Government formation in multi-party democracies is notoriously ridden with information uncertainty. Uncertainty is aggravated when new parties enter parliament, which generally suggests a ‘newcomer handicap’ in government formation. However, relegating newcomers to the opposition comes with uncertainty in its own right, which suggests immediate cabinet participation as new leaders seize the opportunity and established parties pursue containment. We explore elite responses to this strategic problem in the postcommunist democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) where new parties often gain parliamentary representation. Even in CEE, a newcomer handicap in government formation is apparent, controlling for other detrimental party attributes. However, this applies to small newcomers only. For larger parties the handicap turns into a bonus, an effect only qualified once the newcomer outnumbers its competitors. Either way, newness-induced uncertainty thus intensifies the strategic rationale of government formation. As party systems become more volatile, these findings are relevant beyond CEE.

This article offers a contextualization of the recently introduced leadership capital concept within the wider field of political leadership research, and a demonstration of its usefulness for studying leadership performances and patterns in different institutional and political contexts. At the centre of this piece, is an application of the leadership capital approach to studying the conditions and manifestations of executive leadership in the Federal Republic of Germany, which is being considered a classic case of a compound democracy. As the inquiry into the German case suggests, the politics of leadership capital is in fact strongly shaped by the institutional framework of a regime. That said, institutions do not determine the accumulation and spending of leadership capital, and after all, even within a given institutional context, different leaders lead by making different choices. As a case study on Helmut Kohl, the Federal Republic’s longest serving chancellor, demonstrates, the leadership capital approach marks a useful and meaningful conceptual device for a deeper analytical understanding of a leader’s performance. An inquiry carried out along these lines suggests in particular that informality was one of Kohl’s key strengths across all three dimensions of leadership capital (skills, relations, and reputation), which effectively ‘freed’ him to some considerable extent from the supposedly vital ‘performative’ parts of the office of chief executive.

The relation between face-to-face and online communication and its impact on collective identity processes is understudied. In this article I draw on two case studies conducted during a 3-year ethnographic study of the Global Justice Movement network in Madrid, Spain, from 2002 to 2005 to explore the unintended impact of e-mail on the sustainability, internal dynamics, and collective identity of two groups committed to participatory and deliberative practices as key features of their collective identity. I found that despite an explicit commitment to ‘horizontalism’ the use of e-mail in these two groups increased existing hierarchies, hindered consensus, decreased participation, and worked towards marginalization of group members. In addition, the negative and unintended consequences of e-mail use affected both groups, independently of activists’ evaluation of their experience in their face-to-face assemblies (one of which was overwhelmingly perceived as positive and one of which was perceived as negative). The article draws on e-mail research in organizations, online political deliberation research, and existing studies of e-mail use in social movement groups to analyse these findings.

On 8 February 2013, the European Council agreed on the EU’s multiannual financial framework for 2014–20. The agreement includes a reduction of the overall spending level and significant reprioritisations. This paper asks how this agreement has been reached. Scharpf’s actor-centered institutionalism is applied, including the concept of the joint-decision trap. The paper finds that the outcome was made possible by compensating the member states that were worst affected by the policy changes. A coalition of net contributors, centered on Germany and the United Kingdom, was influential regarding the overall spending level. In addition, the external environment with the fiscal and economic crisis created a momentum for reduced expenditures. Those against the reduction, the member states in favour of agriculture and cohesion, were not able to avoid cutbacks. Member states in favour of the cohesion policy faced hard conditions for maintaining unity in their coalition, whereas member states in favour of agricultural spending could more easily negotiate for their common interests.

Policymakers in industrialized democracies often debate the efficacy of subsidizing public broadcasters. Surprisingly however, past media and politics research analyzing the effects of public broadcasting on political knowledge does not isolate the effect of subsidies and instead treats all public broadcasters as equals. This study theorizes that subsidized public broadcasters have to worry less about competing with entertainment-oriented commercial broadcasters for advertising revenue than their unsubsidized peers. As a result, they can focus on providing more comprehensive public affairs coverage instead of only worrying about attracting the largest possible audience. To test this theory, I use Eurobarometer data measuring knowledge, media consumption, and demographic variables from 14 countries. I find that watching public broadcasting increases knowledge levels among citizens, while decreasing gaps in knowledge between citizens caused by varying levels of education, income, gender, and political interest. However, as predicted, these benefits only occur in countries that provide significant subsidies for their public broadcasters.

