Individuals often need to self-promote for social and professional recognition. In this paper, we investigate the existence of a gender gap in self-promotion of a prosocial action and explore its link with modesty norms. Using a novel experiment that combines both lab and field elements, we show that women are up to five times less likely to self-promote than men. We find suggestive evidence that the difference in behaviour across gender is determined by women’s social image concerns of being perceived as immodest. We find that the provision of a justification to self-promote has two important consequences: (i) it leads to an increase in self-promotion by women and (ii) contributes to the elimination of the gender gap in self-promotion behaviour.

People, across a wide range of personal and professional domains, need to accurately detect whether the state of the world has changed. Previous research has documented a systematic pattern of over- and under-reaction to signals of change due to system neglect, the tendency to overweight the signals and underweight the system producing the signals. We investigate whether experience, and hence the potential to learn, improves people’s ability to detect change. Participants in our study made probabilistic judgments across 20 trials, each consisting of 10 periods, all in a single system that crossed three levels of diagnosticity (a measure of the informativeness of the signal) with four levels of transition probability (a measure of the stability of the environment). We found that the system-neglect pattern was only modestly attenuated by experience. Although average performance did not increase with experience overall, the degree of learning varied substantially across the 12 systems we investigated, with participants showing significant improvement in some high diagnosticity conditions and none in others. We examine this variation in learning through the lens of a simple linear adjustment heuristic, which we term the “δ-ϵ” model. We show that some systems produce consistent feedback in the sense that the best δ and ϵ responses for one trial also do well on other trials. We show that learning is related to the consistency of feedback, as well as a participant’s “scope for learning” how close their initial judgments are to optimal behavior.

We performed a field experiment in Uruguay in which a 20-year-old chooses between a socially visible and a non-socially visible good after a friend randomly received one of these goods or an unknown one. We find no differences in choices when the friend received the nonvisible good instead of the unknown one. However, decision-makers significantly changed their allocation when their friend received the visible good. Consistent with status concerns driving the results, those in a disadvantaged position consumed more and those in an advantaged position consumed less of the visible good. These findings constitute the first experimental evidence of Duesenberry’s demonstration effects and show that status consumption is a relevant phenomenon among the youth in a developing country setting.

Social interactions frequently take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature explains cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma as driven predominantly by self-interested strategic considerations. This paper provides a causal test of the importance of social preferences in such contexts. In a series of pre-registered experiments, we show that high levels of cooperation can be sustained when prosocial individuals interact in segregated groups. By comparing their behavior with that of mixed and selfish groups, we highlight the conditions under which other-regarding motivations matter in repeated interactions.

Over the last four decades, a broad stream of experimental literature has been published using the Common Pool Resource (CPR) game to study how people react to congestible resources, and how to keep such resources from socially harmful overexploitation. With the goal of providing guidance to future work on this still-important paradigm, we provide a narrative review of the literature, summarizing the results for several key aspects of the experimental operationalization. We classify these aspects into two broad categories. The first describes ‘environmental’ assumptions on the modeled resource problem itself. This refers to aspects of the experimental environment reflecting factors such as group size, resource size and asymmetry of access, which generally constitute the nature of the dilemma. The second category involves ‘institutional’ issues related to how people might solve the problem, such as user communication between subjects, information about previous subjects’ choices, and regulatory measures.

We report two meta-analyses on the determinants of antisocial behavior in experimental settings in which such behavior is not rationally motivated by pecuniary incentives. The first meta-analysis employs aggregate data from 95 published and unpublished studies (24,086 participants), using laboratory, field and online experiments carried out since 2000. We find that antisocial behavior depends significantly on the experimental setting, being highest in vendetta games and lowest in social dilemmas. As we find significant heterogeneity across the studies, including across game classes, in the second meta-analysis, we focus only on “Joy of Destruction” (JoD) and money-burning (MB) experiments, for which we have the most observations, 51 studies and around 16,784 participants. Overall, our findings suggest that procedural fairness and being observed by others reduce the frequency of antisocial behavior. Online and field experiments display more antisocial behavior than laboratory experiments. We also find that the strategy method biases antisocial behavior upward. However, we do not find evidence for a positive publication bias being correlated with higher destructive behavior, either in the general meta-analysis or in relation to JoD/MB experiments; if anything, there is evidence of a negative publication bias. The JoD/MB meta-analysis finds evidence of a price effect for destruction frequency, negative discrimination against outsiders, within-subject designs underestimating destructive behavior, and more antisocial behavior in one-shot interactions. Collectively, our results point to the value of more laboratory experiments that systematically build on paradigmatic experimental designs to enable comparability and the identification of key economic drivers of antisocial behavior.

