching the DSS docket, and obstructs the need to explore other conceptions of justice – beyond its legal-procedural meaning – such as global distributive, corrective, or transformative justice, through which the diverse roles and outcomes of the DSS may (and should) be evaluated. Against this backdrop, the article puts forwards a broad multifunctional account of the WTO DSS, which goes beyond the prevalent view of the system as primarily an enforcement mechanism, portraying it instead as a system of multiple, competing, and shifting roles. Among them, providing an orderly mechanism of renegotiation, redistribution, and settlement. Roles that essentially allow WTO Members to readjust their original WTO commitments and reallocate their burdens and benefits of international cooperation, and thereby to arrive at new – at times not fully legally-compliant – but not necessarily ‘unjust’ cooperative and sustainable social outcomes.

The contemporary crisis in relation to constitutional literacy relates not to the lack of knowledge that citizens possess about fundamental constitutional texts, but to the considerable lack of development in relation to what constitutional literacy itself entails. This article accordingly unpacks the notion of constitutional literacy: its importance, its characteristics, and its variable nature. Using a comparative lens, the article invites reflection on the role we expect citizens to play in our democracies, and especially the associated knowledge and skills required for successful state performance. We suggest that constitutional literacy is exceptionally multifaceted and fluid in nature, which serves to make its conceptualization and measurement challenging endeavours, and certainly more so than the easy invocation of this notion may assume at first blush. In this regard, engaging with the constitutional text, while an integral component of constitutional literacy, is ultimately only one part of the puzzle.

This article traces how the ‘freedom indispensable for scientific research’ was introduced into the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The review of the drafting history covers ICESCR Article 15.3 and that of its precursor, Article 27 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). It pays particular attention to arguments presented during negotiations over the UDHR (adopted in 1948), as well as over the ICESCR (adopted in 1966), and it reflects on observable norm entrepreneurship. Following the end of the Cold War, details on the right to science and the status of higher education personnel were further elaborated in soft law, notably in the form of two General Comments and two UNESCO Recommendations. These specifications and the earlier traveaux préparatoires reveal a multifaceted and rich debate about science, development, dignity and freedom at the United Nations, including positions that span variations of a liberal science script as well as persistent illiberal contestations.

This article sheds a critical light on judicial dialogue when its purpose and meaning are taken beyond cross-fertilization and comparative reasoning. It cautions against a conceptualization of judicial dialogue as a means to foster commonalities between courts and to legitimize judicial governance. The argument develops from an idealized notion of a ‘transnational judicial public sphere’. In this sphere, domestic, regional and international courts ideally form common opinions through dialogue and pursue common purposes. The danger of this understanding is to construct a new paradigm that not only overlooks important differences in the interest, influence and opinion of courts, but also overstates the socio-normative significance of exchanges between courts and of judicial governance in general. The critical potential of judicial dialogues lies less in the formation of commonalities or in the legitimization of judicial authority than in bringing alternatives and a plurality of opinions to the fore.

Federations present difficulties for prevailing theories of constituent power, which usually attribute ultimate constitution-making authority to a singular people. This article examines how a ‘pluralized’ constituent power functions in federal systems. It argues that the operation of plural constituent power in federations reflects a distinctive model of constitutional formation according to which a ‘polity of polities’ is established and sustained through the maintenance of a tension between plurality and unity.

The recent fortieth anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has sparked a good deal of reflection and retrospection. Looking back, it is clear that the Convention’s architects carefully navigated, and selectively absorbed, a number of competing visions of oceanic governance, from freedom to enclosure to visions of Global North–South equality. This made the Convention’s construction period a very drawn-out and painful one – longer than for any other international treaty in history – and while some hopes were realized, others were dashed. Forty years on, it is important not to let its current canonical status blind us to the fact that the Convention came close to being a failure, and that things could have gone differently at a number of critical junctures. Nor should it stop us asking whether UNCLOS is really fit for purpose today. In this article, I situate the Convention within wider developments in the global economy and the global environment, and consider the role it has played in promoting goals of global justice and environmental protection.

