The significantly divergent trajectories of terrorism and climate change as security issues for Western states in the early years of the 21st century represent a puzzle. While sharing some attributes – uncertainty and the primacy of risk-management responses – climate change clearly represents a more fundamental threat to life than terrorism. Despite this, terrorism has occupied a prominent place on states’ security agendas, while climate change has been decidedly marginal. This paper explores this divergence. Employing the securitisation framework, the paper maps the approach to terrorism and climate change as ‘security’ issues among key proponents of the ‘war on terror’, before exploring why these two issues were treated in such different ways. This analysis suggests a clear inclination to define and approach terrorism as an urgent security threat necessitating emergency measures: a willingness not evident in the case of climate change. While noting elements of the latter that militated against its securitisation, the paper points to the role of ideology – the beliefs and commitments of political leaders in particular – in driving choices around the construction of the security agenda. It concludes by suggesting that unlike the response to terrorism, impediments to enacting emergency measures to address the climate crisis remain.

In this article, we analyse the implications of the end of the Cold War for US non-proliferation policy and the non-proliferation regime. Contrary to widely held expectations, we show that the end of bipolarity did not undercut the pursuit of non-proliferation but supercharge it. While bipolarity had afforded non-proliferation hold-outs opportunities to evade superpower pressure, the structural condition of unipolarity both incentivised and enabled the United States to pursue a more robust non-proliferation policy than before. Against the view that contemporary unipolar power is severely circumscribed by the need to make compromises and adhere to social norms, unipolarity allowed the United States to entrench a regime that was widely considered unjust. We support this argument with an analysis of non-proliferation dynamics in the early 1990s, focusing in particular on the process that culminated with the indefinite extension of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995.

With the decline of the Western framing of the war on terror (WoT) in security discourse, it has become commonplace to note the ‘return’ of great power politics. But under-analysed so far have been the nuclear dimensions of this trend. This is important because we are on the cusp of a multipolar order where the ‘poles of power’ are nuclear-armed. We outline the ways in which almost 30 years of perceptions of unipolarity, and particularly the focus on ‘rogue’ and non-state (nuclear) terrorism post 9/11 on the part of Western policy practitioners, analysts, and scholars, allowed for the previous focus on the threat of nuclear war to be supplanted by a wider ‘nuclear security’ agenda. We unpack the return of nuclear threats and risk-taking in the Euro-Atlantic, the nuclear deterrence balance in the Western Pacific, and the emergence of a non-aligned nuclear great power in the Global South. While we argue that managing the dangers of the return of nuclear great power politics will require a dual approach drawing lessons from both from the Cold War ‘balance of terror’ and from an earlier era of a multipolar ‘balance of power’, many key dynamics from the WoT years remain.

Nuclear deterrence strategies are predicated on nuclear use scenarios. However, as nuclear weapons haven’t been used since 1945, why does use occur in scenarios but not in practice? If scenarios incorporated the political challenges of crossing the nuclear threshold, how would this change the utility of the deterrence strategies they support? To address these questions, this article examines Cold War-era American debates about a Soviet ‘first strike’, discusses the limits of technical critiques of nuclear use scenarios, and argues for an alternative approach to scenario design and criticism that includes political factors observable in crises and wars involving nuclear states.

Two decades into the ‘war on terror’, attention is rapidly shifting away from terrorism. Increasing geopolitical competition between the US and China and Russia’s war in Ukraine prompted talk about a watershed moment in global politics marked by a return of great power competition. To what extent has this paradigm shift – from terrorism to ‘traditional’ considerations of military security from external invasion – taken place in Southeast Asia? Building on securitisation theory, this article argues that the war on terror did not mark a universal historical-political period as it is often presented. In Southeast Asia, so-called non-traditional threats such as terrorism have concerned states since their independence. Therefore, Southeast Asia continued to prioritise ‘traditional’ security threats alongside ‘non-traditional’ ones in what is commonly described as its comprehensive approach to security. Consequently, when the ‘return to geopolitics’ began influencing military doctrine and preparation amongst NATO countries, a similar shift was absent in Southeast Asia. We argue that the region has seen varied emphases on non-traditional versus traditional security threats but did not experience the paradigm shift suggested by the US-dominated security narrative. Southeast Asia’s comprehensive security constellation underscores the need for a more pluralistic and eclectic approach to the study of international relations.

