This paper aims to demonstrate that the current application of the concepts of risk and unsafety in Regulation 178/2002 (GFL) results in a grey area within EU food safety regulation. By means of the food safety risk assessment of aspartame it is illustrated that “grey area foods”, although not “unsafe” according to legal definition, could compromise human health because of, i.e., their nutritional composition. It will be argued that the grey area emerges from a narrow focus of food safety risk assessment within the ambit of the GFL, which disregards certain types of hazard and causes an information gap with respect to how food consumption, eating behaviour and health are interconnected. At the same time, the scope of food safety in the GFL is restricted to what is considered “normal” consumer behaviour in view of the information provided on food labels or generally available in society. In doing so, the legislator has set rather high standards for what may be expected of the average consumer in terms of the understanding and avoidance of behavioural risks. As a result, the consumer bears the responsibility for the consequences of the information gap.

This article aims to consider whether classic criminal offences (such as manslaughter) are adequate to reprove the scientists’ behaviour when major calamities are being judged to have caused the death of people and wide destructions. The fundamental problem hinges on the role of risk-assessment and consultancy carried out by the scientists, as well as on the unknown state of major risks. Then, to establish a link of causality between the defendants’ behaviour and the death-events affecting the victims, it must be proved that: a) the scientists “psychically” influenced the victims to leave any safety precaution in relation to the risk; b) the deaths of the inhabitants are not to be considered an “extraordinary” circumstance, even by experts. The difficulties faced by the Judge to fulfil these tasks prompt us to wonder whether other types of criminal charges would be more appropriate for sanctioning scientists who are found to be derelict in their duty of risk-assessment to authorities and citizens.

The start of a new European Commission represents a unique opportunity to build on successful regulatory reforms and to create the institutional architecture needed to ensure that high quality scientific evidence is used effectively in EU decision–making. The appointment by President Barroso of a Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) in 2011 constituted an important springboard in this respect. The CSA Office has made a considerable and positive difference to the regulatory environment. This article argues for embedding the CSA Office into the institutional and procedural arrangements of the Commission by re–defining its organisational role and responsibilities as well as the resources allocated to it. The institutionalisation of the CSA Office and the creation of a fully–fledged risk regulation regime would provide a robust element of the EU's response to the demands for better governance by its citizens, as expressed in the recent European elections.

The contribution of social sciences to risk assessment has often been confined to dimensions of risk perception and communication. This article relates an effort to promote knowledge from the social sciences that addresses other dimensions of risk issues. A sociological checklist produced for ANSES in France helps to identify and analyse social dimensions that should be given attention during the process of risk assessment.

Risk regulation is a major task of the EU. In this context, scientific knowledge and advice is critical to the preparation, formulation, legislation and later revision of EU risk regulation. However and with some notable exceptions (e.g. some EU Agencies, DG SANCO), there seems to be no systematic view, let alone, organisation for the ‘use of science’ for EU policy–making. It is in this light that the new function of Chief Scientific Advisor (CSA) to the President of the European Commission can best be appreciated. The authors first sketch how ‘science’ is used in the EU regulatory regime and what is or has become problematic about it. Subsequently, an informal SWOT analysis of the ‘use of science’ for EU policy is conducted. The contribution ends with an attempt to evaluate the CSA's accomplishments to date and how it can contribute to improving EU regulation. This is followed by a few recommendations on how the role of the CSA could be strengthened in the near future.

This piece critically analyses the development of a novel food technology: the Frankenburger, a type of cultured/in vitro meat (or ‘shmeat’, which stands for ‘sheet of meat’). It assesses the risks raised by cultured meat as well as the role it could play to alleviate environmental and food security concerns. The article argues that the current EU regulatory structures for cultured meat, and for novel foods more generally, ought to be strengthened. There is a necessity to transfer and develop food innovations in partnerships with all the relevant stakeholders (the public, scientists, the food industry, policy-makers and regulators). Including interested parties from the inception of a technology as well as within the decision-making process would provide a supporting framework for cultured meat.

By taking the EU Cyber Strategy as a case in point, this contribution examines how the distinction between external and internal security in contemporary EU law manifests itself in large-scale risk regulation and in particular, how the EU relies upon external norms to regulate risk. This article also maps the evolution of the rule-making processes themselves.

