This paper addresses the general question of the role of emotions in risk management, with an application to the siting of a repository for spent nuclear fuel. Although it is true that such siting has been very difficult to carry out without meeting with strong local opposition, there are some exceptions in recent Swedish experience. This recent experience constitutes an occasion for reconsidering the received message from risk perception research since the 1970s. This research has purportedly demonstrated a very strong impact of emotional processes on risk attitudes, which in turn is supposed to imply that these attitudes are rigid and unchangeable. However, when this assertion is looked at more closely, it is found that a number of questionable assumptions and overly strong generalizations have been made. The central role played by the concept of ‘dread’ is particularly important. Dread, or a ‘gut reaction’, is by no means demonstrated in the traditional selection of hazard attributes, which contain such dimensions as concern for future generations or voluntariness. Such dimensions may have a relationship to emotional processes but they are not emotional per se and their emotional significance remains to be documented. The items that do measure emotional reactions directly, by asking about fear and anxiety, are found in data on nuclear waste repository siting to have only a weak influence on policy attitudes. The most important weight is instead carried by items measuring the ‘expected severity of consequences’. The argument is, in a concluding section, carried to the level of attitudes to technologies, which may or may not be related to perceived risk. It is found that an important role is played by substitutability of a technology. If people see no good substitute for a technology that has important benefits, they are ready to accept the risks. The current situation in Sweden with regard to nuclear power can be understood in this light, since no realistic alternatives are available.

Over the past 30 years, researchers and practitioners have discussed the importance of risk communication in solving disputes ranging from the public outcry regarding importing GMO foods from the United States to Europe, the siting of waste incinerators in many parts of Europe to the building a permanent high level nuclear waste facility in the United States. In this paper the history of risk communication is discussed, focusing particularly on the importance of the social amplification of risk and trust. This is followed by a detailed discussion on trust as it relates to public perception of risk, where it is argued that trust is composed of three variables. The third section covers the theoretical debate of how to best deal with the decline in public trust. This is followed by a short analysis in which it is concluded that there is no simple solution to increasing public trust (and thereby assuring greater risk communication successes).

Data from the Human Genome Programme has clearly established that the human race is unique. Attempts to identify separately Black, Caucasian and Asian, did not establish a biological basis, which is an interesting socioeconomic point. Evolutionary medicine takes the view that many contemporary diseases are likely to result from the incompatibility between a contemporary lifestyle and dietary habits and the conditions under which the evolutionary pressure had modified our genetic inheritance. The search for gene variants or mutations, which could be associated with arterial hypertension, atherosclerosis and/or cancer, should be directed towards such metabolic genes.