This article critically examines the major shortcomings in multi-country security investments in East Africa during the war on terror. It argues that these investments have not only failed to adequately recognise African contexts but also falls short of recognising the agency of local communities in counterterrorism efforts. Drawing on critical terrorism and security studies, as well as excerpts from interviews with practitioners in Kenya, the article identifies gaps in the prevailing approach that treats Africa as a unitary entity and critiques the notion of universality of knowledge ingrained in these interventions. By taking a decolonial perspective, the article challenges some prevailing constructions about Africa, linked to the war on terror, as the source of this notion of universality of knowledge. By highlighting the connection of counterterrorism strategies to coloniality and the systemic exclusion of subaltern voices, the discussion suggests that a more contextually informed approach is a precursor to envisioning Africa positioned beyond the war on terror.

What are the legacies of the war on terror? This paper seeks to answer this question through an analysis of vernacular uses of terrorism discourse in political commentary on the Ukraine war. The paper describes how the set of tropes, ideas, and recurrent metaphors that constituted the historical backbone of narratives about terrorism before and after 9/11 is now being mobilised in the context of interstate conflict. Instead of rejecting such deployments of terrorism as lay misappropriations of an otherwise-objective concept, we argue that they evidence the aesthetic force of terrorism discourse in organising our ethical relationship to different experiences of (in)human suffering. The paper advances the concept of terrorism as an aesthetic signifier, to provide two contributions to terrorism studies. First, we argue that narrative approaches to the study of political violence in IR can only move forward if they bypass the field’s traditional framing of terrorism – which we dub the (il)legitimacy trap – and push the boundaries of critique beyond the idea of terrorism as unacceptable violence. Second, we contend that IR scholars must situate the signifiers orbiting the discourse on terror within wider racialised aesthetic regimes dictating the visibility and invisibility of collective suffering. With these two moves, we hope to bring more attention to the question of victimisation in terrorism studies, a field historically focused on perpetrators and the conditions of perpetration of violence.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has moved attention within International Security back to Great Power Politics and interstate war, and away from phenomena like ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ and lone actor terrorism. Is the War on Terror paradigm receding? This paper argues that counter-radicalisation imaginaries and counter-extremism programming will all remain stubbornly present despite the shift back to interstate war. The resilience of domestic War on Terror policies will stem from their integration within local municipality activity and social policy during the second decade of the 21st century. These policy areas and levels are detached from the international security community, meaning that shifts in attention at the global level will have little effect upon localised national security practices. The paper then interrogates how counterterrorism agendas have so successfully entered the world of social policy and local public administration, using genealogical methods to trace how social security and crime prevention were historically prefaced upon defence. The paper traces the policy paradigm of ‘social defence’ which dominated mid-20th century international organisations, targeting non-criminal juveniles with pre-emptive interventions to prevent ‘dangerous persons’ imperilling society. Effectively, this untold history of crime prevention in Europe demonstrates the profound interlocking of national security, social policy and defence across the 20th century, with implications for the resilience of this triad.

Dominant debates about China’s growing presence in the Pacific Islands – through infrastructure, aid, trade, and investment – suggest that Chinese material power directly translates to influence and effective interference in Pacific states’ domestic and foreign affairs. These perspectives fail to clarify the causal link between Chinese economic statecraft and Pacific governments’ alignment with Beijing’s interests. They also deny Pacific people agency, overlooking how power relations are mediated by Pacific state and non-state actors operating across complex political and socio-economic structures. We challenge such rationalist conceptualisations of Chinese power by developing a constructivist taxonomy of power as presence (dormant capability), influence (socialisation), and interference (incentives), and applying it to the Melanesian subregion. We argue that Chinese power is not merely material, causal, and unidirectional. Chinese power can also (re)shape the identities and interests of Pacific elites and publics in a constitutive manner, potentially aligning their ideas about substantive norms, rules, and practices guiding their foreign relations with Chinese ‘core interests’ and perspectives on regional and global politics.

What explains the revanchism of (post-)imperial states? This question has renewed salience amid Russia’s expanded war against Ukraine in 2022. In this article, we conceptualise revanchism as a foreign policy preference that involves reclaiming territory once controlled. We also advance a new explanation for revanchism that emphasises elite continuity in those states that experience territorial loss. Elite continuity matters because the ruling political class in (post-)imperial states, which was socialised under the old regime, preserves certain beliefs about world politics and the perceived legitimacy of their territorial claims. We show that elite continuity between the Soviet and post-Soviet political leadership in Moscow helps explain Russia’s revanchism better than those alternative explanations that we derive from the International Relations literature. To substantiate our argument, we compile a novel dataset to operationalise elite continuity across regimes and use discursive evidence and other indicators of elite attitudes towards the desirability of reclaiming lost territory. We also discuss the applicability of our theory to other cases.

