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A House Divided: Federalism and Social Conflict in Italy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Amnon Lev
Amnon Lev*
Affiliation:
University of Copenhagen
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Abstract

Looking at Italy, the article argues that government serves as an intervening variable that can mediate the implication of federalism and social division. Its overall argument is that the Italian state maintained its unity through a governmental practice of configuring social division so as not to align on the North/South divide, while engaging in a comprehensive devolution of competencies to the subnational level. Through readings of Carlo Cattaneo and Guiseppe Mazzini, the first part of the article considers the conjunctural factors that allowed for the creation, against all odds, of Italy as a unitary state. The second part considers by what strategies the political parties colluded in preserving the unity of the national territory, and by what forms of devolution power was transferred to the subnational level. In conclusion, the article considers the rise of federalism in Italian politics from the 1990s.

Type
Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 46 , Issue 4 , December 2018 , pp. 615 - 630
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

*

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of Federal Law Review for their comments which were extremely helpful in sharpening my argument.

References

1 Plato, The Republic (Benjamin Jowett, trans, Cosmic Classics, 2008) 92.

2 Italy is, to use Ronald Watt's terminology, a regionalised, not a federalised, union, the key criterion being whether it is within the legal power of Parliament to amend the devolution statutes. With the exception of a 2001 referendum, Italian devolution has been done through the passing of constitutional laws pursuant to art 138 of the Constitution. Such laws must be debated in both Houses over a period of no less than three months, and must be approved by an absolute majority in both Houses on second vote. On the criteria for distinguishing between federalised and regionalised unions, see Aroney, Nicholas, ‘Devolutionary Federalism Within a Westminster-derived Context’ in McHarg, Aileen, Mullen, Tom, Page, Allan and Walker, Neil (eds), The Scottish Independence Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications (Oxford University Press, 2016) 239Google Scholar, 300–1; Alfred Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics (Oxford University Press, 2001) 295, 320–2; Ronald L Watts, ‘The United Kingdom as a federalised or regionalised union’ in Alan Trench (ed), Devolution and power in the United Kingdom (Manchester University Press, 2007) 239, 240–1.

3 For a statement of this theorem, see Malcolm M Feeley and Rubin, Edward, Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise (University of Michigan Press, 2011)Google Scholar 43–7.

4 Louis F Del Duca and Patrick Duca, Del, ‘An Italian Federalism?: The State, Its Institutions and National Culture as Rule of Law Guarantor’ (2006) 54 The American Journal of Comparative Law 799CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 804.

5 Aroney, Nicholas, ‘The formation and amendment of federal constitutions in a Westminster-derived context’ (2018) 16 International Journal of Constitutional Law 17CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 49. Aroney speculates, very plausibly, that the original configuration of constitutive power perpetuates itself in two ways: by informing constitutional reasoning, and by virtue of the systemic conservative bias of any system of power.

6 See Amnon Lev, ‘Federalism and Public Law Theory’ in Amnon Lev (ed), The Federal Idea: Public Law Between Governance and Political Life (Hart Publishing, 2017) 2, 2–15.

7 Substantiating the claim that sovereignty is constitutive of federalism would take us too far afield. Suffice it to say that what people hope to realise through federal practices of government is the promise of political life that sovereignty held out. In trying to recover forms of federalism that have not been contaminated by sovereignty, as in the covenantalism of David Eleazar, the opposition to (a specific reading of) sovereignty stands in for political life, glossing over the fact that the recovered forms are not immediately transposable, or not transposable at all, to a modern, secularised context.

8 Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations (J Walthoe, R Wilkin, J and J Bonwicke, S Birt, and T Osborne, 1729), 681.

9 See Cattaneo, ‘La riforma legislativa’ in Carlo Cattaneo and Norberto Bobbio (eds), Stati Uniti d’Italia. Scritti sul federalismo democratico (Donzelli Editore, 2010) 85, 85; Cattaneo, ‘Sulla legge communale e provinciale’ in Carlo Cattaneo and Norberto Bobbio (eds), Stati Uniti d’Italia. Scritti sul federalismo democratico (Donzelli Editore, 2010) 103, 103.

