Our study on smart contracts, self-executing agreements based on blockchain technology, can be placed in the field of inquiry within law and economics of contracts which explores new modes of contract enforcement as sources of market creation. We lay the foundations by characterising contract enforcement and trust mechanisms underlying contracts. Considering that trust reduces risks in economic exchange, we explain how the particular trust mechanism underlying smart contracts’ enforcement (no-party trust) provides opportunities for creating new markets and changing existing ones. We explore, among other things, whether using smart contracts could be a path to increasing the autonomy of consumers and offering a solution for democratising trade.

This paper compares Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and equity crowdfunding with Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) and explores the corresponding risks and limitations of these different fundraising practices, with a view to analysing the extent to which the latter should be subject to the same regulatory framework as the former. After assessing the underlying principles and current regulatory framework for IPOs and equity crowdfunding, with a focus on Europe and the US, we investigate the possibility of applying existing financial regulations to ICOs. Drawing from the notion of “functional equivalence”, we contend that many ICOs share a sufficient number of similarities with traditional IPOs and equity crowdfunding, to be regulated in a similar manner. However, given the various attempts by token issuers to escape from the scope of securities laws by assigning a different function to their ICOs tokens, we argue that principle-based regulation based on an in-depth risk-analysis could be an effective way of addressing the regulation of ICOs, thereby moving from “functional equivalence” to “risk equivalence”. Finally, we explore the use of blockchain technology as a regulatory technology, incorporating specific rules and constraints into the technological fabric of an ICO, in order to ensure compliance with the fundamental principles of financial regulation.

Under the phrase “code is law” and based on its “trustless trust”, blockchain has emerged as a disrupting technology considered by some as an alternative to the law. Based on a study of real-life blockchain-based decentralised applications (Dapps), this article takes blockchain developers at their word and adopts the point of view of users: can blockchain live up to its promise and enable them to transact with each other without the need for the trust granted by the law? The article particularly highlights that users need to be able to ascertain that a self-advertised Dapp indeed qualifies as one. Blockchain technology may make it possible to do away with trust in third parties, but this is not enough. Users also need to trust that an alleged Dapp genuinely is one, and blockchain alone cannot provide this. Beyond Dapps, it is argued that blockchain needs the complementary role of the law to deliver its promises and especially to authenticate blockchain “virtues”. The EU certification mark is identified as a promising form of co-regulation for that purpose.

The right to vote and participate in the political process is a quintessential feature of any democratic society. Systematic risks to the integrity of US elections and passive civic participation in the EU political process present fundamental threats to the constitutional aspirations and the democratic ideals connected to “We the People” in the US and “United in Diversity” in the EU. The existence of power imbalances, social inequalities and information asymmetries in electoral and political processes illustrate that both jurisdictions are in peril and in risk of democratic backsliding. Blockchain-based voting can transform existing electoral and political processes in the digital age. This raises the question whether blockchain-based voting can be utilised as a digital tool to enhance the democratic legitimacy of US and EU electoral and political systems. Accordingly, this article aims to examine the prospects and limits of blockchain technology to secure foundational democratic norms connected to the right to vote and civic participation at the heart of contemporary constitutionalism. It contends that the decentralised, immutable, accessible, transparent, and secure processes of blockchain technology have the potential to enhance the legitimacy of the US and EU constitutional orders, since blockchain-based voting can act as a forum for enhanced civic participation, public deliberation, and democratic contestation. Nevertheless, the article concludes that a number of important steps must be taken to fully realise the potential of blockchain-based voting in a manner that combats the risks associated with the technology, strengthens public confidence in electoral and political processes and secures a balanced system of governance in the US and the EU constitutional orders.

With the birth and rise of cryptocurrencies following the success of Bitcoin and the popularity of “Initial Coin Offerings”, public awareness of blockchain technologies has substantially increased in recent years. Many blockchain advocates claim that these software artefacts enable radically new forms of decentralised governance by relying upon computational trust created via cryptographic proof, obviating the need for reliance on conventional trusted third-party intermediaries. But these claims rest on some key assumptions, which this paper subjects to critical examination. It asks: can existing mechanisms and procedures for collective decision-making of public blockchains (which we refer to as internal blockchain governance) live up to these ambitions? By drawing upon HLA Hart’s Concept of Law, together with literature from regulatory governance studies, we argue that unless public blockchain systems establish formal and effective internal governance, they are unlikely to be taken up at scale as a tool for social coordination, and are thus likely to remain, at best, a marginal technology.

Inside companies that produce significant risks, risk managers play a key role. They manage the connection between the risk regulation regime, which stresses public values, and the company, which pursues a broader array of organisational goals. This makes the role of risk managers ambivalent. To better understand this ambivalence and identify the means, motives and strategies that risk managers employ in response to this ambivalence, this article conducts a concise review of (classic) organisation and regulatory literature. Based on this review, we propose a typology that distinguishes four roles of risk managers: risk managers as supporting staff; risk managers as professionals; risk managers as boundary spanners; and risk managers as agents in regulatory communities. Each type subsequently describes how risk managers employ different strategies in their attempt to connect the risk regulation regime and the company, ie translating policies to practices, tailoring policies to practices, explaining and framing policies and practices, and (re)interpreting policies and practices together with regulators. The typology enables researchers and practioners to emphasise and more thoroughly analyse the variety and complexity of risk managers’ work, and can help regulators to broaden and fine-tune their strategies to improve connections with the various roles of risk managers.

In the EU, pharmaceuticals are subject to a marketing authorisation requirement that, depending on the type of product concerned, can be obtained either centrally through a Commission decision with EU-wide effects or in the Member States, potentially subject to mutual recognition in composite authorisation procedures. These composite decision-making processes can nowadays be considered a standard way of administrative decision-making in the EU internal market. Yet, judicial supervision remains anchored in the separation of jurisdictions between the national and the EU level, and between national levels. This article explores the challenges posed to judicial review in the case of pharmaceutical marketing authorisations when European administrative composite structures are used.