In this article, I critically examine the ‘Cyber Kill Chain’, a methodological framework for thought and action that shapes both contemporary cybersecurity practice and the discursive construction of security threats. The history and epistemology of the Cyber Kill Chain provide unique insight into the practice of contemporary cybersecurity, insofar as the Kill Chain provides cybersecurity practitioners with predetermined categories and indicators of threat that shape how threats are conceptualised and understood by defenders and suggests actions to secure against them. Locating the origins of the kill chain concept in US military operational logics, its transformation through the anticipatory inquiries of intelligence, and its automation in computational networks, this article argues that the Cyber Kill Chain is emblematic of a vigilant socio-technical logic of security, where human perception, technical sensing, and automation all respond to and co-produce the (in)security through which political security concerns are articulated. This practice makes politics; it excludes, includes, and shapes what is perceived to be dangerous and not, directly impacting the security constructed. Through a critical reading of the Cyber Kill Chain, this article provides insight into cybersecurity practitioners’ epistemic practice and as such contributes to discussions of cybersecurity expertise, threat construction, and the way in which cybersecurity is understood and practised as a global security concern.

While there is literature on ‘populist securitisation’ and on the ‘securitisation of Islam’, the possibility that some populists may desecuritise Islam is not sufficiently explored. Left-wing populist parties have demonstrated solidarity towards Muslim minorities in Europe through a discourse based on inclusionary rhetoric and deconstruction of the securitising narratives promoted by mainstream and populist right-wing parties. However, their attitude towards Islam can be ambiguous. This paper argues that left-wing populists tend to desecuritise Islam. However, desecuritisation happens in ways that do not always accommodate Muslims’ religious freedoms. This happens because the driver of the left-wing populist desecuritisation of Islam lies in the left-wing thick ideology surrounding populism and not in the populist thin core. I illustrate this argument through the case study of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader of the left-wing populist party La France Insoumise. Through a discourse analysis of texts from 2009 to 2022, I show that Mélenchon has predominantly desecuritised Islam. While his desecuritisation is populist, it has not been truly emancipatory for Muslims. Although a more committed fight against Islamophobia has emerged since 2019, Mélenchon’s ideological attachment to laïcité hinders a full rearticulation of French political community based on genuine recognition of Muslims’ religious freedoms.

The integration of ‘AI’ technologies into weapon systems introduces a complex dimension to international relations and security, championing technological solutions for enduring warfare challenges, notably enhancing ‘situational awareness’ through advances such as automated ‘vision’. However, the discourse, particularly in Western militaries like that of the United States, often overlooks inherent limitations and issues in AI-based warfare. This paper explores ‘AI’s’ implications for military vision by inter alia scrutinising the US military’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) process. It argues that the US military actively transforms the observation, decision, and action apparatus, progressively substituting human vision and decision-making, leading to a multidimensional de-visualisation. This denotes fundamental changes in human perception, reshaping knowledge, control, and agency dynamics. In conclusion, the paper suggests an imminent era of de-visualisation in the military – a deliberate relinquishment of human control for perceived military efficiency and effectiveness. This marks a transformative shift, urging nuanced consideration of the profound impact of ‘AI’ technologies on warfare dynamics.

Women who are currently serving in a variety of combat roles and combat support positions in many state militaries around the globe have had to struggle for their positions by proving their abilities, and such struggles are still ongoing. Based on interview materials with veterans, this article examines the ways in which the veterans interpret their roles as women in combat positions and how they understand agency. The article further traces how their presence in war could alter the gendered meaning of protection. While the military is a key institution of overt gendered power in the state, women combatants’ voices can create a crack in the masculine dominance that is taken for granted in state narratives; they can also create a wedge that allows in a reconsideration of gendered roles and power relations in the context of militaries, thereby offering more nuanced interpretations of protection and agency.

The Covid-19 pandemic saw a surge in cyber attacks targeting pharmaceutical companies and research organisations working on vaccines and treatments for the virus. Such attacks raised concerns around the (in)security of bioinformation (e.g. genomic data, epidemiological data, biomedical data, and health data) and the potential cyberbio risks resulting from stealing, compromising, or exploiting it in hostile cyber operations. This article critically investigates threat discourses around bioinformation as presented in the newly emerging field of ‘cyberbiosecurity’. As introduced by scholarly literature in life sciences, cyberbiosecurity aims to understand and address cyber risks engendered by the digitisation of biology. Such risks include, for example, embedding malware in DNA, corrupting gene-sequencing, manipulating biomedical materials, stealing epidemiological data, or even developing biological weapons and spreading diseases. This article brings the discussion on cyberbiosecurity into the realms of International Relations and Security Studies by problematising the futuristic threat discourses co-producing this burgeoning field and the pre-emptive security measures it advocates, specifically in relation to bioinformation. It analyses how cyberbiosecurity as a concept and field of policy analysis influences the existing securitised governance of bioinformation, the global competition to control it, and the inequalities associated with its ownership and dissemination. As such, the article presents a critical intervention in current debates around the intersection between biological dangers and cyber threats and in the calls for ‘peculiar’ policy measures to defend against cyberbio risks in the ‘new normal’.

