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How to Make Sure My Cryptokitties Are Here Forever? The Complementary Roles of Blockchain and the Law to Bring Trust

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 July 2019

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Abstract

Under the phrase “code is law” and based on its “trustless trust”, blockchain has emerged as a disrupting technology considered by some as an alternative to the law. Based on a study of real-life blockchain-based decentralised applications (Dapps), this article takes blockchain developers at their word and adopts the point of view of users: can blockchain live up to its promise and enable them to transact with each other without the need for the trust granted by the law? The article particularly highlights that users need to be able to ascertain that a self-advertised Dapp indeed qualifies as one. Blockchain technology may make it possible to do away with trust in third parties, but this is not enough. Users also need to trust that an alleged Dapp genuinely is one, and blockchain alone cannot provide this. Beyond Dapps, it is argued that blockchain needs the complementary role of the law to deliver its promises and especially to authenticate blockchain “virtues”. The EU certification mark is identified as a promising form of co-regulation for that purpose.

Type
Symposium on Blockchain Regulation and Governance
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 10 , Issue 2: Symposium on Blockchain Regulation and Governance , June 2019 , pp. 315 - 329
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2019 

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76 ibid, p 146.

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