How do bribes and lobbying distort judgment? In our experiment, referees are tasked with judging a worker’s performance, and awarding a bonus to workers who score above a certain threshold. We find that bribes and lobbying are both distortionary, but in different ways. Whereas lobbying increases the number of workers receiving a bonus, bribes weaken the relationship between performance and success, with bonuses mostly being awarded to workers who bribe. We discuss implications for anti-corruption interventions.

In a field experiment where revelation of co-worker earnings and the shape of the earnings distribution are exogenously controlled, I test whether relative earnings information itself influences effective labor supply and labor supply elasticity. Piece-rate workers shown their peer earnings standing provide significantly more labor effort. However, the productivity boost from earnings disclosure disappears when inequalities in the underlying piece rate exist. By cross-randomizing net of tax piece rates, labor supply elasticity with respect to the net of tax wage is also estimated. Unlike labor level, I find this labor elasticity is unchanged by the relative standing information. Taken together, these findings have direct implications for how to best model relative status concerns in utility functions, supporting some and precluding other common ways. More speculatively, they also suggest social comparisons could be strategically used to grow firm output or the tax base, and, that underlying inequalities in compensation schemes inhibit the ability of social comparisons to incentivize work.

In two sets of novel laboratory experiments, we show that the mere presence of an existing alliance at the onset of coalition formation may lead managers to form economically suboptimal alliances. Study Set 1 considers alliance formation when a focal firm is already embedded in an existing coalition. These studies show evidence of a status quo bias: participants managing the focal firm tend to include the current partner in alliance offers and thus are less successful in forming optimal alliances compared to those in an unattached control condition. Study Set 2 examines the extent to which an unattached focal firm attempts to ‘poach’ away attractive coalition partners from their embedded alliances. Our results show evidence of poaching avoidance: participants make fewer offers to, and are less likely to partner with, an attractive firm already in an alliance. However, this tendency to avoid poaching may be attenuated when the existing coalition is perceived as a powerful threat and/or alternate partners are unavailable. These findings provide behavioral insights into how judgmental biases can constrain alliance formation. We conclude with a discussion of how selected environmental, firm, and decision-maker characteristics (e.g., turbulence, embedded relationships, and risk orientation) may moderate these results.

Narrow bracketers who are myopic in specific decisions would fail to consider preexisting risks in investment and neglect hedging opportunities. Growing evidence has demonstrated the relevance of narrow bracketing. We take a step further in empirical investigation and study individual heterogeneity in narrow bracketing. Specifically, we use a lab experiment in investment and hedging that elicits subjects’ preferences on rich occasions to uncover the individual degree of narrow bracketing without imposing distributional assumptions. Combining prospect theory and narrow bracketing can explain our findings: Subjects who invest more also insure more, and subjects insure significantly less in the loss domain than in the gain domain. More importantly, we show that the distribution of the individual degree of narrow bracketing is skewed at two extremes, yet with a substantial share of people in the middle who partially suffer from narrow bracketing. Neglecting this aspect, we would overestimate the severity of narrow bracketing and misinterpret its relation with individual characteristics.