Anarchy is the conceptual cornerstone of international relations theory and international law scholarship. Anarchy is described as the ordering principle of the international system, it is used as a variable that explains state behaviour, and the international legal order is depicted as anarchic and decentralised. This article questions this privileged status of anarchy. It challenges the designation of anarchy as the ‘ordering principle’ of the international system, and proposes an alternative theoretical construct – the Constitutive Regime of the International System – that performs the functions of the ‘ordering principles’ of the international system. This Constitutive Regime consists of three components. The first is a principle of differentiation that identifies the constituent units of the international system. The second is a theory of world order that prescribes policies and principles that are necessary to maintain order within the system, and the third are the secondary rules of international law that generate the international law-making and law-enforcement processes. In short, the Constitutive Regime provides a novel theoretical vernacular to understand and conceptualise the normative foundations of the international system.

The laws of war and international human rights law (IHRL) overlap, often with competing obligations. When two or more areas of the law overlap, political agents attempt to address these areas of ambiguity with interstitial rules. However, a lack of consensus on interstitial rules can destabilise the law, leading to increased contestation of legal norms and principles. Such is the case for international law in counterterrorism. Prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks (9/11), international agreements and US domestic practices placed counterterrorism within the framework of law enforcement. After 9/11, the Bush Administration replaced law enforcement with armed conflict and the laws of war as the dominant paradigm for counterterrorism, but this decision, among other legal justifications in the War on Terror, has been contested by the international legal community. As IHRL still applies in law enforcement operations, international law in counterterrorism now sits within a contested overlap of IHRL and the laws of war. The contestation of US policies in the War on Terror, including the use of drone strikes in particular, is a product of this unresolved overlap and the lack of clear interstitial rules. Lacking these rules, US counterterrorism policies risk undermining the rule of law.

This article addresses the bastardization of constitutional law in Argentina and the corrosive power of legacies of authoritarianism. It offers a genealogy of the use by Argentina’s Supreme Court of self-restraint canons from the time when they were borrowed from the US Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century. Partly resulting from the country’s experiences with military rule, the court transformed or expanded these canons, which entailed a gradual depreciation of statutes as the (uneasy) cornerstone of constitutionalism. Based on a fresh dataset and employing narrative and network analysis, the article focuses on a slogan the court has invoked since the 1960s: invalidating a rule is a matter of extreme institutional gravity and hence a strategy of last resort. Under the 1976–83 dictatorship, the court applied the slogan to various rules, including those passed by the military. It thus invoked familiar canons outside its scope conditions, conveying an illusion of constitutional regularity by masking the abnormal in acceptable garb and contributing to the regime’s legitimation. While the democratic court abandoned the most blatant expressions of authoritarianism, connections persisted, manifesting in the frequent citations to the dictatorship court’s use of the slogan and its extension to any rule. Authoritarian legacies die hard.

The various and diverse academic responses to the Conference on the Future of Europe’s efforts at democratic renewal, including those by Ben Crum, Markus Patberg and Sandra Seubert, speak not only to the lack of a clear institutional locus or pathway associated with the Conference, but also to differing understandings of the basic conditions of existence – or political ontology – of the European Union. These differing understandings are reflected in different attitudes to the European Union’s constitutional standing and prospects. This article explores how the special place of constitutional retrofitting in the European Union – of reconstructing and reimagining an originally pre-constitutional system in constitutional terms – helps to illuminate the different understanding of political ontology in play, and helps clarify what is at stake in the continuing debate over fundamental reform.

In A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Kant, Constitutional Justice and the European Convention on Human Rights, Alec Stone Sweet and Clare Ryan reconstruct Kant’s legal philosophy as a program of cosmopolitan legal order (CLO). A CLO is defined as a multi-level, judicialized, transnational system of rights protection that confers on all persons, by virtue of their humanity, the entitlement to challenge the rights-regarding decisions of public officials, who are under an obligation to assure the equal juridical status of all. The authors illustrate this claim with respect to the development of the ECtHR and the Court of Justice of the European Union. While generally agreeing with their argument, I claim that they minimize the republican aspects of Kant’s political philosophy in favour of strong judicial review. After outlining republican and democratic objections, I claim that their book illustrates a model that I call ‘dialogic constitutionalism’. Dialogic constitutionalism does not neglect legislative authority, but places it in a conversation with judicial authority, whether domestic or transnational; such conversations can serve to upgrade standards of rights protection over time and are not frozen precommitments. Constitutions also have a representative function of standing for the intergenerational continuity of the people, whereas legislatures are bound by electoral cycles.

