In this Article, I have analyzed the philosophical grounds on which stands the conception of law implied in legal transplants. On the one hand, behind the idea of legal transplants lurks the misleading assumption that two different legal cultures share common epistemological accounts of what is meant by law; on the other, the idea that a certain legal institution verbally framed may be exported to another culture and touch off similar interpretations and conceptual performances reflects, at its core, a conception of language based on an isomorphic correspondence between legal words and the meanings those words are to stand for. My goal has been to critically expose the philosophical backdrop that lies behind the conception of law implied in the idea of a legal transplant with an eye to the cultural perspective. To this end, I have availed myself of different but convergent perspectives gathered from Wittgenstein’s pragmatic philosophy of language, Geertz’s cultural anthropology, Eco’s semiology, Harris’ integrational epistemology, and Rosen’s cultural theory of law, as a methodological strategy to spotlight different facets of the problem in three dimensions: Language, knowledge, and law.

Before the Law stands a doorkeeper. A man from the countryside comes up to the door and requests admittance to the Law. But the doorkeeper says that he can't grant him admittance now. The man thinks it over and then asks if he'll be allowed to enter later. “It's possible” says the doorkeeper, “but not now.” Since the gate to the Law stands open as always, and the doorkeeper steps aside, the man bends down to look through the gate into the interior. When the doorkeeper sees this, he laughs and says: “If you're so drawn to it, go ahead and try to enter, even though I've forbidden it. But bear this in mind: I'm powerful. And I'm only the lowest doorkeeper. From hall to hall, however, stand doorkeepers each more powerful than the one before. The mere sight of the third is more than even I can bear.” The man from the country has not anticipated such difficulties; the Law should be accessible to anyone at any time, he thinks, but as he now examines the doorkeeper in his fur coat more closely, his large, sharply pointed nose, his long, thin, blank tartar's beard, he decides he would prefer to wait until he receives permission to enter. And the doorkeeper gives him a stool and lets him sit down at the side of the door. He sits there for days and years. He asks time and again to be admitted and wearies the doorkeeper with his entreaties. The doorkeeper often conducts brief interrogations, inquiring about his home and many other matters, but he asks such questions indifferently, as great men do, and in the end he always tells him he still can't admit him. The man, who has equipped himself well for the journey, uses everything he has, no matter how valuable, to bribe the doorkeeper. And the doorkeeper accepts everything, but as he does so he says: “I'm taking this just so you won't think you've neglected something.” Over the many years, the man observes the doorkeeper almost incessantly. He forgets the other doorkeepers and this first one seems to him the only obstacle to his admittance to the Law. He curses his unhappy fate, loudly during the first years, later, as he grows older, merely grumbling to himself. He turns childish, and since he has come to know even the fleas in the doorkeeper's collar over his years of study, he asks the fleas too to help him change the doorkeeper's mind. Finally his eyes grow dim and he no longer knows whether it's really getting darker around him or if his eyes are merely deceiving him. And yet in the darkness he now sees a radiance that streams forth inextinguishably from the door of the Law. He doesn't have much longer to live now. Before he dies, everything he has experienced over the years coalesces in his mind into a single question he has never asked the doorkeeper. He motions to him, since he can no longer straighten his stiffening body. The doorkeeper hat to bend down to him, for the difference in size between them has altered greatly to the man's disadvantage. “What do you want to know now,” asks the doorkeeper, “you're insatiable.” “Everyone strives to reach the Law,” says the man, “how does it happen, then, that in all these years no one but me has requested admittance.” The doorkeeper sees that the man in nearing his end, and in order to reach his failing hearing, he roars at him: “No one else could gain admittance here, because this entrance was meant solely for you. I'm going to go and shut it now.”

The Council of Europe on July 3, 2001, released the Second Report on Germany prepared by its European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). (1) ECRI is a mechanism to combat racism, xenophobia, antisemitism and intolerance that was established by the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Council of Europe at their Summit in Vienna on October 9, 1993, and improved during the Strasbourg Summit held on October 10–11, 1997.

