Sociology of law usually applies three basic distinctions that also can be applied to the analysis of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law or constitution).

More than a year has passed since the European Commission introduced the European Private Company (Societas Privata Europaea, SPE) in June 2008. What has become of the draft statute? This paper is meant to give a short overview of its basic features, the other European institutions' discussions and statements, the problems that prevented the proposal from being adopted so far and possible solutions that were introduced.

In the first place, I should like to stress that the emphasis of my rather ambitious-sounding subtitle is on ‘speculation’, and not on ‘the future of international law’; for one, it is, at least at the time of writing, entirely speculative to think about the mid- and long-term consequences of the September 11 attacks, since, so far, the announced response to the attacks by the United States, the ‘West’ and the ‘civilised world’, has not yet happened. We are in a strange state of limbo, where everything seems possible, from secret James Bond-type operations to outright military attack of Afghanistan by the US and NATO troops, from civil war in Pakistan to biological —or even nuclear-counterattacks by the terrorist fold, from ‘business as (almost) usual’ to ‘the world is out of joint’. At such times, to speculate is not only all one can do, but it is, I believe, positively encouraged for those who professionally and/or passionately deal with the structure and meaning of social reality, as, inter alia, international legal academics do. Secondly, the emphasis is also on speculation because, evidently, it would be quite preposterous to pretend to set out, in a very brief comment written ‘out of the moment’, what all this will come to mean for so richly textured an academic discourse as international law. Yet international law and international lawyers are in everyone's mouth at this moment, and so it seems precisely apt to ‘speculate’ —and no more—, in rough sketch, about the consequences the events of September 11 and their political-military aftermath could have on the theory and practice of the ‘law of nations’.

This spring, Florence was cluttered with peace flags, hanging out from private apartments, churches, official buildings, and businesses. One day in the middle of March, I counted as many as 50 bandiere de la pace in a single street crossing in the Oltrarno area, south of the river Arno. On 9 June 31 of them were still hanging there. At the time of my first count, it was obvious that the flags all meant “no” to the military action that was to begin in Iraq. What did they mean two months after the fall of Baghdad?

In these notes, I reflect on the possibilities of confronting the darkest chapters of East-Central European history, namely, genocide. This problem is closely related to the moral refoundation of society, law and politics. My concerns are primarily related to the role of law in the process, both descriptively, by trying to explain very contradictory developments in Hungary, and normatively, by arguing for a shame dictated legal policy.

The revival of the political constitution has come about in parallel with two developments, one in constitutional practice and the other in political theory. With regard to the former, the political constitution has been seen as something of a bulwark against the rise of legal (or judicial, or common law) constitutionalism. The seeming hegemony of this latter model of constitutionalism among contemporary lawyers and political scientists has produced from (so-called) political constitutionalists a reaction against the delegation of important decisions to non-political institutions and an obsessively court-centered scholarship. Perceiving this shift in focus from political to legal institutions to be the very antithesis of the traditional Commonwealth (more particularly, of the United Kingdom's parliamentary) model of constitutionalism, and, more broadly, to be an affront to democratic sensibilities, the notion of the political constitution was retrieved and defended in a seminal article in the 1979 edition of the Modern Law Review, written (though first delivered in his Chorley Lecture the previous year) by the late John Griffith. More recently, in the work of Adam Tomkins, Richard Bellamy, and Grégoire Webber and Graham Gee, a normative interpretation has been lent to Griffith's thesis so as to provide a full-fledged constitutional theory capable of standing as an alternative to the liberal-legal paradigm—a turn, one might say, from the political constitution to political constitutionalism.

At the current stage of its evolution, the European Union (“Union” or “EU”) has reached a juncture where many leaders and scholars believe that greater integration is both desirable and necessary. Presumably, a primary method by which greater solidarity and integration can be achieved within the EU is through the public inclusion of common value-laden concepts – as defined through a dialectical process – present within comprehensive doctrines such as religion. To date, however, an effective and inclusive means for utilizing religion in this manner has yet to be formulated. In response, this article takes two prominent paradigms – Jurgen Habermas' intersubjective discourse theory and John Rawls' liberalism – to approach the problem and draws from them a new solution that, while tied to their theoretical underpinnings, is nonetheless a novel approach to achieving greater integration within the Union. Under this new framework, the process of legislatively defining human rights allows the morality common to European comprehensive doctrines – including official and unofficial religions – to bolster the Union's solidarity, legitimacy, and democracy both procedurally and substantively.

In the current European social and political climates there is much focus on forming the European Union into a more integrated, sustainable, and globally competitive economic market. This ideology is especially reflected in the aims of the EU 2020 agenda. With regards to these economic goals, it is very important that European law protects the economic freedoms of all participants in the internal market. Considering the alternative and concurrent 2020 goals of social integration, social cohesion, and human rights protection, EU law is also bound to protect the rights of workers and the public interest.

During the past year, I have had an intensive and ongoing dialogue with European government officials about U.S. counterterrorism laws and policies, especially those relating to the detention, questioning, and transfer of members of al Qaida and the Taliban. During this same period, the U.S. legal framework governing the detention and treatment of detainees has evolved significantly, through the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act last December, the Supreme Court's decision in the Hamdan case in June, the transfer of 14 al Qaida leaders to Guantanamo in September, the announcement of new DOD detention policies in September, and the enactment of the Military Commissions Act earlier this month. It has been vexing that so many myths and misunderstandings about United States policies have proliferated. My dialogue with EU governments during the past year has helped to clear up some of these myths and to address issues that are troubling to Europeans. Tonight, I want to provide a comprehensive public explanation of our legal views and policy decisions with respect to the detention and treatment of terrorists, as these have evolved in the United States since September 11th.