Wrong-doers may try to collaborate to achieve greater gains than would be possible alone. Yet potential collaborators face two issues: they need to accurately identify other cheaters and trust that their collaborators do not betray them when the opportunity arises. These concerns may be in tension, since the people who are genuine cheaters could also be the likeliest to be untrustworthy. We formalise this interaction in the ‘villain’s dilemma’ and use it in a laboratory experiment to study three questions: what kind of information helps people to overcome the villain’s dilemma? Does the villain’s dilemma promote or hamper cheating relative to individual settings? Who participates in the villain’s dilemma and who is a trustworthy collaborative cheater? We find that information has important consequences for behaviour in the villain’s dilemma. Public information about actions is important for supporting collaborative dishonesty, while more limited sources of information lead to back-stabbing and poor collaboration. We also find that the level of information, role of the decision maker, and round of the experiment affect whether dishonesty is higher or lower in the villain’s dilemma than in our individual honesty settings. Finally, individual factors are generally unrelated to collaborating but individual dishonesty predicts untrustworthiness as a collaborator.

Research on individual decisions from experience reveals a robust tendency to behave as if rare events are underweighted. Experimental studies of strategic interactions often exclude probabilistic outcomes, thus neglecting the potential extension of this tendency to strategic games. Our study addresses this gap by examining how players in games adjust their strategies when confronted with low-probability, high-impact outcomes. We introduce two finitely repeated, asymmetric games with lottery-based payoffs. These games, when simplified by replacing lotteries with their expected values, yield straightforward equilibrium predictions based on dominant strategies. However, results from three experiments reveal players strongly deviate from these predictions, instead behaving consistently with underweighting of rare events. The results additionally indicate that social preferences also play a role in shaping behavior. To explain these observations, we propose the simplistic Reciprocal Altruistic Sampler (REALS) model. This model posits that players’ decisions are a result of the interplay between reliance on small samples of past experiences, altruistic tendencies, and strategic considerations. We experimentally compare behavior in variants of the games that disentangle the behavior to these three components, and show that the REALS model, despite its simplicity, effectively captures their complex interactions. Our results additionally demonstrate that players can often choose strictly dominated strategies in a sophisticated effort to react to underweighting of rare events by other players. Overall, this study enhances our understanding of strategic decision making by highlighting the crucial impact of rare events and the interplay of different uncertainties in influencing players’ choices.

Using a laboratory experiment, we investigate complexity in decision problems as a cause of failures in contingent reasoning. For this purpose, we introduce three dimensions of complexity to a decision problem: the number of contingencies, the dominance property of choices, and reducible states. Each decision problem is designed to reflect variations in complexity across the three dimensions. Experimental results show that the number of contingencies has the most significant effect on failures in contingent reasoning. The second dimension, the dominance property of choices, also has a statistically significant effect, though the effect size is smaller than in the existing literature. In contrast, the third complexity dimension has no impact; presenting the decision problem in a reduced or reducible form does not change subjects’ performance on contingent reasoning. Additionally, we examine the Power of Certainty and show its existence. This effect is particularly pronounced when the number of contingencies is large.

Explicit and implicit incentives and opportunities for mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation coexist in many economic relationships. In a series of eight laboratory gift-exchange experiments, we show that incentives can lead to crowding out of voluntary cooperation even after they have been abolished. This crowding-out also occurs in repeated relationships, which otherwise strongly increase effort compared to one-shot interactions. Using a unified econometric framework, we unpack these results as a function of positive and negative reciprocity, as well as the principals’ wage offer and the incentive compatibility of the contract. Crowding-out occurs mostly due to reduced wages and not a change in reciprocal wage–effort relationships. Our systematic analysis also replicates established results on gift exchange, incentives, and crowding out of voluntary cooperation while being exposed to incentives. Overall, our findings show that the behavioral consequences of explicit incentives strongly depend on the features of the situation in which they are embedded.

Information about the consequences of our consumption choices can be unwelcome, and people sometimes avoid it. Thus, when people possess information that is inconvenient for another person, they may face a dilemma about whether to inform them. We introduce a simple and portable experimental game to analyze the transmission of inconvenient information. In this game, a Sender can, at a small cost, inform a Receiver about a negative externality associated with a tempting and profitable action for the Receiver. The results from our online experiment (N = 1,512) show that Senders transmit more information when negative externalities are larger and that Senders’ decisions are largely driven by their own preferences towards the charity and their own use of information. We do not find evidence that Senders take the Receiver’s preferences into account, as they largely ignore explicit requests for information, or ignorance, even if Receivers have the option to punish the Sender.