This article critically addresses the varied ways in which political parties can be said to represent. Three important ideal-typical modes of party representation are outlined: the popular, the statal, and the reflexive. Arguments are offered for countering the common view that, for example, popular modes are the most democratic, and statal modes the least democratic. Statal modes in particular are often taken to be an indicator of a decline in parties’ representative functions; however, shifting modes of party representation often have more to do with strategic choices and contextual pressures than democratic ideals. No one ideal-typical mode is intrinsically more democratic than others. Further, there is evidence that a new mode of party representation, the reflexive, may be emerging; parties may be transforming into something they never were in order to continue to do the things they have always sought to do. Whether democracy is unthinkable save for political parties is no longer the question we need to ask. Rather, we need to ask: what kinds of representative democracy are thinkable? And what forms of party claims, if any, are appropriate to them?

As a result of various political and non-political developments, the socio-culturally anchored and well structured character of European party systems has come under strain. This article assesses the overall social embeddedness of modern party politics and identifies newly emerging conflict-lines. It draws attention to phenomena that do not fit into the trend of dealignment, and discusses the relationship between group-based politics and democratic representation.

The ability of political parties in advanced industrial democracies to maintain the traditional linkage between voters and their governments by making and attempting to fulfill policy promises is potentially being challenged by emerging social, political, and economic forces of the 21st century. Parties may become less meaningful to the electorate as they deal with the cross-pressures created by the forces of Europeanization, globalization, localism, and the increasing independence of central banks. These factors have the potential to make parties in government, at the national-level, marginally less able to fulfill the promises they make to voters. The review of literature presented here regarding these challenges indicates that although the risks to parties are very real, the effects of these emerging forces have yet to substantially diminish the primary roles and functioning of national parties in government. Those most at risk of being affected in the future are parties who rely strongly on economic appeals and promises.

This article addresses the sudden and somewhat unexpected rise of populist parties in West, Central, and Eastern Europe. The first section highlights the core characteristics of populism through the construction of an ideal type. Subsequently, the focus is on the opportunity structures that give rise to populism, emphasizing the end of the post-war settlement, post-industrialism, the gradual erosion of party politics, and frustrations emanating from the consolidation of liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. The final section examines three distinct forms of populism, focusing on radical-right populism (parties such as the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party), center-right populism (Forza Italia), and left populism (the German Party of Democratic Socialism).

This article is concerned with a closer investigation of the growing tendency for the state to intervene in contemporary party politics. It examines two trends. First, it looks more closely at the increased levels of regulation of party activity and behaviour in European democracies, discussing the empirical practice as well as the underlying normative paradigms of party regulation. Second, it examines the increased availability of public funding to political parties from a comparative perspective, while also exploring the motivations for its introduction in light of particular understandings of party democracy. It is argued that both dimensions constitute part of the way in which parties have strengthened their linkages with the state in recent years, and that parties, as a result of the increased involvement of the state in their internal affairs and external behaviour, have become increasingly defined as public utilities or semi-state agencies.

Party patronage is generally associated with social, economic and political underdevelopment, and is hence seen as largely irrelevant in the context of contemporary European politics. In this article, we argue to the contrary, proposing that patronage reappears on the stage of European politics as a critical organizational and governmental resource employed by political parties to enhance their standing as semi-state agencies of government. In order to illustrate our main contention, we first define party patronage, disentangling it from other notions of political particularism that are often used synonymously in the literature. Second, we provide a brief overview of the literature on the past and present of patronage practices in Europe, arguing that rather than declining, patronage is still likely to be a relevant feature of contemporary party politics in Europe. Finally, we analyse the role of party patronage in the light of recent developments in several European countries, identifying three distinct patterns of patronage practices in the region.

The purpose of this paper is (a) to point out some difficulties in the notion of European values, (b) nevertheless to present some ideas on what might be at least part of specific European traditions in bioethics, and (c) to outline a conceptual framework for further conceptual and empirical studies in this area. In European declarations and conventions, a number of important values are enshrined, including human dignity, integrity, freedoms, autonomy, health, safety and security, justice, prosperity, equity and equality, as well as solidarity. Since almost all of these values are also referred to in many other declarations, the notion of European values is problematic. Moreover, Europe is becoming increasingly multicultural due to immigration. If there is a particular European approach to ethics, based on European values, two possibilities suggest themselves. First, although the same terms referring to basic values also appear in, for instance, various UN declarations, these terms are interpreted in a particular way in Europe. Secondly, the difference lies in the ranking order between the values. In this paper, the second of these possibilities is explored. However, the notion of a ranking order can be interpreted in several ways, which are also discussed in the paper. The paper concludes with some remarks on the necessity of a global dialogue on ethical issues.