Trust is an essential element for the functioning not only of ancient societies but also of modern societies. This article explores the different dimensions of trust in general and the different dimensions of the relationship between trust and the law, in particular. More specifically, we distinguish three different levels of interaction between trust and the law: (1) trust in the law; (2) trust through the operation of law, and (3) trust as defined by the law. Building on these categories, we finally turn to the “tsunami of regulation” (“Regulierungstsunami”) in the area of EU financial market law that has occurred in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. As will be shown, trust can serve as a legal concept for making sense of this flood of legislative acts and of shaping these into a coherent framework. A different question yet to be answered is whether the flood of legislation already resulted in providing for an excess level of trust.

The meaning of idem in the ne bis in idem principle is controversial in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. In interpreting the provision of Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, the court has emphasized the necessary requirement in the identity of the material acts while in antitrust law three requirements have been deemed necessary: (1) Identity of the facts, (2) unity of offender, and (3) unity of the legal interest protected. Despite the opinions of some Advocates General, the court has confirmed different interpretations of the same principle, depending on differences of the legal scope in question. A few years ago, however, the European Court of Human Rights proclaimed the criterion based on the identity of the material acts as the most suitable. This might push the Court of Justice of the European Union to correct its position in the antitrust field. Should this happen, this adjustment might serve as grounds to recognize the existence of a regional custom concerning the ne bis in idem principle.

The exploration of international legal patterns is an increasingly multifaceted enterprise. As such, it inevitably entails recourse to a progressively broader array of analytical instruments designed to place the process on a firmer scientific, or quasi-scientific, foundation. This expanding set consists predominantly, albeit not exclusively, of qualitative techniques relied upon in seeking generalizations about complex realities that are shrouded in uncertainty. The cluster of tools employed or deemed potentially usable includes, although tentatively, counterfactual thinking. The latter may be regarded as a research vehicle of “last resort,” underpinned by a soft substructure, but it may facilitate the quest for better grasp of phenomena observed in the international law domain and more effective action in that realm.

This Article assesses the extent to which Article 13(2) TEU supports a republican reading of the EU's institutional structure. This question has arisen in light of the move towards more intergovernmental forms of economic governance following the Eurozone Crisis. Dawson and de Witte and Bellamy have critiqued this mutation through theory-driven readings the institutional balance clause of Article 13(2) TEU, arguing that it establishes a norm of non-domination between EU institutions that has been undermined by increased intergovernmentalism. This Article considers whether the institutional balance case law supports their reading. It finds that institutional balance's dominant role is not normative: It protects pre-existing institutional competences. It does carry a normative side when used as a general principle of EU law to support arguments about increasing the European Parliament's legislative contributions, but this is not an independent head of claim. A better legal support for the presence of a non-domination in Article 13(2) lies within its second clause, the principle of sincere cooperation. Ultimately, the case law around both clauses of Article 13(2) TEU means that the provision is best understood as having a tripartite structure providing a constitutional basis for non-domination during lawmaking.

Throughout its history, the United Nations has resorted to large-scale ad hoc Commissions of Inquiry (UN COIs) to investigate serious international incidents. These UN COIs have often been highly political affairs, though their tasks and goals—including most recently investigating reports of war crimes or crimes against humanity the world over—are distinctly legal in nature. The result has been a focus on both the politics of such UN COIs—including most prominently whether their mandates or their Commissioners are biased—and on the merit of their legal-criminal findings. Yet it is the processes and procedures of UN COIs, and particularly their commitment to transparent due process, that are best able to form a bulwark against both political and legal attacks. Thus, it is their processes and procedures that should be the focus of much legal-academic work; unfortunately, to date this has not tended to be the case. By analyzing perhaps the most well-known and controversial recent UN COI, the 2009 United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, and focusing on its due process and procedures rather than its politics or its correct application of international criminal or human rights law, this paper seeks to remedy this oversight. It seeks to identify the legal and procedural shortcomings—the failures of due process—of a well-resourced, well-staffed political inquiry to offer a representative example of how UN COIs tend to fall short, why they must be considered legal undertakings, and how future UN COIs might remedy these common shortcomings by focusing on the legality of their procedures.

Public Officials are bound by the fundamental rights when they are acting in their political function. Acting as such they cannot, in general, claim the freedom of speech for themselves as normal citizens do. If they give statements regarding other political parties they have to abide by the principle of neutrality. Statements that could be understood as negative will be — especially if they are made during the election process — a violation of the right of political parties to equal opportunity, which is an indispensable element of the free and open process of forming popular opinion. The delineation of whether a public official is appearing as such, as a “party politician” or “private individual” can, however, be difficult and it is the obligation of the public official to leave no doubt about the role he is exercising. Different from any other public official the Federal President needs not comply with the principle of neutrality. He has a broad margin of assessment and only transgresses his legal boundaries if he violates the integrative task of his office in an arbitrary manner.

The German Federal Constitutional Court has issued its long-awaited judgment in the Gauweiler Case. The Court ruled that the policy decision on the Outright Monetary Transactions programme (OMT programme) does not manifestly exceed the competences attributed to the European Central Bank (ECB) and does not manifestly violate the prohibition of monetary financing of the budget, if interpreted in accordance with the preliminary ruling of the European Court of Justice (Court). This article surveys the Court's decision and offers a critical commentary on this important case.