Notwithstanding impressive gains in occupational safety across the Australian coal mining sector, this research reveals that even within the same company, some mines substantially outperform others in terms of safety outcomes, raising questions as to why, notwithstanding the introduction of sophisticated and systemic risk management mandated by government, such variation still exists. Potential contributory variables are considered (technology, physical environment, management systems), and discarded, before examining the role of safety culture. Drawing on qualitative (interviews) and quantitative research (safety statistics and audit results) it was found that distinctive patterns of site and context specific cultural factors align to safety performance. The article provides insights as to whether, to what extent or in what circumstances site specific cultural variables, served to undermine or reinforce the effectiveness of the company's overall risk management strategy.

Despite Iceland's economic recovery, nearly 48% households continue to struggle to make ends meet. This study argues, first, that the main reason behind over-indebtedness in this country is a loan system without parallel in Europe, based on a triple cost of credit (fix/variable interest, indexation of credit to inflation and negative amortization). Second, the problem is examined in the context of European law as some alleged malpractices of indexation have been referred to the EFTA Court. Third, the focus shifts to the debt-relief programme presented by the Icelandic government in 2013/2014 after the relative failure of previous debt-relief measures. It is argued that this plan will fail in the long run as long as the indexation of credit to inflation is not abolished. The private pension system in Iceland relies indirectly on indexed mortgage credit issued by the public Housing Financing Fund. Since a ban on indexation and a holistic pension reform are not expected soon, all present debt write off benefits will surely be eaten up by higher inflation. As long as indexation of credit is legal, the future scenario resembles less a debt-relief jubilee and more the theater play “Waiting for Godot ”.

Before the Treaty of Lisbon, EU agencies were unknown in the EU's primary law defined procedural law. Today, following (i) the Treaty's entry into force, (ii) the Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies and (iii) the European Court of Justice's ruling in Short–selling it is interesting to take a look at the peculiar position of EU agencies under the EU's primary and secondary law defined procedural law.

In order to secure their fishery products market share in the EU, third countries, especially the developing ones, tend to transplant EU requirements into their domestic legal order. In reality, theses transplanted laws do not correspond to measures to reach a level of protection needed by the country of destination. Based upon the case of Benin, this paper intends to show that when these legal transplants are adversely made, they can in some cases have disastrous effects. It can be argued that an unintended result of EU policy was that it contributed to the collapse of the shrimp industry in Benin. The paper moreover argues that despite the stringency of the EU requirements, the implementation of its control policy might inadequately protect European consumers of shrimp.

With the New Approach for goods, the EU has created a regulatory framework for placing products on the market in which both public and private parties have an important role to play. The various cases which have been brought after the PIP breast implants scandal show the difficulties with trying to link this ex ante regulatory framework to potential liability for defective products. National courts have reached different conclusions about the scope of the obligations of certification bodies in the New Approach. Since these issues are about the fundaments of the construction of the New Approach, it would be desirable for the ECJ, and perhaps even the European legislator, to get involved.

The EU authorization process of the insect-resistant maize 1507, branded by its developer company Pioneer-DuPont as ‘Herculex’, is perhaps the most interesting and emblematic example of the current regulatory crisis of GMO regulation in Europe. The case is particularly controversial, because it concerns the first risk assessment regarding the cultivation of a GMO issued by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) since its establishment in 2005. It involves a long and complicated authorization process marked by persistent contestation of both the EFSA's risk assessment and the Commission's risk management; a total of six EFSA opinions; administrative delay; and ultimately a judicial condemnation of the Commission’s behavior by the EU General Court.

This case is of particular relevance, because it registers a slight yet meaningful change in the EFSA's approach to GMO risk assessment including the way the EFSA has dealt with competing scientific opinions, risks and uncertainty involved in GMO regulation. Moreover, in the field of GMO authorizations under the new legislative framework, the European Parliament (EP) has actively intervened in the administrative authorization process. It should be noted that the outcome of this process remains unclear at the moment, given that at the time of writing the Commission has not yet taken its final decision on Maize 1507. The present report aims to offer an overview of this year-long and controversial process including the approaches taken by the relevant institutions involved therein.

Sweden has long been seen as a pioneer in the area of chemical control policy. In 1995 it put forward a so called “generation goal” which called for a phasing out of all human made chemicals within a 25 year period. The Swedish Government took up the challenge of how to best reach this goal by putting forward a number of environmental quality objectives, which were approved by the Swedish Parliament in 1999. What has happened since then? Will Sweden reach its proposed generation goal? This paper addresses these two questions.