Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
“The world truly shares a common fate.” These words seem to resonate with Immanuel Kant's famous statement that “a violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all.” Yet, they are not from his Toward Perpetual Peace but from the UN Millennium Project report. What makes our world one of “overlapping communities of fate” are first and foremost the “interconnected threats and challenges” we face in our globalizing age. During the last fifty years we witnessed an enormous growth of transboundary problems – climate change, migration, terrorism, infectious diseases, violent conflicts etc.
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