The Bologna Declaration of 19 June 1999, committed 29 European nations, including Germany, to develop a system of higher education

This contribution examines the possible contribution the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) can make towards the achievement of transitional justice in countries or regions recovering from (civil) war or other serious conflict. It will first briefly epitomize the recent process culminating in the set-up of the PBC and then address the functions and tools of the Commission with particular focus on its transitional justice capabilities. Thereby, I will examine conceivable operative approaches the PBC might take in the first cases submitted to it, i.e., Burundi and Sierra Leone, and assess the Commission's potential and added value both in general terms but in particular with regard to transitional justice activities.

On 11 July 2002, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (Eur. Ct. H.R.) ruled unanimously in the cases of Goodwin and I v. the United Kingdom that the failure of British law to recognize gender re-assignment and to permit male to female transsexuals to marry persons of their newly opposite sex violated the applicants’ right to privacy (Article 8 ECHR) and to marry (Article 12). These two cases, apart from constituting an explicit deviation from previous constant jurisprudence, gave the Court (sitting as a Grand Chamber) an opportunity to creatively apply its longstanding interpretative principles, including the search for a ‘common European approach’ – now increasingly an ‘international trend’ –, in order to evolve human rights law. The following observations will focus on this aspect, while paying due attention to the other implications of the present cases. Finally, the two cases will be placed in the context of the current jurisprudence of the Court which, unfortunately, does not show a consistent tendency to progressively advance human rights law.

The recent crisis involving the territory of Crimea has been characterized both as a case of wrongful annexation and as one of rightful secession. Territory and competing territorial claims lie at the heart of the normative questions of secession and annexation. Any normative theory of secession or of annexation must therefore address their territorial aspect: It must explain why one agent rather than another has a valid claim to the disputed territory. One of the most interesting, yet controversial, normative accounts of secession has been offered by choice theorists of secession. Choice theorists adopt a rather permissive stance, based on the normative significance of political self-determination. Choice theories, however, have been widely criticized for failing to provide a satisfactory account of what legitimates the seceding group's territorial claim. This article argues that it is possible to remedy choice theories’ failure to address the question of territorial justification adequately. To do so, this article offers a two-tier account of territory that is grounded in the normative significance of self-determination. It defends this account of territory by showing that it is implied by our normative condemnation of annexation. It argues that the same reasons that warrant opposition to annexation provide support for secession, In closing, this article revisits the case of Crimea in light of its two-tier account of territory, and considers what role international law and institutions might play in addressing this type of situation.

One of the probably most groundbreaking – and at the same time also most contentious – issues of the German reform of private limited companies by the Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen (MoMiG – Law for the Modernization of the Private Limited Companies Act and to Combat its Abuse) is the introduction of the Unternehmergesellschaft (UG – Entrepreneurial Company). This new sub-type of the Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH – Private Limited Company) is specifically designed for entrepreneurs and has already unofficially been dubbed the “Mini-GmbH” and “GmbH light”. It can be seen as the centerpiece of the legislator's overall aim to facilitate and accelerate the formation of companies and the underlying motive of increasing the international competitiveness of the German GmbH.

This article examines the evolution of legal education as it has moved through international, transnational, and now global paradigms. It explores these paradigms by reference to practice, pedagogy, and research. Internationalization saw the world as an archipelago of jurisdictions, with a small number of lawyers involved in mediating disputes between jurisdictions or determining which jurisdiction applied; transnationalization saw the world as a patchwork, with greater need for familiarity across jurisdictions and hence a growth in exchanges and collaborations; globalization is now seeing the world as a web in more ways than one, with lawyers needing to be comfortable in multiple jurisdictions.

There is an increasing involvement of lawyers and law firms in public affairs through activities that are aimed at influencing legislative and regulatory developments. Law firms offer services which can be regarded as lobbying, and yet, to the detriment of transparent policy-making, they are reluctant to register in the European Union Transparency Register (EUTR) and provide information about their activities. As growing attention is paid to the need to regulate lobbying at the EU and Member State levels, the question arises as to whether and to what extent such regulatory framework should also cover certain services provided by law firms, that is, legal lobbying. This Article charts the phenomenon of legal lobbying and its regulation in the EU context. It shows how the EUTR attempts to distinguish between legal services and lobbying by defining two lawyer roles: a legal expert, and an advocate. These roles allow the possibility to pinpoint two unresolved issues associated with legal lobbying: the scope of professional secrecy, and the meaning of the legal advice exception. An important conclusion is that regulatory clarification is necessary to resolve ambiguities and broadly address the implications that legal lobbying raises in terms of transparent and legitimate law-making processes.