In this article, I ask about the extent to which the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) has advanced democracy in the European Union. I critically engage with the claim that the CoFoE’s success should not be measured by whether it enabled constituent power, or ultimately results in treaty reforms, but by the fact that, by introducing citizens’ assemblies to EU politics, it has laid the foundation for participatory democracy in the European Union. Drawing on established theories of participatory democracy, I argue that this interpretation misses the point. To put forward an alternative view, I revisit James Bohman’s concept of a democratic minimum. The best democratic defence of permanent EU citizens’ assemblies is that they could provide citizens with the capacity to initiate deliberation about common concerns – and thus function as a nucleus for constituent power in the European Union. Nevertheless, the idea should be viewed with caution, as permanent citizens’ assemblies could just as well become a democratic fig-leaf allowing EU institutions to reject calls for fundamental reforms. Much therefore depends on their institutional design.

This article examines the development of the doctrine of the ‘permanent constituent power’ in Mexico. This doctrine reflects a long tradition in constitutional theory according to which the exercise of constituent power is a one-time event: once a constitution is adopted, there will be no legal mechanism in place for the exercise of the people’s original constitution-making authority. This view is nonetheless in tension with a notion that has also been historically embraced by liberal constitutionalism: that the people has an inalienable right to alter the form of government. The constitutional provisions that reflect that idea, we will see, can have important implications in terms of the nature and scope of the amending authority and, at the same time, point toward alternative mechanisms for the exercise of constituent authority. By closely examining the operation of those kinds of provisions in the Mexican constitution, we seek to illustrate a tension central to the liberal constitutional tradition and to suggest a way out of it. In so doing, we aim to draw some lessons from the Mexican case that can contribute to current discussions about constituent power and fundamental constitutional change in liberal constitutional orders.

What is the significance of the School Strike for Climate from an international constitutional perspective? In this article, I compare the School Strike for Climate with the Hong Kong protests of 2019–20. Both these movements became necessary because of gaps in their countries’ respective domestic and international legal frameworks – what I term constitutionalism gaps. The immediate cause of each protest was how state and non-state actors exploited these constitutionalism gaps in the existing legal framework. Protests in Hong Kong were triggered by the attempt to enact an Extradition Law that threatened people’s autonomy, whereas the School Strike for Climate is a response to the failure of the state to deliver climate justice. Both these movements use similar strategies of advocacy and they have relied extensively on new technology. Based on this comparison, I argue that the School Strike for Climate promotes procedural and substantive values of constitutionalism at the international level, similar to the Hong Kong Protests at the domestic level. Through the School Strike for Climate, people seek to engage directly in the transnational legal process. In attempting to bridge the constitutionalism gap at the international level, the School Strike for Climate promotes values of global constitutionalism.

How can we account for the normative dimension of international practices? Silviya Lechner and Mervyn Frost’s Practice Theory and International Relations answers this question by proposing, with a considerable degree of epistemological sophistication, what the authors call ‘normative descriptivism’, which they combine with a focus on ‘macro practices’. In this contribution, I start by examining the authors’ engagement with IR’s practice turn, and the insights this engagement may offer on the underlying objective of their approach. I then turn to Lechner and Frost’s decision to eclipse history. The contribution concludes by using the evolution of international law as a cursory illustration of the types of analyses Lechner and Frost’s approach would lead to. It thereby emphasises potential challenges inherent in the authors’ combination of internalism as rooted in individual self-consciousness and a focus on ‘macro practices’, including the possibility that it might limit the potential to critically question the standard that becomes identified as universal.

There is a need for the field of global constitutionalism to consider a wider array of voices, such as women’s voices and perspectives from the Global South. Here, I argue that global constitutionalism must pay attention not only to a wider array of human perspectives, but also to non-human perspectives and to different understandings of what the law is and can be. Evaluating how international law categorizes the environment and non-human animals as things or objects to be exploited for human needs, I argue that posthuman feminism provides an alternative epistemic frame for rethinking both global constitutionalism and international law.