At a time of increasing recognition worldwide of the role of Chief Science Advisers as of critical importance in improving dialogue between science and policy, the European Union, notably the European Commission, is currently considering – under the pressure of civil society organisations – whether to maintain or scrap this recently–created position. After contextualizing this debate within the broader efforts undertaken by the Barroso Commission to strengthen science in EU policymaking, this article discusses what role, if any, a Chief Scientist may play within the EU systemof scientific advice. After denouncing the lack of a public debate about the merits of this post at the time of its creation, the article takes as a point of departure the criticisms made against this position and assesses them in the light of the mandate entrusted to the Chief Scientist Advisor. It argues that the major point of disagreement on this post revolves around the question of whether the Chief Scientist Advisor, as it currently stands, helps or hinders the EU incorporating the ‘best science’ into policy. After identifying the flaws of the actual mandate and the challenges faced by the first holder of the position, it argues that the burden of proof rests with the EU Commission to prove the merits, and more specifically, the rationale for having yet another source of scientific advice in the EU.

Case n. 380, 22.10.2012, Victims of the earthquake v. Barberi et al., (members of the NationalCommission for the Prediction and Prevention of Major Risks),Tribunal of L'Aquila, grounds delivered on 29.01.2013; (first degree of judgment).

Articles 113, 589, c.1and 3, 590 Criminal Code (113 – Cooperation in negligent homicide, 589 – Negligent homicide, 590 – Negligent personal injury)

The Tribunal of L’Aquila condemned seven members of the National Commission for the Prediction and Prevention of Major Risks to six years in prison for manslaughter because they dismissed the role of scientists in a March 31, 2009 meeting. The meeting was convoked in L’Aquila to provide the population of L'Aquila, which was scared after a continuous series of tremors lasting three months, with serious information on a scientific base. On the contrary, the members of the Commission supported a press campaign launched by the Chief of the National Civil Protection to reassure the population. Five days after the meeting, a serious tremor took place causing more than 300 deaths.

At the end of August 2014, scientists and policymakers from forty-eight countries gathered at the Heritage Hotel in Auckland, New Zealand to debate the science and art of scientific advice. Jointly hosted by Sir Peter Gluckman, chief scientific advisor to the PrimeMinister of NewZealand, and the International Council for Science (ICSU), the Auckland summit was the largest ever meeting of its kind, attracting science advisors, advisory bodies and academic experts fromAlbania to Zimbabwe, and a host of countries in between.

Over two days of intense discussion, participants debated structures and methods for the provision of scientific advice in emergency situations, across national and disciplinary boundaries, and on contested topics,where science, values and politics collide. The meeting ended with a call to strengthen collaboration between advisory systems, an agreement to formalize the network, and a commitment tomeet again in 2016. As Sir Peter Gluckman said afterwards: “Our goal was to start a global conversation on the practices and challenges of conveying science advice to governments…The meeting has highlighted a real thirst among practitioners to share models and lessons.”

The objective of the article is to analyse the use of Humanities and Social Sciences (HSS) in public risk assessment and risk management organisations in France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada and the United States based on more than a hundred interviews conducted with social sciences experts employed by or working for these organisations. If the added value brought by the integration of social scientists is recognised, the use of social sciences differs from one organisation to another. The article compares the different positions given to social scientists inside and outside the organisation, the various methods used and the different contents produced. The survey highlights a set of initiatives that are scattered, differentiated and ultimately have little in common – except that they often play a marginal role in the main activities of the agencies concerned.

This article examines the large interstate variation in levels of unconventional gas development in the U.S. states. The following hypotheses are advanced to predict whether a state will be predisposed toward development: (H1) the availability of unconventional gas reserves; (H2) the availability of infrastructure to support development; (H3) a recent history of conventional oil and gas development; (H4) Republican party control of the Governor's office and state legislature; (H5) relatively low sensitivity to environmental issues; (H6) regulatory systems that treat UGD as a variant of conventional gas development; (H7) a pressing need for economic benefits as indicated by state and local measures of household income, unemployment and poverty; (H8) and public opinion supportive of development. To various degrees, each of the hypotheses is supported but important exceptions and surprises are uncovered in the qualitative and semi-quantitative analyses. Future research should continue the effort to explain the variation of development by expanding the geographical scope of inquiry and enlarging the sample of jurisdictions.

Legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament in June 2012 to impose minimum unit pricing for alcohol sold in Scotland as part of a strategy to tackle alcohol-related harm has yet to be implemented pending the outcome of a challenge to its legality under EU law before the Scottish Courts brought by three associations of producers of wines and spirits, namely the Scotch Whisky Association, the Confédération Européenne des Producteurs de Spiritueux and the Comité de la Communauté économique européenne des Industries et du Commerce des Vins, Vins aromatisés, Vins mousseux,Vins de Liqueur et autres Produits de la Vigne. The first instance court in Scotland rejected the challenge in May 2013, but Scotland's appeal court decided in April 2014 that before ruling on the producers’ appeal, it should refer a number of questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”). The CJEU is not expected to rule until late 2015 at the earliest and so the ultimate outcome before the Scottish courts is not likely to be known until 2016.

