We develop a new design for the experimental beauty-contest game (BCG) that is suitable for children in school age and test it with 114 schoolchildren aged 9–11 years as well as with adults. In addition, we collect a measure for cognitive skills to link these abilities with successful performance in the game. Results demonstrate that children can successfully understand and play a BCG. Choices start at a slightly higher level than those of adults but learning over time and depth of reasoning are largely comparable with the results of studies run with adults. Cognitive skills, measured as fluid IQ, are predictive only of whether children choose weakly dominated strategies but are neither associated with lower choices in the first round nor with successful performance in the BCG. In the implementation of our new design of the BCG with adults we find results largely in line with behavior in the classical BCG. Our new design for the experimental BCG allows to study the development of strategic interaction skills starting already in school age.

We demonstrate how the standard usage of the random incentive system in ambiguity experiments eliciting certainty and probability equivalents might not be incentive compatible if the decision-maker is ambiguity averse. We propose a slight modification of the procedure in which the randomization takes place before decisions are made and the state is realized, and prove that if subjects evaluate the experimental environment in that way (first-risk, second-uncertainty), incentive compatibility may be restored.

We examine strategic sophistication using eight two-person 3 × 3 one-shot games. To facilitate strategic thinking, we design a ‘structured’ environment where subjects first assign subjective values to the payoff pairs and state their beliefs about their counterparts’ probable strategies, before selecting their own strategies in light of those deliberations. Our results show that a majority of strategy choices are inconsistent with the equilibrium prediction, and that only just over half of strategy choices constitute best responses to subjects’ stated beliefs. Allowing for other-regarding considerations increases best responding significantly, but the increase is rather small. We further compare patterns of strategies with those made in an ‘unstructured’ environment in which subjects are not specifically directed to think strategically. Our data suggest that structuring the pre-decision deliberation process does not affect strategic sophistication.

In theory, search conditions are a key determinant of Pandora’s rule (i.e. of the optimal search pattern), and of the eventual payoffs (Weitzman, 1979; Doval, 2018). We compare different search conditions in the laboratory and find strong evidence that they affect subjects’ order of inspection and payoffs greatly. Subjects are more conservative at the beginning of the search, and earn less if they are constrained to choose only among the inspected alternatives, than if they are not. These findings reinforce the empirical pertinence of the formal search literature, and generate novel insights regarding relevant settings of applied interest (e.g. the impact of market digitization on consumer behavior).

We investigate the implications of Salience Theory for the classical preference reversal phenomenon, where monetary valuations contradict risky choices. It has been stated that one factor behind reversals is that monetary valuations of lotteries are inflated when elicited in isolation, and that they should be reduced if an alternative lottery is present and draws attention. We conducted two preregistered experiments, an online choice study ($N=256$) and an eye-tracking study ($N=64$), in which we investigated salience and attention in preference reversals, manipulating salience through the presence or absence of an alternative lottery during evaluations. We find that the alternative lottery draws attention, and that fixations on that lottery influence the evaluation of the target lottery as predicted by Salience Theory. The effect, however, is of a modest magnitude and fails to translate into an effect on preference reversal rates in either experiment. We also use transitions (eye movements) across outcomes of different lotteries to study attention on the states of the world underlying Salience Theory, but we find no evidence that larger salience results in more transitions.

We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate how different deliberative structures of varying inclusiveness affect collective decisions in the presence of economic conflict. An electorate consists of two groups, one informed and one uninformed about an uncertain state of the economy. This state affects payoffs differently for the two groups. We study three deliberative structures that vary in how the uninformed are included in pre-vote communication. Compared with a setting without any communication, we find that communication in all three deliberation treatments leads to more frequent votes for the efficient policies. The most inclusive deliberative structure motivates more truthfulness, more trust, more cooperativeness (i.e. refraining from protest votes), and more votes for the efficient policies, than the least inclusive structure. However, comparison among the deliberation treatments reveals that the most inclusive deliberative structure is not the one that generates the highest degree of truthfulness. The dynamics of communication lead to a general deterioration of truth-telling and cooperativeness, reinforced by the use of disrespectful and uncooperative language.

