The populist challenge to constitutional democracy—and constitutionalism as its modus operandi—is significant and raises deep questions regarding the nature of modern democracy. A crucial question pertains to the challenge that our existing (but eroding) democratic systems faces. The way we perceive this challenge is essential for our descriptive and prescriptive contributions. The first, perhaps most widely embraced view, is to perceive populism as a ‘disease’, ‘deviation’, or ‘pathology’ of existing democracy. A second view understands contemporary ‘neo-populisms’ rather as one particular instance of a rather profound, complex, and long-term set of transformations of democracy. Where we stand on this matter is of great importance, as the feasibility and potential success of our responses and solutions depend on our description of the problem. Many of the contributions to this special issue clearly go beyond the current state-of-the-art, in which populism and constitutionalism are often seen as mutually exclusive categories. The special issue provides ample reflection on intrinsic problems in constitutional democracy itself, and, taken as a whole, stimulates a self-reflexive and historically informed scrutiny of the modern projects of liberal democracy and constitutionalism, so as to provide due acknowledgement of the political and conflictive origins of the project, as well as of its current deficits.

The principle of the rule of law is a well-established notion at the core of modern constitutionalism and the undisputed building block of democratic governments. This principle is characterized by the breadth of its scope, the difficulty to strictly define its content, and the increasing possibility of a more or less broad interpretation. This explains the wide-ranging debate on the rule of law which has been developed over time with significant contributions from several disciplines, including philosophy, constitutional law, and international law.

Traditionally in the division of labor between the European level and the Member States it was, roughly, the European legislature that set the norms and the Member States that took care of enforcing these norms. In various policy areas, an implementation deficit has been observed, which is said to be partly due to the Member States facing difficulties with the choice of procedural options. For that reason, among others, the European legislature increasingly prescribes the enforcement approach to the Member States to back up national legislation that implements European law. This Article examines the incoherence of the EU's approach to law enforcement in the areas of consumer, competition, environmental, and insider trading laws. After setting out the EU's legal competences with a view to law enforcement, the rather diverse picture—mixes—of private, administrative, and criminal law enforcement in the four areas will be illustrated. The authors then ask the question of whether this divergence can be explained by an economic reasoning with respect to law enforcement. The analysis, however, identifies substantial differences between an ideal enforcement mix and the current enforcement approaches used in EU law. Moreover, it is suggested that the economic approach could be employed to provide more consistency to the use of enforcement tools in EU law.

On 3 September 2008, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) handed down its long-awaited decision on the Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation where, setting aside the relevant judgments of the European Court of First Instance (CFI), the Court held that the Community judicature must ensure the full review of the lawfulness of all Community acts. This included those deriving from UN Security Council's resolutions, in the light of the fundamental rights as protected by Community law.

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth: BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by the BVerfG about the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of the BVerfG remain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why the BVerfG had for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).

For want of an effective and accessible universal system for redress of international human rights abuses, victims of human rights violations increasingly seek reparations in domestic civil courts. In the United States in particular, the federal courts, since the 1980 Filártiga decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, have already decided on a remarkable number of civil suits alleging human rights violations committed abroad, the most recent example of this trend being a class action of members and supporters of opposition political groups in Zimbabwe who invoke the so-called Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) against President and Foreign Minister Robert Mugabe with respect to alleged acts of torture. According to the proponents of such lawsuits, international human rights litigation in domestic civil courts can serve as an important tool in the worldwide effort to enforce international norms concerned with the protection of the individual which may complement criminal prosecutions of the offenders. As stated by Professor Stevens, who has litigated many of the international human rights cases in the U.S. federal courts, \\\“civil lawsuits for human rights violations […] serve a role similar to tort litigation in a domestic forum: to offer victims of violence a legal remedy which they control and which may satisfy needs not met by the criminal law system.\\\”

