The closure of part of European airspace as a result of the eruption of the Eyjafjallajokull volcano constitutes “extraordinary circumstances” which does not release air carriers from their obligation, in the event of cancellation of a flight, to provide passengers care and assistance (author's headnote).

Modern financial law historically emerged as a patchwork of regulatory reactions to a series of financial crises. It continued to develop in sync with the ebb and flow of regulatory cycles that oscillated between periods of calm, conducive to a deregulatory frenzy, and periods of crises followed by re-regulatory fervour. Reform initiatives spurring in reaction to crises also comprise procedural/institutional reforms (i.e. those relating to the “who” and “how” of regulation, as opposed to the “what”). The latest financial crisis is no exception to this rule. This article focuses on the EU institutional reforms, which arguably represent a more radical departure from the status quo (in comparison to domestic or international initiatives) in that they involve an instance of “proper” institution-building with implications across different levels of governance. This reform is examined first against the backdrop of the existing EU agencies' legal framework and is found to constitute an important milestone in the crystallization of this framework. A closer look is then taken at the new European Supervisory Authorities' role in EU rulemaking, and to their relationship with the European Commission. Subsequently, the paper takes a further step back and offers some thoughts about the continuously mutating relationship between law and new governance practices, as illustrated in the context of EU financial regulation.

“The Court considers that the Commission should give due consideration to the principles of clarity of objectives, simplification, realism, transparency and accountability when designing new and revising existing interventions.”

This study focuses on the dispute over Korea’s import bans and the additional testing and certification requirements for Japanese foods and analyses the relevant findings of the reports of the Panel and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation’s dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). Although the Panel had found that Korea’s measures were inconsistent with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), the Appellate Body reversed most of these findings. Korea notified that it had completed the implementation of the reports of the Panel and the Appellate Body. However, the DSM has failed to contribute in settling this dispute positively and meaningfully, since it remains uncertain whether Korea’s import bans are based on scientific principles. Furthermore, the Appellate Body failed to complete its legal analysis of the inconsistency of Korea’s measures based on fact-findings and the facts uncontested between both disputing parties.

This contribution will draw on the literature that has accumulated on how the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has responded to the European Banking Union, which was established in similar crisis circumstances that now face the European Union (EU) in the age of COVID-19, to illustrate the legal issues on which the CJEU’s input will be particularly important in the shaping of any future European Health Union. This contribution will highlight three legal issues in particular: the interpretation of EU Treaty provisions in the health field; the scope of EU competence; and the powers of EU institutions and agencies. This contribution will argue that the CJEU case law to date on health issues is encouraging with respect to competence and agencies, but more cautious with respect to the Treaty’s health provisions.

Today,more than ever, citizens expect value formoney, not only from their elected representatives, but also from the laws and regulations passed to protect them. As the European economy faces continued challenges and limited economic growth, citizens rely on policy-makers to encourage innovation and stimulate growth and jobs. This requires flexible legislation which fosters start-ups, encourages SMEs during those early days, but which also simultaneously maintains the high levels of consumer health and safety that they have become accustomed to.

Public accountability is also increasing – and rightly so. Citizens don't just want legislation that delivers – they alsowant transparency and open dialogue. They want decision-makers to explain why certain policy choices weremade over others, and what benefits they can expect fromsuch choices. This requirement for information must also be seen against a backdrop of increasing demands on consumers’ time and a tendency to deal in “twitterati” style soundbites. This often results in consumers feeling the need for analysis and validation of information via a third party, sometimes a journalist, sometimes anNGOor government agency.

On 20 July 2016, a new legal framework comes into effect for the so-called “food for specific groups”, established by Regulation (EU) No. 609/2013 on food intended for infants and young children, food for special medical purposes, and total diet replacement for weight control (hereinafter, FSG Regulation). The FSG Regulation repeals Directive 2009/39/EC on foodstuffs intended for particular nutritional uses (hereinafter, the PARNUTS Directive). Food intended for sportspeople placed on the market will be affected by the repeal of the PARNUTS Directive as such food has not been included in the FSG Regulation's scope and will have to comply with general EU food law from 20 July 2016. This has a major impact on compositional requirements, product names and claims made on such food. Inter alia, the possibility to make so-called “suitability statements” on food intended for sportspeople, which currently does give manufacturers some margin to make statements that some consider as something similar to claims, is likely to be controversial without the PARNUTS Directive.

No matter how good a smart device may be, it remains useless outside the context of a digital ecosystem. Internet of Things (IoT) environments are possible as long as services and products can interconnect smoothly and exchange data in real time. Therefore, interoperability ranks high in global policy agendas, with the promise of bringing an end to network effects slanted in favour of ecosystem orchestrators. However, recent regulatory initiatives introducing interoperability obligations risk falling short of their intent or even risk generating unintended consequences in the absence of a coherent approach to standardisation. Against this backdrop, focusing on the UK Open Banking experience, this article makes a proposal for workable interoperability in IoT ecosystems aimed at ensuring market contestability without undermining incentives to innovate.

The European Commission’s 2020 draft Chemicals Strategy for Sustainability set the ambitious goal of achieving a “Toxic-Free Environment”. Those ambitions were harshly criticised by a team based in Germany’s Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (or BfR); they claimed that toxicological risks from chemicals had already been minimised and were optimally regulated. This paper outlines evidence to support the Commission’s implication that the European Union’s chemicals regulatory regime is suboptimal. It also criticises the BfR team’s contentions by reference to empirical findings (eg concerning tumours, congenital anomalies and the toxicity of mixtures) and by disentangling their conceptual confusions.

Next to Member States, European Union (EU) level organisations have come to play a larger role in enforcement in the EU during the last two decades. Analysing the roles of Member States, networks of national authorities and EU agencies in this stage of the policy cycle through multiple academic lenses could lead to a more comprehensive understanding and assessment of their design. This article sets elementary steps towards a framework that brings together prominent theoretical insights from the legal and political disciplines, to discuss their combined leverage for understanding the EU legislator's choice for these enforcement regimes.