Robert Alexy is one of the most prominent proponents of proportionality in international legal scholarship. His theory has two dimensions. On the one hand, it is a normative defense of balancing. On the other hand, it seeks to provide a reconstruction of the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court. This Article focuses on the reconstructive part of his theory. It argues that his reconstruction of the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court is only partly accurate. In particular, it does not provide a suitable reconstruction of the decisions in which the Court finds a statute to be inconsistent with the constitution. For this reason, the normative critique of Alexy’s theory does not necessarily translate into a critique of the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court’s application of proportionality or even the proportionality doctrine itself. Instead, it targets only one specific interpretation of proportionality.

In April 2011, University College Dublin (UCD) School of Law research students held their Fifth Annual Postgraduate Conference, the theme of which was “The Legacy and Future of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Evaluating Sixty Years of the European Human Rights Project.” The articles contained in this special edition of the German Law Journal reflect the efforts made at this conference by its participants. While the papers presented vary quite widely in their substantive content, they are connected by a recurring theme— that the ECtHR faces a crisis of legitimacy. A judgment is legitimate if it is persuasive to the civic society constituted by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), and perceived as authoritative by the subjects affected by the ECtHR's decision. The judgments of the ECtHR are fiercely criticized and their legitimacy is repeatedly questioned by the Contracting Parties and media in particular, and by civic society in general. As it stands, the ECtHR is suffocating from the overwhelming number of applications lodged, and even the tiny percentage of those applications that are decided by it face “a barrage of hostile criticism,” as Michael O'Boyle outlines in his article. The ECtHR's future, to a major extent, depends on how this crisis is tackled.

States of emergency pose the most significant challenges to the safeguarding of fundamental rights and civil liberties. Crises are generally characterized by a strengthening of the executive to the detriment of judicial authority and parliamentary oversight. One of the immediate consequences of emergencies is the absence of effective domestic mechanisms of supervision of the executive. The gradual replacement of the judicial role with police operations represents a symptom of how prolonged emergencies prompt the eclipse of legal certainty and lead to the rapid and irreversible degradation of public institutions.

This Article addresses the difficult compromise between defending national interests and protecting individual rights during public emergencies. It analyzes the common features across the recent derogations and exceptional measures of Ukraine, France, and Turkey. The derogations submitted by the three countries in question, together with the exceptional measures adopted for counter-terrorism purposes, substantially restrict several fundamental rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention). In particular, preventive detention measures, with the suspension of the habeas corpus otherwise approved by the three States, not only enable police forces to use arbitrary and unlimited use of force, but also seriously affect the protection of absolute and non-derogable rights. The Article concludes that, as the recent emergency laws and their widespread and apparently indiscriminate implementation present the risk of destabilizing the whole European system of protection, it becomes ever more necessary that the European Court of Human Rights depart from its previous jurisprudence and adopt a more rigorous and principled scrutiny of the derogation conditions under Article 15 of the Convention.

The right to the freedom of movement for all Germans is one of the nineteen so-called Grundrechte (Fundamental Rights) and is enshrined in Article 11(1) of the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law): “All Germans enjoy freedom of movement throughout the Federal territory.” On 17 March 2004, however, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) handed down a decision in which it concluded that the restriction of freedom of movement for one clearly defined group of German citizens is constitutional. Pursuant to the Wohnortzuweisungsgesetz, or Residence Assignment Act, as amended in 1996, Spätaussiedler (ethnic German migrants from the former Soviet Union who are eligible for full citizenship status), may have their freedom of movement restricted during the first three years of their residency in Germany. The restriction on their freedom of movement is triggered if they seek to avail themselves of any of a range of social benefits, including: welfare, some forms of unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe), or integration assistance directed at Spätaussiedler, such as a six-month language course. Confronted with the loss of these social benefits, Spätaussiedler who nonetheless choose to exercise their freedom of movement are eligible to receive only a subsistence level of support. This restriction applies, nearly without exception, to all Spätaussiedler for the first three years of their residence in Germany due to the high rate of reliance among Spätaussiedler in their initial years in Germany upon these forms of public assistance.