10 Mazzini, ‘On The Superiority of Representative Government’ in Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati (eds), A Cosmopolitianism of Nations: Guiseppe Mazzini's Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and International Relations (Stefano Recchia trans, Princeton University Press, 2009) 39, 43.

11 Cattaneo, ‘Il numero e la volontà’ in Carlo Cattaneo and Norberto Bobbio (eds), Stati Uniti d’Italia. Scritti sul federalismo democratico (Donzelli Editore, 2010) 63, 66. This would be a combination of nationalities, not the dreaded fusion that Cattaneo identified as the cause of hatred between nations (at 65. ‘As threads of different colour,’ nations should, he tells us, ‘interweave without becoming one so as to take, from opposition, greater vigour and contrast’ (Cattaneo, ‘Programma del Cisalpino’ in Carlo Cattaneo and Norberto Bobbio (eds), Stati Uniti d’Italia. Scritti sul federalismo democratico (Donzelli Editore, 2010), 57, 59).

12 On the place of this notion in European public law theory, see Amnon Lev, ‘The Transformation of International Law in the 19th Century’ in Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed), Research Handbook on Theory and History of International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) 111, 123–7.

13 Cattaneo, ‘Agli esuli italiani in Londra’ in Carlo Cattaneo and Norberto Bobbio (eds), Stati Uniti d’Italia. Scritti sul federalismo democratico (Donzelli Editore, 2010) 73, 77.

14 Mazzini, ‘Toward a Holy Alliance of the Peoples’ in Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati (eds), A Cosmopolitianism of Nations: Guiseppe Mazzini's Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and International Relations (Stefano Recchia trans, Princeton University Press, 2009) 117, 125–6.

15 In a perspective different from ours, Agostino Carrino has noted the shared federalist strain in Cattaneo's and Mazzini's work, see Agostino Carrino, ‘L’identità italiana tra federalism e nuove forme della cittadinanza’ in Guiseppe Duso and Antonino Scalone (eds), Come pensare il federalismo? Nouve categorie e trasformazioni costituzionali (Polimetria, 2010) 279, 284–5.

16 Mazzini, ‘Neither Pacifism nor Terror: Considerations on the Paris Commune and the French National Assembly’ in Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati (eds), A Cosmopolitianism of Nations: Guiseppe Mazzini's Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and International Relations (Stefano Recchia trans, Princeton University Press, 2009), 153, 158. On Mazzini's opposition to federalism, see Axel Körner, America in Italy: The United States in the Political Thought and Imagination of the Risorgimento, 1763–1865 (Princeton University Press, 2017) 110–11.

17 For the classic statement of the states’ claim to be sovereign, see John C Calhoun, ‘Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States of America’ in Richard K Cralle (ed), The Works of John C. Calhoun Vol I (D Appleton, 1854) 111, 145–7.

18 Alexander Hamilton, ‘Federalist No 17’ in Isaac Kramnick (ed), The Federalist Papers (Penguin Books, 1987) 156, 157, cf Alexander Hamilton, ‘Federalist No 25’ in Isaac Kramnick (ed), The Federalist Papers (Penguin Books, 1987) 192, 193.

19 John Jay, ‘Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence’ in Isaac Kramnick (ed), The Federalist Papers (Penguin Books, 1987) 90, 91. On the avoidance of sovereignty in The Federalist Papers, see Amnon Lev, ‘Sovereignty and Federalism: Inventing and Reinventing Public Law’ (2017) 17 Jus Politicum 204.