While there is now a large amount of social science research on scientific expertise, testimonies made by sociologists who themselves participated in scientific expertise on a controversial topic remain rare. It is this type of feedback and testimony that this paper will articulate and discuss. The aim is to propose a series of reflections on scientific expertise from a personal experience: the participation of the author as a sociologist in an expert committee set up by the former French Agency for the Safety of Health, the Environment and Work (AFSSET) on the topic of radio-frequencies. Several problematic aspects of scientific expertise will thus be discussed from this concrete experience: the problem of the composition of the expert group and the issue of conflict of interest, the way in which the work of expertise is organized within the group, the effects of the presence of an observer from an association, and the differences between scientific work and scientific expertise.

This article investigates the L'Aquila decision. It aims to present a theoretical framework from contemporary disaster research and political philosophy to better understand why blame and responsibility has come to play such a prominent role in the aftermath of disasters. Furthermore, it presents a number of examples from criminal law around the world to provide context to the decision. The central claim in tthis piece is that the decision is not an extraordinary, isolated decision on responsibility following disasters; rather the decision is emblematic to an on-going development of disaster responsibility. Thus, after disaster follows a legal process aimed at identifying, and if necessary, penalizing the mistakes leading to the horrifying outcome. In that way disasters are increasingly like any other event in society with major negative implications; it is evaluated and if appropriate adjudicated.

Today,more than ever, citizens expect value formoney, not only from their elected representatives, but also from the laws and regulations passed to protect them. As the European economy faces continued challenges and limited economic growth, citizens rely on policy-makers to encourage innovation and stimulate growth and jobs. This requires flexible legislation which fosters start-ups, encourages SMEs during those early days, but which also simultaneously maintains the high levels of consumer health and safety that they have become accustomed to.

Public accountability is also increasing – and rightly so. Citizens don't just want legislation that delivers – they alsowant transparency and open dialogue. They want decision-makers to explain why certain policy choices weremade over others, and what benefits they can expect fromsuch choices. This requirement for information must also be seen against a backdrop of increasing demands on consumers’ time and a tendency to deal in “twitterati” style soundbites. This often results in consumers feeling the need for analysis and validation of information via a third party, sometimes a journalist, sometimes anNGOor government agency.

This article aims to analyse the role of law in the identification of the responsibility domain of ‘regulatory science’ (Jasanoff, 1990) within the risk regulatory process. The main research question is therefore,what kindof relationshipbetween science andpolicy-making lawshould design in risk regulation.

In order to address this issue, this contribution focuses on the recent verdict of the Tribunal of L’Aquila. After the earthquake occurred in L’Aquila on the 6th April 2009, six Italian scientists that had participated in the Major Risks Commission's meeting have been condemned for the multiple manslaughter of 29 people who were among the 309 victims of the earthquake, ‘for having assessed the risks related to seismic activity in the L’Aquila territory in an inaccurate, generic and ineffective way’ and for having provided ‘information which was imprecise, incomplete and contradictory as to the nature, the causes and the hazardousness and on the future development of the seismic activity’.

As far as risk assessment and risk communication are concerned, firstly the tasks of the Major Risks Commission under the Italian Civil Protection law will be analysed. Against this backdrop, the issues related to this expert body's responsibility will be addressed and the gaps in the current accountability regime will be pointed out.

How can we assess the quality of an analytical deliberative decision support procedure in environmental health practice? Objectifying quality criteria is difficult for several reasons. Opening up evaluation to a diversity of critics is one approach to take into account different actor perspectives and complexity. We describe how social scientists organized extended peer evaluation of a participatory multi-criteria procedure that was applied in Flemish environmental health practice. International peer review was combined with local extended peer evaluation. Social scientists collaborated closely with natural scientists and policy representatives in designing several evaluative activities and in interpreting the results.We discuss how these different perspectives came to reach conclusions, with a special focus on methodological decision-making. A process of learning by doing and negotiating, finding a methodological path amidst practicalities, complexity and ambition.

Collection and provision of scientific information for policy and decision-making is particularly important during emergencies or when uncertainty and ambiguity creates situation of fear and anxiety. This article offers two suggestions for addressing natural or technology risks, leveraging research by the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) and project contributors. The first advice is that concepts and instruments for risk governance be recognised and used as intermediation between evidence and policy. The second is that the role of the Chief Scientific Adviser in public sector organisations includes those of the Chief Risk Officer. These suggestions could help address the challenge for policymakers to deal with uncertainty and emergency, when little or contradictory evidence is available.

“Negative claims” can be defined as claims indicating that certain ingredients, nutrients or substances are not present in a foodstuff. Legitimate uses of regulated negative claims in the EU include some nutrition claims and “gluten-free” claims. Some EU Member States have legislated on “GM-free” claims. The article describes in more detail some cases (i.e., BPA-free, MSG-free, Aspartame-free and palm oil-free), where negative claims are used with an implied message that whatever is used instead of the often “demonised” substance is safer, healthier or greener. The article argues that EU and EU Member States’ legislators and regulators should ensure that consumers are not misled by astute marketing techniques that have no informative agendas, but simply aim at denigrating certain products in order to promote “free-from” products. This issue is particularly timely and important given the imminent application of the EU's Food Information Regulation and the additional costs that it will impose on the industry in the name of providing complete, reliable and evidence-based information to consumers.