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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
This Article assesses the extent to which Article 13(2) TEU supports a republican reading of the EU's institutional structure. This question has arisen in light of the move towards more intergovernmental forms of economic governance following the Eurozone Crisis. Dawson and de Witte and Bellamy have critiqued this mutation through theory-driven readings the institutional balance clause of Article 13(2) TEU, arguing that it establishes a norm of non-domination between EU institutions that has been undermined by increased intergovernmentalism. This Article considers whether the institutional balance case law supports their reading. It finds that institutional balance's dominant role is not normative: It protects pre-existing institutional competences. It does carry a normative side when used as a general principle of EU law to support arguments about increasing the European Parliament's legislative contributions, but this is not an independent head of claim. A better legal support for the presence of a non-domination in Article 13(2) lies within its second clause, the principle of sincere cooperation. Ultimately, the case law around both clauses of Article 13(2) TEU means that the provision is best understood as having a tripartite structure providing a constitutional basis for non-domination during lawmaking.
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