20 One might object that this is a contingent fact about the founding of the American Republic, not an essential truth about American governmental rationality. Leaving to a side the question of whether that distinction holds here, or elsewhere, I would argue that if the starkness of conflict between federalists and states’ rights advocates is obviously, in part, a function of historically contingent circumstances, the valence these circumstances have is a function of how they are internalised by the actors. It is clear from The Federalist Papers that there are outside parties looking in. The powers of Europe meddle continuously in the affairs of the young republic, hoping to render its rival nations ‘the instruments of foreign ambition, jealousy, and revenge’ (James Madison, ‘Federalist No 41’ in Isaac Kramnick (ed), The Federalist Papers (Penguin Books, 1987) 266, 269, cf John Jay, ‘Federalist No 5’ in Isaac Kramnick (ed), The Federalist Papers (Penguin Books, 1987) 101, 103. The federalists react by taking America out of equilibrium politics altogether. What they want is not a more favourable position than the one they could obtain within the system; they want to constitute a domain of government that is not dictated by reciprocal action/reaction between states, a new world, if you like. In taking themselves out of the old one, they take up position in a closed space with no possibility of triangulation to offset internal conflict.

21 On the existence of, and uneasy alignment of, two movements of Risorgimento, see Gilles Pécout, Naissance de l’Italie contemporaine (1770–1922) (Éditions Nathan, 1997) 163–5.

22 The conjunctural genesis of the Italian State militates against seeing the choice for a unitary, as opposed to a federal, political form in terms of the infrastructural capacity of constituent states to provide certain basic public goods theory, as Daniel Ziblatt proposes (see Ziblatt, Daniel, ‘Rethinking the Origins of Federalism: Puzzle, Theory, and Evidence from Nineteenth Century Europe’ (2004) 57 World Politics 70CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 87–90.

23 On this point, see Derek Beales and Biagini, Eugenio F, The Risorgimento and The Unification of Italy (Routledge, 2nd ed, 2002)Google Scholar 118–19; Sabetti, Filippo, ‘The Making of Italy as an Experiment in Constitutional Choice’ (1982) 12 Publius 65CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 70–5; Smith, Denis Mack, Cavour (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985)Google Scholar 249. For a different account, see Ciuffoletti, Zeffiro, Federalismo e regionalismo: Da Cattaneo alla Lega (Laterza, 1994)Google Scholar 49–51.

24 Maria Agostina Cabbidu notes how extraneous the law of the new Italian Kingdom was in relation to different regions of the country and how tightly that law curtailed local autonomy. See Maria A Cabbidu, ‘Autonomia e democrazia sostanziale’ in Franco Bassanini, Floriana Cerniglia, Alberto Q Curzio and Luciano Vandelli (eds), Territori e autonomie. Un’analisi economico-giuridica (il Mulino, 2016), 33, 35–6.

25 Gramsci, Antonio, Pensare la democrazia. Antologia dai «Quaderni del carcere” (Einaudi, 1997)Google Scholar 147–8.

26 On this point, see Axel Körner, Politics of Culture in Liberal Italy. From Unification to Fascism (Routledge, 2009) 21–30. On the persistence of traditional elites in the Fascist period, see Melis, Guido, La macchina imperfatta: Immagine e realtà dello Stato fascista (il Mulino, 2018)Google Scholar 227–30.

27 For an analysis of the many moving parts—geopolitical, political, economic, and social—that had to fall in place for the compromise to be struck, see Vacca, Guiseppe, L’Italia contesa. Communisti e democristiani nel lungo dopoguerra (1943–1978) (Marsilio, 2018)Google Scholar 224–6, 309–15. The author stresses that Moro and Berlinguer both believed the arrangement to be of a transitory nature, dictated by conjunctural constraints (see page 320).

28 Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 24.07.1977, n. 616 (G.U.R.I. n. 234 del 29 agosto 1977).

29 On this point, see Jansen, Christian, ‘Region-Province-Municipality: Spatial Planning and Spatial Policy in Italy, 1860–2016’ (2017) 42 Historical Social Research 267Google Scholar, 284.

30 Codevilla, Angelo, ‘A Second Italian Republic?’ (1992) 71 Foreign Affairs 146CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 164.

31 Guzzini, Stefano, ‘The “Long Night of the First Republic”: Years of Clientelistic Implosion in Italy’ (1995) 2 Review of International Political Economy 27CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 40–2.

