Many of today’s products and services fall into the category of products and services that are, as such, legal but still unhealthy. Think of smoking as an example. This paper deals with the question of which mix of legal instruments should ideally be used in the light of such products and services. It distinguishes between products and services that predominantly lead to “harm to oneself” or “harm to others”. In the end, most law and economics arguments point in the direction of ex ante safety regulation. However, when there are concerns about the quality of regulation (eg due to lobbying efforts), liability has important added value. In the “harm to others” scenario, safety regulation is even more warranted because the larger number of victims and the increased difficulty to prove the causal link render litigation burdensome. Strict liability has several advantages over negligence and is, therefore, generally preferred. A strong point of negligence, however, is that it enables the court to conduct its own weighing of costs and benefits, which in specific circumstances may be better than that of the regulator or the producer. Furthermore, it enables the judge to consider not only the harm to the user, but also the harm to others in setting the due care standard.

One of the few certainties we have in dealing with corruption lies in its adaptive nature. Over time, corruption has in fact proved to be able to change, evolve and adapt within all political systems. Such an adaptive nature calls for close scrutiny of the setting or space where corruption spreads out. Therefore, this raises questions about the unappreciated risks and immeasurable opportunities for corruption in the ever-changing and interconnected world of techno-social systems we live in. This article aims to advance the policy and regulatory debate surrounding corruption by focusing on its complex and adaptive nature. In applying the main tenets of complexity theory, the analysis builds on the well-known Cynefin framework. This decision-aiding framework proves to be an insightful tool for shedding light on some critical features of corruption (eg its perception and the affected confidence).

There is no time more opportune to review the workings of the International Health Regulations (IHR) than the present COVID-19 crisis. This article analyses the theoretical and practical aspects of international public health law (IPHL), particularly the IHR, to argue that it is woefully unprepared to protect human rights in times of a global public health crisis. To rectify this, the article argues that the IHR should design effective risk reduction and response strategies by incorporating concepts from international disaster law (IDL). Along similar lines, this article suggests that IDL also has a lot to learn from IPHL in terms of greater internationalisation and institutionalisation. Institutionalisation of IDL on par with IPHL will provide it with greater legitimacy, transparency and accountability. This article argues that greater cross-pollination of ideas between IDL and IPHL is necessary in order to make these disciplines more relevant for the future.

COVID-19 is a zoonosis, a disease transmitted by an animal to humans. The diffusion of the outbreak is therefore born of an unsuitable, insufficient, excessively permissive food safety system. Hence, the regulation of food safety plays a central role in the protection of health and has done so on a global scale. The overall regulation of food safety therefore requires an increase in the level of health protection, even at the expense of commercial prerogatives. For these purposes, four reform measures are suggested: to transform the Codex Alimentarius Commission into an organisation that adopts international standards with the sole purpose of protecting health; to apply the precautionary principle on a global scale and in international organisations; to strengthen the mandatory labelling tool; and to create a worldwide system of controls.

The role of software in society has changed drastically since the start of the twenty-first century. Software can now partially or fully facilitate diagnosis and treatment of a disease, regardless of whether it is psychological or pathological. Consequently, software plays a role comparable to medical equipment with a physical footprint. Understanding when software as a medical device must comply with applicable rules is vital for both manufacturers and regulators. We therefore examine the Medical Device Regulation to expand on the notion of intention, as this is the key basis for the classification of medical devices. Finally, we develop objective criteria that software must fulfil to be considered a medical device under European Union law.

The issue of super-intelligent artificial intelligence (AI) has begun to attract ever more attention in economics, law, sociology and philosophy studies. A new industrial revolution is being unleashed, and it is vital that lawmakers address the systemic challenges it is bringing while regulating its economic and social consequences. This paper sets out recommendations to ensure informed regulatory intervention covering potential uncontemplated AI-related risks. If AI evolves in ways unintended by its designers, the judgment-proof problem of existing legal persons engaged with AI might undermine the deterrence and insurance goals of classic tort law, which consequently might fail to ensure optimal risk internalisation and precaution. This paper also argues that, due to identified shortcomings, the debate on the different approaches to controlling hazardous activities boils down to a question of efficient ex ante safety regulation. In addition, it is suggested that it is better to place AI in the existing legal categories and not to create a new electronic legal personality.

Under the notion of human rights due diligence (HRDD), firms are under a responsibility to account for the social and environmental impact connected to their operations across global value chains. This responsibility intersects with the sphere of operation of voluntary sustainability standards (VSS), which certify production against certain social and environmental criteria. With mandatory European rules on HRDD in the making, the question arises regarding the extent of alignment of VSS with HRDD notions and, consequently, the possibility for this form of transnational private regulation to complement European Union (EU) HRDD legislation. After presenting the regulatory effects of HRDD in global value chains and its current transposition in EU instruments, this contribution examines the relationship between private standards and HRDD. By delving into the substantive requirements and policies of several schemes certifying agricultural commodities, this paper studies the extent to which they manage social and environmental risks in global value chains and the possible support they provide to firms subject to the upcoming HRDD obligations.

This article contributes to the discussion about managing the risks and uncertainties of emerging technologies through increased stakeholder participation. Authorities have increasingly invited stakeholders from high-technology sectors to participate in assessing the risks of, and designing responses to, new technologies. Yet authorities often struggle to attract stakeholders from such sectors to participate; a critical challenge identified but still undertheorised in the literature. Responding to this gap, this article presents a case study of the UK’s regulatory sandbox for financial technologies, applying a document study, questionnaire and interviews to explore fintech firm motivations and apprehensions about participation. Drawing on the bureaucratic reputation literature, the study finds that fintech firms have a range of practical, reputational and normative motivations to participate, and these motivations are inextricably tied to the regulator’s strong reputation with the sector as procedurally correct, high-performing and morally committed to facilitating innovation. On this basis, recommendations for practitioners and hypotheses for future research into the drivers of stakeholder participation in regulatory decision-making surrounding emerging technologies are proposed.

Analysts agree that public opposition is one of the main factors that hinder ambition in many countries’ carbon pricing policy agenda. This article argues that motivated reasoning contributes to this opposition by inducing the public to underestimate the effectiveness of carbon pricing to mitigate climate change and yield co-benefits. This article also argues that measures of implicit carbon pricing can help overcome public opposition to carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes due to motivated reasoning. These measures are becoming increasingly available thanks to recent work by the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and private-sector actors, and therefore they offer a potential instrument for reducing public opposition to carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes in various countries. A strength of the approach proposed in this article – compared to some of the mainstream approaches to risk regulation – is that it tries is to keep the regulation of climate risks in line with public attitudes towards these risks.

The latest Russian regulatory reform (2016) sought to introduce the risk-orientated approach – a move away from the “blanket inspections” (or the risk regulation reflex – a term coined by Blanc in 2011) method that has been criticised by the Russian business community. The present paper aims to assess its success using administrative data on federal watchdogs’ inspections. We argue that this reform ultimately failed in its goal regarding the overall number of inspections, and thus the volume of regulatory burden did not change significantly throughout the reform. This failure resulted from two mechanisms. First, the legal framing of the reform radically redefined risk as the probability of incompliance (as opposed to the likelihood of accident). Second, the watchdogs used key performance indicators that incentivised “street-level” inspectors to maintain the pre-reform regulatory burden levels.