This article challenges the ‘regulatory license’ view that reliance by regulators on the output of rating agencies in the 1930s ‘caused’ the agencies to become a central part of the fabric of the US financial system. We argue that long before the 1930s, courts began using ratings as financial-community-produced norms of prudence. This created ‘a legal license’ problem, very analogous to the ‘regulatory license’ problem, and gave rise to conflicts of interest not unlike those that have been discussed in the context of the subprime crisis. Rating agencies may have had substantial responsibility for the Great Depression of the 1930s.

The failure in 1697 of the ‘Malt Lottery’, the second lottery loan, presents a fruitful case study. From a practical point of view, it tells us three things. First, the technical features of the English state lottery loans were established for more than a century after only three experiments. Second, its two components (‘lottery’ and ‘loan’) led to an abnormally poor return for investors since its expected return was 3.91 per cent whereas its effective return was 5.84 per cent – two figures in contradiction with the 6.3 per cent advanced by Dickson (1967). Third, a most strange solution was devised to counteract the failure: delivering the unsold tickets to the Exchequer to be used as cash. From a more theoretical point of view, the condition North and Weingast (1989) advanced for a successful financial issue proves necessary but not sufficient. The Malt Lottery failed (1,763 tickets sold out of 140,000) because it did not meet the three requirements for success: its return was too low and was lower than the return on competitive assets; its reimbursement dates were uncertain; and the economic and political environment was gloomy.

In 1899, James Keene, a prominent bear, and Roswell Flower, a well-known bull, both attempted to manipulate the share price of Brooklyn Rapid Transit (BRT), a young commuter railway company. Flower and Keene were stock ‘operators’, who used pools of cash from like-minded investors to push share prices higher or lower. In their efforts to garner profits, BRT operators claimed insider status, planted rumors in the press, used leverage to accumulate large positions, manipulated borrowing costs and camouflaged trades. The events of 1899 can shed light on current market dynamics, and we draw parallels between the predatory trading strategies used in 1899 and those of today.

The institutional environment of Portuguese banking during the golden age years of economic growth (1950–73) has been criticised in many instances, at the time and in recent literature. Direct observers of the period as well as historians have stressed two main aspects of that environment: excessive protection of existing banks, allowing them to obtain high rents, which represented a disincentive for them to compete and innovate; excessive concentration of their activity on short-term commercial paper, thus preventing them from contributing to finance growth. There seems to be a contradiction here, however, with the high growth rates of the years 1950 to 1973. The apparent contradiction is not limited to Portugal, in fact, as rapid growth in many economies in that period occurred within a framework of heavily regulated financial systems. This is the ‘financial paradox’ of the golden age. Portugal is an interesting case in the international perspective. As in the rest of the western world, legislation repressed banking quite tightly, but banks circumvented the law and competed with each other. The signs of competition were visible mostly in two dimensions: the growth of time deposits and geographical expansion.

This article reviews the political economy of Manchuria under the rule of Zhang Zuolin, which resulted in the economic instability that occurred during the winter of 1928. One can conjecture that the economic instability did not occur only because of the arbitrariness of the political and military regional government. The instability appears to be related to an ongoing seasonal demand for monies, which was relatively high between the months of September and March, since it corresponded to the period of commerce in soybeans − the region's main economic activity −, the migration of seasonal workers, and also the festive period of the Chinese New Year. The analysis was conducted based on primary materials published by the South Manchuria Railway Company, such as currency issuance and the variation of the exchange rate of the major currencies in circulation among foreign and Chinese currencies.