Democracies come in all shapes and sizes. Which configuration of political institutions produces the highest democratic quality is a notorious debate. The lineup of contenders includes ‘consensus’, ‘Westminster’, and ‘centripetal’ democracy. A trend in the evaluation of the relationship between empirical patterns of democracy and its quality is that the multidimensional nature of both concepts is increasingly taken into account. This article tests the assertion that certain centripetal configurations of proportionality in party systems and government, and unitarism in the remaining state structure, might outperform all other alternatives both in terms of inclusiveness and effectiveness. Analyzing 33 democracies, the results of interactive regression models only partially support this claim. Proportional–unitary democracies have the best track record in terms of representation, but there are little differences in participation, transparency, and government capability compared with other models.

Moises Ostrogorski once denounced political parties for burying diverse concerns of pluralistic societies under monolithic electoral options. E.E. Schattschneider celebrated them for the same reason: organizing choice and ‘responsible party government’ amid pluralistic complexity. Comparativists have found both dynamics in European legislatures: most European parties exhibit the high average levels of voting unity that Schattschneider’s theory implies, but also display rather Ostrogorskian cycles of discipline, stifling dissent on divisive issues at election time. We use comparativists’ tools to explore the dynamics and normative quality of party unity in the different terrain of the US Congress. We find similar cycles of unity in roll-call voting, but in the American context – with more loosely organized parties, especially historically but still today – Ostrogorskian stifling of dissent operates against a less Schattschneiderian background. In comparative perspective, Congressional parties muffle divisive issues more effectively than they deliver governance, with tenuous implications for representation.

The purpose of this study is to examine the adolescents who cross the boundaries of legality, also including illegal political means in their political action repertoire. The data comprised of questionnaire responses from middle and late adolescents in a Swedish city of around 130,000 citizens. Analyses of covariance, EXACON, and logistic regression were used to examine the extent to which adolescents including illegal political activities in their political activity repertoire compare with their legally oriented counterparts. Adolescents using illegal political activity reported higher levels of political interest and goal-orientation than adolescents involved solely in legal political activity. The major contrasts with legal political activism were that illegal political activism seemed to co-occur with (a) reluctance to accept authority, irrespective of the context (societal, school, or parental) and (b) approval of violent political means. In a simultaneous model, further analysis revealed that reluctance to accept authority reduced the predictive power of illegal political activities with regard to approval of political violence. This suggests that the tendencies to approve of political violence, among adolescents involved in illegal political activities, might be partially explained by challenges toward authority. To conclude, adolescents in illegal political activism seem to have similar resources for political engagement as their legally oriented counterparts. However, adolescents involved in illegal political activity seem more likely to let ends justify the means. Most likely, this position is related to authority challenges.

How well do corruption perception measures reflect actual levels of public sector corruption? Leading cross-national corruption perception measures have come under much theoretical and empirical scrutiny in recent years, with serious implications for the validity and reliability of the data in this ever growing sub-field. Critics argue that perceptions – in particular those of outside experts – do not reflect actual corruption in that they are far too ‘noisy’ or simply biased by external factors such as economic performance. Moreover, a number of recent empirical studies, focused on developing areas, have put forth evidence that outside expert assessments of corruption correspond little, if at all, with the experiences and views of actual citizens, and that such a lack of correspondence demonstrates pessimism for existing perception measures. This study offers a systematic analysis of the empirical strength of corruption perception measures in a previously unexplored area in this debate – Europe. Using new survey data collected by the author based on 85,000 European respondents in 24 countries, this issue is analyzed directly, addressing several contemporary critiques of the data. First, perceptions of citizens with, and without, personal corruption experience are compared at both the national and sub-national level in Europe. Second, external factors are checked, which might bias the extent to which citizens perceive corruption relative to how much actual corruption exists in countries and regions. Finally, expert perception indicators and citizen perceptions and experiences are compared. In summary, strong counter-evidence is found to the prevailing pessimistic claims in the literature – the consistency between actual reported corruption, as well as citizen and expert perceptions of corruption, is remarkably high and such perceptions are swayed little by ‘outside noise’. I conclude that, although existing corruption measures certainly have their share of problems, concerns regarding the validity and bias of perceptions have, perhaps, been overstated.