Sir Garfield Barwick prepared this article some considerable time ago. It was in the hands of the publishers well before Sir Owen Dixon's retirement as Chief Justice of the High Court. The Review, including the article, was in course of printing when Sir Garfield's appointment as Chief Justice was announced on 23 April, 1964.

Let me start on a note of consensus, if not reconciliation. I am certain that we all agree that there would be no one else as well equipped to give the opening paper for this seminar as is Lindsay Curtis. He is well equipped by direct experience, by close knowledge, by personal commitment, and at the same time not least by an ability to stand back from the unfolding of a complicated bit of business and assess what has been going on. His paper is the ideal source of ideas, but in speaking to it I will be able to pursue only one or two.

As this is a seminar arranged by the Law School, it would only be appropriate to start with a text from WS Gilbert. In Act One of that understandably neglected work, “Utopia Limited”, there enters a character named Tarara who explains his constitutional function thus:

Aboriginals – Land Rights – Administrative Law – Inquiry by Aboriginal Land Commissioner – Party not disclosing information to inquiry – Ex parte representations to Minister by party detrimentally affected – Failure to take into account relevant considerations – Obligation of Minister to have regard to exparte representation – Constructive knowledge of Minister of matters within his departmenrs knowledge – Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (C’th) ss 11, 50

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (C’th) s 5(2)(b).

In 2015, a majority of the High Court of Australia incorporated structured proportionality testing into Australian constitutional law for the first time, but the test’s suitability for Australian law has been contested ever since. The recent case of Clubb is an ambivalent result for the test’s advocates: while structured proportionality testing now seems to have the support of a solid majority of current members of the High Court, the dissentients seem as strongly opposed as ever and continue to be vocal about the test’s unsuitability for Australian law. This article surveys the three main criticisms levelled against structured proportionality in Australia: that it is too indeterminate, that it involves judges transgressing the separation of powers, and that it is inappropriate in the unique context of the implied freedom of political communication (‘the freedom’). There are reasons why these critiques of structured proportionality carry particular weight and resonance in Australia’s constitutional culture, marked as it is by legalism and deference to the legislature. But these reasons are also why adoption of structured proportionality is consistent with Australia’s constitutional commitments and jurisprudence. The question of whether structured proportionality is beneficial needs to start with the question of ‘compared to what?’ Many of the criticisms levelled against structured proportionality apply all the more forcefully against the prior test of whether the legislative measure is ‘appropriate and adapted’ to serve a legitimate end. And the inherent commitments of proportionality make it better suited to Australian law than the increasingly proposed alternative of a categorical approach. The particular method of judicial reasoning in cases concerning the freedom might seem like a highly abstract and theoretical question, especially when the justices applying differing methods largely agree on the merits in the relevant cases. But this continuing uncertainty and divergence on the Court has tangible costs. The project of making reasoning more transparent and constrained is significantly undermined by uncertainty as to whether and how the test will be applied at all. There are also second-order effects in the form of institutional costs. In the context of the freedom, where judicial review has long been controversial, the division of the Court into pro- and anti-structured proportionality factions has particularly high costs to institutional integrity and legitimacy. At some point there will be a question of whether the damage of warring judgments over method outweighs the damage done by choosing even the ‘worst’ of the available options. This article argues that structured proportionality is not that ‘worst’ option.

In Breavington v Godleman, Deane J stated: Basic to the jurisprudence of this country is the notion that the courts apply, as distinct from make, the law, that is to say, that the law operates contemporaneously to regulate lawfulness and consequences of conduct independently of judicial proceedings. In that context, it would be to substitute the bedlam of a Babel for an ordered system of law to recognise the right of each of the country's court systems, notwithstanding the place of this Court inall of them, to speak at the same time but in conflicting terms about the lawfulness, consequences or attributes of a particular act or thing in a particular place at a particular time.

[I]n order to begin to understand public law we must first try to make it strange.

The law of statutory interpretation is often wrongly thought of as a “quiet backwater”. The myth that it is a dry, formal subject containing simple rules persists despite high-level seminars devoted to it, law reform reports, sweeping statutory reforms, mammoth texts, sophisticated judicial descriptions, and, in the last decade, numerous scholarly articles and works emanating particularly from North America.

It is often claimed that, in addition to arriving at the “correct or preferable” decision in the individual case, a primary objective of an administrative review system is to have a “normative” influence on government decision-making. As the Federal government has made a commitment to the overhaul of the administrative review system, it is timely to question the significant normative achievements which have been claimed over the past two decades of codified administrative review rights in Australia.

The first part of this article outlines the theoretical and practical foundations of the normative goal and the changing influences upon it. It attempts to unpack the concept and consider some of its claims. Is it, for example, realistic in the context of the dynamics of government administration, to continue to claim the “normative effect” as a goal of administrative review? Is the administration responsive to review? Is there evidence of administrative law “values” in the culture and processes of the administration?

Constitutional law — Law for establishing any religion — Grant of Financial Assistance to States — Validity of Commonwealth legislation providing financial assistance to non-government schools — Constitution ss. 96, 116

It is clear that s 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (‘the Judiciary Act’) operates on the common law in cases in federal jurisdiction, but its precise effect is somewhat obscure. Section 80 provides:

Until recently, the High Court tended to concentrate on s 79 of the Judiciary Act (which applies the laws of the State and Territory where a court is exercising federal jurisdiction), and to consider s 80 only as an afterthought.

