Some words said in closing to the recent International Conference on Federalism in New Delhi (hereinafter 4th ICF) could not help but bring to mind the lyrics of an old pop song: “Thank you India”, said George Anderson, President of the Forum of Federations, echoing the well-known refrain of his compatriot Alanis Morissette. In her hit single “THANK U”, Morissette expresses gratitude to India for the life lessons she learned during a visit. Anderson's words provoked at least this audience member to reflect upon “Unity in Diversity” and to “learn […] from each other”, the ICF's overall theme and goal. Ironically, the lessons that I draw are not dissimilar from Morissette's: “clarity”, “consequence”, and “disillusionment”. For these valuable lessons I would like to express gratitude too, namely to the Indian Government, the Conference host.

Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code (TPC), much debated at both national and international levels, has recently been subject to an amendment aimed at clarifying its meaning and averting more distressing cases related to freedom of expression. It should be noted that the former article 301 was an amended version of article 159 of the former TPC of 1926. As Türkan Sancar rightly states in her comprehensive book on both articles 159 and 301, article 159 is an article which has been revised many times. It was amended seven times after coming into effect in 1926 (in 1936, 1938, 1946, 1961, twice in 2002, and 2003). The new TPC was introduced as a package of penal-law reform prior to the opening of negotiations for Turkish membership of the European Union, and came into effect on 1 June 2005. Article 301 stated the following:

1. 1. A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be sentenced a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to three years.

2. 2. A person who publicly denigrates the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial bodies of the State, the military or security organizations, shall be sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to two years.

3. 3. Where denigrating of Turkishness is committed by a Turkish citizen in another country, the penalty to be imposed shall be increased by one third.

4. 4. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime.

Evolutionary theories have always been treated by legal scholars as a sort of cousin to the legal theoretical family, both in Europe and the United States. They are nice theories, they tell interesting stories, you sometimes listen to what they have to say and when among friends, you may even quote them. However, in the modern mononuclear family, when it is time to tackle important issues and reach important decisions, or simply to celebrate some success stories, these cousins are often left outside the door, being simply “relatives” and not part of the legal family in the proper sense. A former evolutionary scholar strikingly stated in a manner that can be seen as representative of the general skepticism towards the evolutionary approach of a large segment of the legal family, “Legal scholarship should not be so timid as to depend on others for its theoretical models. We might take our inspiration where we find it, but we should build our theories within our own discipline, constrained only by the data that defines it and the criteria of quality appropriate to it.” The main objective of this article is to take the first step towards making evolutionary theory “our own discipline,” by elevating evolutionary theory from the status of “cousin” to one of “sibling” (or at least “in-laws”) of the legal family. The focus in particular is to understand why, despite the fact that the evolutionary theory approach to law (or “evolutionary theory and law”) has been present quite a while in the legal scholar's discussion, the legal world at large has left it at the front step of the legal house. Based on this analysis, the task is also to evaluate whether it is possible, after certain adjustments, to invite evolutionary theory into the larger family of legal thinking, in particular as part of the legal theories of law-making (as “legal evolutionary theory”).

On 1 November 2007 the Finanzmarktrichtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz (FRUG) came into effect. The FRUG is supplemented by two directives, the Wertpapierdienstleistungs-Verhaltens- und Organisationsverordnung (WpDVerOV) (as amended by the Erste Verordnung zur Änderung der Wertpapierdienstleistungs-Verhaltens- und Organisationsverordnung) and the Erste Änderungsverordnung zur Finanzanalyseverordnung. Together with the aforementioned directives the FRUG implements the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) into German law, which is itself supplemented by a MiFID Implementing Directive and a Commission Regulation. Altogether this legislation is part of the Financial Services Action Plan of the European Commission aiming at the formation of a single market for financial services. The new legislation leads to material changes in the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG). On the one hand numerous new regulations have been added, on the other hand already existing regulations have become much more detailed. Thus the WpHG has finally become “the constitution” of German capital market law.

CITES is acknowledged as one of the most successful international environmental treaties in the world. CITES is not just a conservation treaty, it is also a trade instrument that attempts to strike a balance between these often competing values.

Although the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a technical intergovernmental organization with a limited mandate, it has been entrusted with a panoply of tasks. These include, inter alia, the international harmonization of intellectual property law, the administration of fee-based global intellectual property protection services, and the delivery of dispute resolution services to individuals. While the central role of WIPO in the continuous development of substantive intellectual property law has been questioned by developing countries, the administrative activities of WIPO have remained largely unscathed by critique and, therefore, have not attracted much attention. They revolve around the international filing, registration or recognition of industrial property rights, such as patents, industrial designs and trademarks, and provide an interesting perspective on the law of international institutions.

In the field of environmental law, be it on the domestic or the international level, it is especially difficult to develop effective regulatory systems and systems for sanctions to enforce obligations. The legal solutions employed under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, as well as the Kyoto Protocol, constitute a fascinating attempt to address these problems, providing “a huge testing ground for the legal instruments of environmental policy, at the international as well as on the lower levels,” mirroring “enormous creativity in the design of regulatory approaches.” Even though the Kyoto Protocol, “if fully implemented, will not … avert or even slow climate change,” it serves as a fine example of emerging international composite administrations, where multiple actors participate in transnational institutions of a multilevel system, serving the common goal of mitigating climate change. The climate change regime's unique regard to flexibility in fulfillment is particularly prominent. This is complemented by especially stringent and complex compliance mechanisms, which have no parallel in other international forms of cooperation. A further significant characteristic of the system is the high degree of legitimacy enjoyed by its institutional organization, its procedures and procedural outcomes. Thus, the international cooperation under the framework of the Kyoto Protocol is a landmark: it achieves not only flexibility but also a high degree of legitimacy and represents a more mature example of the exercise of public authority by international institutions.

The most important change in public international law over the past century has been a re-direction of its focus exclusively on states to a broadened scope of subjects including, most importantly, individual human beings. This shift in the status of individuals may be directly traced to the widely acknowledged need, in the aftermath of the Second World War, for a more adequate response to the Holocaust and other large-scale atrocities than that offered by traditional international law. Substantive concerns led to the development of human rights law. Victims' demands for compensation or restitution for the material injuries caused by genocidal Nazi persecution spurred a parallel procedural revolution. The innovation lay in national and international recognition of individuals' rights to assert such claims on their own behalf against their own governments, foreign states and foreign private entities.