The concern for the safety and security of personnel involved in peacekeeping missions has grown in the last two decades, mainly because of the increased risks deriving from deployment in volatile environments and mandates comprising multiple tasks. This article provides an overview of the developments of international law regarding the protection of peacekeepers, with a special focus on international criminal law and its role in enhancing the safety of the personnel and objects involved in peacekeeping missions. Indeed, starting in 2008, international and hybrid tribunals have issued their first decisions and judgments against individuals indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity in connection with attacks against peacekeepers.

After an analysis of the legal regimes established by the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and by international humanitarian law, the article examines the relevant international criminal law provisions and their application and interpretation by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the International Criminal Court. It is argued that the application of the specific war crime of attacking peacekeepers, introduced for the first time in the Rome Statute in 1998, presents particular challenges, but it has also led to the punishment of a broader range of offences against peacekeepers. Furthermore, the application of this crime may contribute to the broadening of the range of punishable offences under the more general war crime of attacking civilians, thus leading to the enhancement of the protection of civilians.

On October 24, 2002, the Second Senate of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court) issued its ruling in the Geriatric Nursing Act case. The eagerly expected judgment not only puts an end to the discussion on the Federation's legislative powers in the field of geriatrics, which has occupied German politicians and constitutional scholars since the mid-1980s, when the drop in the number of applicants for geriatric nursing jobs and the steady growth of the elderly population have led to calls for a standardization of the education for geriatric nurses at Federal level. More importantly, the decision brings clarity to the question of the justiciability of the so-called Erforderlichkeitsklausel (“necessity clause”) laid down in Article 72 para. 2 of the Basic Law.

European integration has forced constitutional law scholars to abandon the perspective of methodological nationalism. Prior to the emergence of the interpretative problems raised by the intersection of domestic and European law, the dominant legal paradigm conceived of “constitution” and “state” as two inseparable terms. With the intensification of European integration and economic globalization, many different constitutionalist interpretations have emerged which all share a belief in the State's loss of centrality, such as post-, supra- and transnational constitutionalism, constitutionalism without the state and multilevel constitutionalism.

This Article considers the development of urban law. It suggests that urban law is socio-legal in its exploration of law’s role in the production of the city and urban life, enabling the study of the city as a distinctive legal entity. Addressing the question “why urban law?,” this Article considers similar debates in geography and urban policy before developing three arguments for studying urban law: (i) urbanism is a vibrant field of scholarly research; (ii) socio-legal research can take an explicitly normative focus in pursuit of improving urban quality; and (iii) at a city scale we can investigate governance concepts of territory, sovereignty and jurisdiction. One of the difficulties with urban law is finding the right level of analysis, covering sufficient legal and empirical detail whilst also making the city legible at an urban scale. Although this tension produces imperfect compromises, accepting the limitations means that we can begin the shared task of developing an intellectual infrastructure, a grammar, for the study of urban law.

In its most recent term, the United States Supreme Court heard a case arising out of the activities of a price-fixing cartel in the vitamins market. The defendants were a number of major international pharmaceuticals companies, including F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Rhone-Poulenc, Daiichi Pharmaceutical, and BASF, that had fixed prices for bulk vitamins and vitamin pre-mixes in markets around the world. The cartel, which has been described as “probably the most economically damaging cartel ever prosecuted under U.S. antitrust law,” is estimated to have affected over $5 billion of commerce worldwide. Previous proceedings against the participants in the cartel, initiated in Australia, Canada and the European Union as well as in the United States, included administrative investigations and criminal prosecutions of individual executives. In these various proceedings, the cartel participants were found to have violated antitrust laws in the United States and elsewhere, and were subjected to heavy – indeed, record – fines in many countries. By all accounts, the countries engaged in investigating and then prosecuting the cartel participants did so in full cooperation with each other. In particular, they made use of the mutual assistance and information sharing agreements that have become an important component of coordinated international antitrust enforcement.

“The world truly shares a common fate.” These words seem to resonate with Immanuel Kant's famous statement that “a violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all.” Yet, they are not from his Toward Perpetual Peace but from the UN Millennium Project report. What makes our world one of “overlapping communities of fate” are first and foremost the “interconnected threats and challenges” we face in our globalizing age. During the last fifty years we witnessed an enormous growth of transboundary problems – climate change, migration, terrorism, infectious diseases, violent conflicts etc.