32 See Avanza, Martina, ‘Une histoire pour la Padanie: La Ligue du Nord et l’usage politique du passé’ (2003) 58 Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 85CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 92–4; Eva, Fabrizio, ‘Deconstructing Italy: (Northern) Italians and Their New Perceptions of Territoriality’ (1999) 48 GeoJournal 101CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 101–2; Domenico Losurdo, La Seconda Repubblica: Liberismo, Federalismo, Postfascismo (Bollati Boringhieri, 1994), 22–6; Machiavelli, Marta, ‘La Ligue du Nord et l’invention du « Padan »’ (2001) 10 Critique internationale 129CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 130–1.

33 ‘Referendum, il trionfo del No’, La Repubblica (Rome), 26 June 2006.

34 Legge 5 maggio 2009 nr. 42 (Italy) (GU Serie Generale n. 103 del 06–05–2009).

35 Decreto Legislativo 28 maggio n. 85 2010 [Legislative Decree No. 85/2010] (Italy) (GU Serie Generale n. 134 del 11–06–2010).

36 Decreto Legislativo 17 settembre 2010, n. 156 [Legislative Decree No. 156/2010] (Italy) (GU Serie Generale n. 219 del 18–09–2010) (Italy).

37 Decreto Legislativo 26 novembre 2010, n. 216 [Legislative Decree No. 216/2010] (Italy) (GU Serie Generale n. 294 del 17–12–2010).

38 Decreto Legislativo 14 marzo 2011, n. 23 [Legislative Decree No. 23/2011] (Italy) (GU Serie Generale n. 67 del 23–03–2011).

39 Decreto Legislativo 6 maggio 2011, n. 68 [Legislative Decree No. 68/2011] (Italy) (GU Serie Generale n. 109 del 12–05–2011).

40 Decreto Legislativo 31 maggio 2011, n. 88 [Legislative Decree No. 88/2011] (Italy) (GU Serie Generale n. 143 del 22–06–2011).

41 Decreto Legislativo 23 giugno 2011, n. 118 [Legislative Decree No. 118/2011] (Italy) (GU Serie Generale n. 172 del 26–07–2011).

42 Decreto Legislativo 6 settembre 2011, n. 149 [Legislative Decree No. 149/2011] (Italy) (GU Serie Generale n. 219 del 20–09–2011).

43 Gilbert, Mark, ‘The Bassanini Laws: A Half-Way House in Local Government Reform’ (1998) 14 Italian Politics 139Google Scholar, 154–5; Massetti, Emanuele, ‘Federal Reform: The End of the Beginning or the Beginning of the End?’ (2011) 27 Italian Politics 137Google Scholar, 139.

44 For an analysis of the referendum, see Luigi Ceccarini and Bordignon, Fabio, ‘Referendum on Renzi: The 2016 Vote on the Italian Constitutional Revision’ (2017) 22 South European Society and Politics 281Google Scholar, 288–93; Gianfranco Pasquino and Valbruzzi, Marco, ‘Italy says no: the 2016 constitutional referendum and its consequences’ (2017) 22 Journal of Modern Italian Studies 145Google Scholar, 154–7.

45 The force of the (abusive) appropriation of Cattaneo by league ideologists is perhaps best measured by the push-back it provoked. See Lucio Cecchini, ‘Le vere idee de Carlo Cattaneo liberate dalle deformazioni leghiste’, L’Unità (Rome) 24 April 2001; Maurizio Virioli, ‘Giù le mani da Cattaneo’ Il Corriere della Sera (Milano) 23 April 23 2001.

46 ‘Salvini lancia la Superlega,’ Il Corriere della Sera (Milano) 2 July, 2018.

47 This would be an aspect of what Stephen Tierney has called the demotic premise of federalism, see Stephen Tierney, ‘Federalism and the Plurinational Challenge’ in Amnon Lev (ed), The Federal Idea: Public Law Between Governance and Political Life (Hart Publishing, 2017), 227, 234–5.