It has become a standard critique of European integration that the upward transfer of sovereignty in market-related matters leads to the fragmentation of statehood between the supranational, European level and the largely incapacitated nation-states that retain jurisdiction over social and distributive policies. My article takes up this critique in the elaborate version of one of Germany's leading post-war constitutional theorists, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, whose approach has been influential in how German constitutionalism relates to the project of European unification. In this account, vertical integration uses law to sever economics from democratic politics, fragments the concern for the common good of citizens and undermines the unity of statehood. I contrast this account to instances of horizontal fragmentation of statehood, such as those underway in member-states such as Hungary or Poland where the nation state's constitutional structures are coming undone at the hands of authoritarian populists. The European Union's role of defending the rule of law within its constitutive states seeks to restore their normative integrity and, as such, is best understood as a role of vertical de-fragmentation of political and constitutional transformations at the domestic level. The question if statehood can be established at the European level gains greater urgency and complexity in light of these developments.

Quite a few recent ECJ judgments touch on various elements of territorial rule. Thereby, they raise the profile of the main question this Article asks: Which territorial claims does the EU make? To provide an answer, the present Article discusses and categorizes the individual elements of territoriality in the EU’s architecture. The influence of EU law on national territorial rule on the one hand and the emergence of territorial governance elements at the European level on the other provide the main pillars of the inquiry. Once combined, these features not only help to improve our understanding of the EU’s distinctly supranational conception of territoriality. What is more, the discussion raises several important legitimacy questions. As a consequence, the Article calls for the development of a theoretical model to evaluate and justify territoriality in a political community beyond the state.

National legislators approach European law very differently. The reason for these differences lies partly in the historical development of their individual legal cultures. If one pursues a broad interpretation of the term ‘legal culture’ one takes especially into account the style of law and the attitude toward it. Thus legal culture can be defined as the Continental civil law countries’ ideal of a “concise, but comprehensive codification by which the judge can derive solutions for all possible cases through teleological interpretation;” whereas the common law rather limits this concept to “special laws which are interpreted very narrowly by the courts and accordingly are designed by the legislator to the last detail”. Furthermore, one could include the status of a judge, the nature of legal discourse, or the training of legal professionals, as well as the respect accorded to the law by the population when defining the concept of ‘legal culture'.

Since the 1990s it is possible to witness, in the multiplication of inter- and transnational actors, an increasing diversity in international norm-making processes as well as a growing variation in enforcing these norms, generically labeled under the term “global governance.” The actions of these private, hybrid or intergovernmental actors on the global level are increasingly seen as equivalent to the exercise of political authority formerly reserved for the state. As in the domestic context, the exercise of such authority raises questions about the procedural guarantees that anyone affected by this action should enjoy. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has evaded intensive scholarly attention from the global governance perspective thus far, although by now it is evident that it strongly contributes to this phenomenon through its various activities. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) are but one area in which the OECD is said to assume global governance functions by strongly influencing corporate behavior.

The last decade has been a time of changes in all branches of German company law. Whilst the changes in the law of civil partnerships go to the very fundaments of what was a firm belief for a hundred years in national law, the future of the private limited company is increasingly determined by the competition of regulators in the European common market. The European dimension of modern company law making is even more pervasive in the law of stock corporations where growing convergence can be noted in regard to the national approaches of the European Member States towards internal controls. A common denominator for most of the changes in German company law is the partly court driven, partly legislature driven attempt of a better adjustment of investor and creditor protection to evolving business needs. Looking on the changes from a wider angle that includes capital markets, however, there are signals for a shifting in the traditional approach of German corporate governance towards an increasingly market driven system.

The article argues, based on results from massive online survey experiments, that, just as the utterances from ordinary conversation, legal rules can convey a surplus meaning, which is more than just the amalgam of the meanings of the words which are employed in the legal rule’s formulation. More precisely, the experiments check whether a typology of the types of this surplus meaning—pragmatic typology—describes adequately the psychological processing of, not only everyday speech, but also legal rules. In two experiments—total N = 733—we find that in morally neutral cases the pragmatic typology adequately describes the psychological processes involved in the interpretation of a legal rule. However, we also find that in morally valenced cases, it is rather the moral inferences carried by participants that shape the pragmatic inferences than the other way around.