All jurisdictions assume a concept of an act of a sexual nature by regulating sex crimes. Until the sex revolution and feminist movements for equality in sexual relations, criminal law was mostly concerned with specific types of sexual acts, particularly non-marital sexual intercourse. With the paradigm shift of recent years, criminalization tends to embrace all acts of a sexual nature with another person without her valid consent. Whether the law contains a definition of a sexual act or not, borderline cases show that neither merely objective criteria nor purely subjective elements can serve as basis for the description of the conduct under prohibition. Our Article tries to overcome this deficit in the criminal law theory. Sexual acts should not be understood through the metaphor of a “picture,” as German legal scholars believe, but with the metaphor of a script played out by an actor as sexual theorists put it.

[Editors’ Comment: The following is the text of Mr. Kenny's remarks at the Second European Corporate Governance Conference, which was organized by the Vlerick Management Institute and the University of Gent, Belgium, and held at the Belgian National Bank, Brussels, 28 & 29 November 2002. The conference, which was convened by Professor Lutgart Van den Berghe of the University of Gent, was dedicated to the intensive debate over the marks and characteristics of “European Capitalism” in light of the international corporate governance debate, which has been affected by the recent earthquakes in the confidence of investors, shareholders and stakeholders precipitated by the corporate scandals of Enron, Worldcom, Global Crossing and others. The conference also took note of the impact of America's new Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, which seeks to respond to the wave of corporate scandals, on the international corporate governance debate.

This article focuses on the European Court of Justice's [ECJ] recent case law on the free movement of goods in order to show how the boundaries of the prohibition laid out under Articles 28 to 30 EC are once again coming under strain. Such a development, it will be argued, can be observed both in terms of the modification of the scope of the prohibitions set out by Articles 28 and 29 EC and of their application to purely internal situations.

Negotiated agreements in criminal trials—often, somewhat deprecatingly, called “deals” in Germany—are a curious phenomenon. Such agreements informalize criminal proceedings, yet—according to the legislature—they are also restrained by the formal structure of German procedural law, through the principle of judicial investigation. The restraining of deals via procedural law seems like a futile attempt to achieve the impossible: In an inquisitorial system, the court is obliged to find the “real,” material truth by extending the taking of evidence to all facts and means of proof relevant to the decision. Neither ascertainment of guilt nor sentencing can be based merely on hypothetical facts of the case. A recent judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court on negotiated agreements has stressed that it is unconstitutional to base a conviction on facts that have been mutually agreed upon, if it is not certain that the facts are actually real. This decision hints at the problems deals pose for criminal proceedings in Germany. Despite these problems, such agreements have been very common in the last years and decades. There are many reasons for this. We are going to discuss the most important ones here.

When former state president C. Wulff stood accused of having received benefits from a film producer known to him for several years, he argued: “Is a politician not entitled to have friends?” Before such background, the question of where to draw the line between social life of a public servant or politician and criminal behavior arises. Are such persons subject to permanent threat of criminal prosecution if they accept invitations etc., or is it their obligation to the general public to refrain from accepting donations from persons who have interests in their decisions, even if these persons are long known friends of the public servant?

On January 20, 2007, the Transparenzrichtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz (Transparency Directive Implementation Act or TUG) came into effect implementing the European Transparency Directive. It entails some significant changes to the disclosure requirements of German listed corporations, such as a newly introduced Bilanzeid (confirmation of the balance sheet). In addition, material alterations to the share ownership notification rules in the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (German Securities Trading Act or WpHG) have been made. The latter changes should be carefully observed by investors and are analyzed in this article.

This article argues that the European Central Bank (ECB), supported by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), can be perceived to have functionally softened the no sovereign lender of last resort (LOLR) rule originally implied by Articles 123 and 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) towards a rule-with-exceptions and, increasingly, towards a presumption: The ECB will act as sovereign LOLR to a constituent Member unless and until that Member is insolvent or unwilling to cooperate with measures designed to restore market confidence. This functional moderation of a rule, from an ex ante specification of an outcome towards the exercise of greater choice at the point of application, carries with it contentious normative questions. To motivate discussion thereof beyond a largely ahistorical, non-indexical, rules versus discretion debate, the rules of the currency union are located within the genealogy of international exchange rate regimes. The “convertibility” rule of the gold standard and the “parity” rule of the Bretton Woods system are contrasted with their Eurozone equivalent. A consequentialist standpoint is sketched out from which the interventions of the ECB, in light of their available alternatives, appear broadly consistent with welfarist cost-benefit analysis and less normatively worrisome than by reference to evaluative criteria that emphasize a narrowly rule-bound conception of the rule of law.

In light of the uncertainty surrounding recent unilateral declarations of independence, this Article purports to re-visit the question of their legal nature under international law. The Article shows that the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) judgment in the Kosovo advisory opinion (hereafter referred to as the Kosovo Opinion) is of little assistance in establishing whether and to what extent such declarations fall within the ambit of international law. The Article proceeds to examine claims that unilateral declarations of independence are regulated—entirely or partly—by international law and argues that these claims are ill-founded on multiple grounds. The Article asserts that international law is legally neutral towards the claims—a proposition in accord with both the factual nature of the process of state formation in international law and with the relevant practice.