How do people distribute defenses over a directed network attack graph, where they must defend a critical node? This question is of interest to computer scientists, information technology and security professionals. Decision-makers are often subject to behavioral biases that cause them to make sub-optimal defense decisions, which can prove especially costly if the critical node is an essential infrastructure. We posit that non-linear probability weighting is one bias that may lead to sub-optimal decision-making in this environment, and provide an experimental test. We find support for this conjecture, and also identify other empirically important forms of biases such as naive diversification and preferences over the spatial timing of the revelation of an overall successful defense. The latter preference is related to the concept of anticipatory feelings induced by the timing of the resolution of uncertainty.

Are there positive or negative externalities in knowledge production? We analyze whether current contributions to knowledge production increase or decrease the future growth of knowledge. To assess this, we use a randomized field experiment that added content to some pages in Wikipedia while leaving similar pages unchanged. We compare subsequent content growth over the next 4 years between the treatment and control groups. Our estimates allow us to rule out effects on 4-year growth of content length larger than twelve percent. We can also rule out effects on 4-year growth of content quality larger than four points, which is less than one-fifth of the size of the treatment itself. The treatment increased editing activity in the first 2 years, but most of these edits only modified the text added by the treatment. Our results have implications for information seeding and incentivizing contributions. They imply that additional content may inspire future contributions in the short- and medium-term but do not generate large externalities in the long term.

Experimental game theory studies the behavior of agents who face a stream of one-shot games as a form of learning. Most literature focuses on a single recurring identical game. This paper embeds single-game learning in a broader perspective, where learning can take place across similar games. We posit that agents categorize games into a few classes and tend to play the same action within a class. The agent’s categories are generated by combining game features (payoffs) and individual motives. An individual categorization is experience-based, and may change over time. We demonstrate our approach by testing a robust (parameter-free) model over a large body of independent experimental evidence over $2\times 2$ symmetric games. The model provides a very good fit across games, performing remarkably better than standard learning models.

This paper constitutes the first economic investigation into the potential detrimental role of smartphones in the workplace based on a field experiment. We exploit the conduct of a nationwide telephone survey, for which interviewers were recruited to work individually and in single offices for half a day. This setting allows to randomly impose bans on the use of interviewers’ personal smartphones during worktime while ruling out information spillovers between treatment conditions. Although the ban was not enforceable, we observe substantial effort increases from banning smartphones in the routine task of calling households, without negative implications linked to perceived employer distrust. Analyzing the number of conducted interviews per interviewer suggests that higher efforts do not necessarily translate into economic benefits for the employer. In our broad discussion of smartphone bans and their potential impact on workplace performance, we consider further outcomes of economic relevance based on data from employee surveys and administrative phone records. Finally, we complement the findings of our field experiment with evidence from a survey experiment and a survey among managers.

A key parameter estimated by lab and field experiments in economics is the individual discount rate—and the results vary widely. We examine the extent to which this variance can be attributed to observable differences in methods, subject pools, and potential publication bias. To address the model uncertainty inherent to such an exercise we employ Bayesian and frequentist model averaging. We obtain evidence consistent with publication bias against unintuitive results. The corrected mean annual discount rate is 0.33. Our findings also suggest that discount rates are independent across domains: people tend to be less patient when health is at stake compared to money. Negative framing is associated with more patience. Finally, the results of lab and field experiments differ systematically, and it also matters whether the experiment relies on students or uses broader samples of the population.

An influential result in the literature on charitable giving is that matching subsidies dominate rebate subsidies in raising funds. We investigate whether this result extends to “unit donation” schemes, a popular alternative form of soliciting donations. There, the donors’ choices are over the number of units of a charitable good to fund at a given unit price, rather than the amount of money to give. Comparing matches and rebates as well as simple discounts on the unit price, we find no evidence of dominance in our online experiment: the three subsidy types are equally effective overall. At a more disaggregated level, rebates lead to a higher likelihood of giving, while matching and discount subsidies lead to larger donations by donors. This suggests that charities using a unit donation scheme enjoy additional degrees of freedom in choosing a subsidy type. Rebates merit additional consideration if the primary goal is to attract donors.

We investigate how people make choices when they are unsure about the value of the options they face and have to decide whether to choose now or wait and acquire more information first. In an experiment, we find that participants deviate from optimal information acquisition in a systematic manner. They acquire too much information (when they should only collect little) or not enough (when they should collect a lot). We show that this pattern can be explained as naturally emerging from Fechner cognitive errors. Over time participants tend to learn to approximate the optimal strategy when information is relatively costly.