In the recent Anglo-American scholarly debate, contrary to that of continental Europe, judicial review of legislation raises strong criticism for various aspects. Among these, I will examine the claim that legislators are better equipped than courts in constitutional reasoning, on the ground that the institutional settings and procedures affecting the former ensures a better protection of rights than those that characterize the judicial function. The following questions will be posed: Do legislators primarily deal with rights as such? Do they reason about rights, and in that case for which purposes? Are these purposes sufficiently similar to those affecting the judicial reasoning about rights? Why in most legal orders courts are bound to reason-giving? While answering these questions, I will outline the different meaning that consequentialist reasoning is likely to acquire, respectively, in representative assemblies and on the bench. I will then classify the kinds of juridical consequences, and of the corresponding premises, that might affect constitutional reasoning according to the different weight of judicial construction. Finally, I will attempt to demonstrate why the indeterminacy of principles on which constitutional reasoning is expected to rely should be viewed as enhancing, rather than as distorting, the insight of courts on the right at stake.

This essay describes an emergent scheme for modernizing the study of law in German universities, creating a structure that is better equipped to address twentyfirst century socio-legal issues and bring legal scholarship to bear on relevant research problems in the social sciences—and vice versa. It is a by-product of efforts by University of Bremen professors and administrators to foster their university's coming of age as a mature, internationally recognized research university and to compete for new funds that the German government is making available to select universities. As such, it provides a rare example of the integration of legal studies into a large interdisciplinary research program, and of law professors rising to the challenges of contemporary funding demands, joining forces with political scientists, sociologists, economists, and philosophers.

The insolvency of a company does not arrive suddenly. Normally, insolvency precedes a crisis. At present, the term “crisis” is defined in § 32 a sec. 1 of the Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit Beschränkter Haftung (GmbHG – Private Limited Companies Act) as the point when the company does not receive any credits according to the usual conditions in the particular market and when the shareholders provide the company with further shareholder capital instead of debt capital. Besides the rules governing shareholder capital substitution, which will be omitted due to the upcoming reform of private limited companies, there are few legal guidelines that regulate the standards of conduct for managing directors and shareholders in the case of a crisis. In particular, § 49 sec. 3 GmbHG needs to be singled out. This paragraph establishes an obligation to call a shareholder meeting if more than half of the capital stock is lost. If an adverse balance arises because of the payouts to the shareholders, the protections of §§ 30, 31 GmbHG will intervene. An adverse balance results when there is insufficient capital to cover the liabilities, ownership's equity, and guaranteed capital. However these protections often do not suffice.

Sixty years after the entry into force of the Basic Law the world is much more interdependent. The concepts of statehood and sovereignty have changed. The following contribution examines how the Basic Law, as amended and interpreted by the Federal Constitutional Court, deals with this development. As a foundational matter, the Basic Law contains a commitment towards integration, although sixty years ago integration largely was seen as a promise. Now, 60 years later, the Federal Constitutional Court is developing limits to integration and recently ruled out Germany's participation in a European Federal State and sees itself as the guardian of German sovereignty. A change of paradigms seems to have taken place. For the founding fathers and mothers, a united—possibly even federal—Europe was considered to be the solution to protect against war and relapse towards an undemocratic, terroristic regime. But now the Federal Constitutional Court feels compelled to protect democracy and the core values of the Basic Law against “too much” European integration.

On 17 July 2002, the First Senate of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) upheld the recently enacted Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz (Lifetime Partnership Act). The Court found, unanimously, that the process leading to the law's enactment was constitutional. The Court further found, over three dissenting votes, that the substance of the law conforms to the Grundgesetz (GG - Basic Law).