Payday loans are small-amount, short-term, unsecured, high-cost credit contracts provided by non-mainstream credit providers. Payday loans are usually taken out to help the consumer pay for essential items, such as food, rent, electricity, petrol, broken-down appliances or car registration or repairs. These consumers take out payday loans because they cannot — or believe that they cannot — obtain a loan from a mainstream credit provider such as a bank. In recent years there has been a protracted debate in Australia — and in several overseas jurisdictions — about how to regulate the industry. Recent amendments to the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) — referred to in this article as the 2013 reforms — are designed to better protect payday loan consumers. While the 2013 reforms provide substantially improved protection for payday loan consumers, further changes to the law may be warranted. This article raises several law reform issues which should be considered as part of the 2015 review into small amount credit contracts, including whether the caps on the cost of credit are set at the right level, whether the required content and presentation of the consumer warnings needs to be altered, whether more needs to be done to protect consumers who are particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable and whether a general anti-avoidance provision should be included in the credit legislation.

The introduction of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) (‘the HRA’), although contentious, is indicative of a move towards the introduction of bills of rights at State or Territory level in Australia. The HRA is modelled on the UK Human Rights Act and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, and has precipitated discussion in several States on the merits of introducing their own bills of rights, with Victoria enacting the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).

However, one significant area of uncertainty, which has been given little consideration, is how the HRA (and equivalent legislation at State level) will operate within Australia's constitutional framework. Section 32 of the HRA enables the ACT Supreme Court to issue a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ when a provision of ACT legislation is incompatible with a right enunciated in the HRA. However, this declaration is intended to initiate ‘dialogue’ between the judiciary and the legislature: it does not invalidate the legislation, or affect the rights of the parties in the dispute in which the declaration is made. This article will address the constitutional limits that may be placed on the exercise of this novel ‘remedy’.

In April 2016, then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull confirmed the existence of Australia’s offensive cyber capability. Said to constitute both a coordinating Information Warfare Division inside the Australian Army as well as dedicated cyberoffensive capability inside the Australian Signals Directorate, the unveiling of this capability was a watershed in Australian defence policy. Yet whilst the literature has briefly examined whether Australia’s cyberoffensive capability is congruous with international law, no such analysis under Australia’s domestic laws has been undertaken. This paper seeks to partially address this gap in the research by focusing on whether the Australian Defence Force could legally launch cyberattacks against domestic targets under Commonwealth call-out powers.

In 2013, the right to request flexible work arrangements was extended to include employees who are 55 years or older, with a refusal by an employer of such a request in theory available only on the basis of ‘reasonable business grounds.’ This expansion of the right to request is one of a number of different strategies implemented with a view to enhancing the workforce participation of older Australians. This paper examines the scope of the right to request and how it operates with respect to older workers as part of the National Employment Standards in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The paper also examines the gender dimension in the making of requests and in the utilisation of flexible work practices. Since the ‘right’ exists as merely the subject for negotiation at a workplace level, rather than an enforceable claim, this paper contends that it is unable to overcome persistent and prevalent age discrimination in employment. The paper argues that a review process and independent oversight are required in order to bring about the attitudinal change necessary if the right to request flexible work arrangements is to operate as a viable means of providing constructive opportunities for older workers to maintain their workforce participation.

This article evaluates the rise of interpretation as an alternative means of judicially enforcing legislative compliance with rights. Instead of the traditional method where courts are empowered to invalidate statutes that are found to be incompatible with rights, the alternative empowers courts to interpret statutes in a manner that renders them compatible with rights. It argues that interpretation emerged as an alternative to invalidation among both constitutional reformers and judges in Australia (and elsewhere) in the 1990s and 2000s because interpretation was seen as a way of addressing democratic concerns about rights-based judicial review and as a less confrontational method of resolving rights issues. The article puts forward an argument for invalidation over interpretation on the basis that interpretation’s comparative appeal is not particularly strong—there are alternative ways of addressing the democratic concerns, and the connection between invalidation and confrontation is weak—and that invalidation is a more transparent, and therefore accountable, exercise of public power than interpretation.

Judicial incapacity, while under-researched, presents unique challenges for supporting and responding to issues of judicial performance. In this article, we argue for a reconceptualisation of this topic based on contemporary theories of socially-constructed disability and principles of anti-discrimination law. While assisting and supporting judicial officers who are attempting to work with a disability or ongoing health issue will always be complex, this reconceptualisation offers heads of jurisdiction, conduct commissions and parliamentarians, who retain the ultimate sanction of removal, the opportunity to craft a surer guide for handling cases of incapacity. This will not only better serve the individual concerned, affording them greater agency and dignity than has traditionally been the case, but also protect the principle of judicial independence.

There has been a vigorous debate both judicially and academically about the correct approach to constitutional interpretation. An aspect of that debate has involved the role of assumptions in informing our interpretation of the Constitution. I have argued elsewhere that ‘some assumptions form part of the fabric upon which the written words of the Constitution are superimposed … where the assumption is integral to a proper understanding of the structure and text of the Constitution, it can be both used and applied in constitutional interpretation.’

The ‘executive power of the Commonwealth’ is conferred by s 61 of the Commonwealth Constitution. Section 61 provides that ‘the executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General’. Neither that section nor any other informs us as to what ‘the executive power’ is. Nor does the structure of the Commonwealth Constitution provide much of a hint of it.