For more than two decades, Iran’s nuclear programme has concerned policymakers and scholars alike. Whether speeding up uranium enrichment, slowing down international negotiations, or disrupting the timing of key initiatives, actions around Iran’s nuclear programme bear a clear time signature. Yet systematic accounts of the importance of time in shaping foreign and security policymaking have been largely neglected. Through foreign policy timing theory’s (FP4D) reconceptualisation of time we show how actors both constructed and then used time to pursue their strategic interests, creating, altering, and sabotaging the timing mechanism linking Iranian nuclear technology and international sanctions. These manipulations of time by both domestic and international actors resulted in prolonged international negotiations and fluctuating periods of crisis and produced a temporally flawed agreement frozen in time. We consider time’s impact on the current challenges and future direction of nuclear diplomacy with Iran as well as its importance for broader nuclear security issues.

This article explores the emergence of new military-strategic rationalities in relation to conceptions of hybrid warfare in the grey zone through a case study of Sweden’s reinstatement of total defence since 2015. Through a governmentality-inspired approach, I analyse what it means for the organisation of a new total defence when one of the main threats to be dealt with is daily antagonistic but highly ambiguous hybrid attacks. I illustrate how conceptions of an ambiguous strategic non-peace entails a move beyond war preparedness into urgent demands for an everyday active total defence that hinges on a ‘martialisation’ of civilian life. This in turn run the risk of challenging fundamental democratic principles and civil liberties. The analysis contributes to an increased understanding and uncovering of the politics made possible by a military-strategic rationality geared towards hybrid threats in the grey zone – which in the Swedish case has resulted in a historically specific version of total defence that builds on a highly diffused and rather extreme form of decentralised defence.

Although Critical Security Studies (CSS) has done much to advance security debates, some shortcomings remain. Its excessive focus on the individual – which we term ‘me’ – reduces CSS' capacity to propose solutions to current global security problems such as pandemics and climate change. This paper contributes to the emerging scholarship on the potential of relational ontologies in Security Studies by introducing Buen Vivir Indigenous cosmopraxes into the debate. Indigenous cosmopraxes such as Sumak Kawsay, Suma Qamaña, and Teko Kavi, we argue, can inform CSS by providing alternative considerations to the pluriverse of ideas that address security crises. These cosmopraxes, which make up the broad notion of Buen Vivir, provide a way to think and enact security from a collective perspective, one that emphasises ‘we’ instead of the liberal self. In that sense, these cosmopraxes allow us to conceive security differently and face insecurities together.

This article investigates the defence policies of the Nordic and Baltic countries from the perspective of shared security culture. To that end, the article analyses conceptualisations of total defence and resilience in a comparative perspective and inquires into existing and prospective regional cooperation in this area, in order to determine to what degree there exists a common security culture based on shared norms and identities and manifested in practices of security cooperation. The study, which draws on 19 interviews with civil servants from the eight states of the region, shows that while there is fertile ground for a shared security culture to emerge, thus far, due to variations in conceptualisations, threat perceptions, and interaction preferences, only three Nordic states show clear signs of a shared security culture. The study contributes to existing research by situating the concept of resilience in (total) defence discourses; by expanding the theoretical work on security culture to an international context; and by offering a unique empirical account of the process of (re)building total defence policies in a region crucial to European security.

Is individual support for internationally agreed military humanitarian interventions (MHIs) subject to a religious bias? Conducting a vignette-based survey experiment, the paper provides micro-level evidence for such a bias within a highly unlikely sample: German university students. Participants in our survey experiment were more compassionate and indeed more supportive of an MHI when the victims of war-related violence were Christians rather than Muslims. The paper thus contributes to the literature on support for MHIs in two important ways: first, whereas the existing literature has a strong focus on the United States, this paper studies individuals’ support in another Western country that regularly contributes to MHIs, namely Germany. Second, while the existing literature has mainly examined how other social factors, such as the race or gender of the victims, affect individuals’ support for MHIs, drawing on social identity theory, this paper claims that religious identification also has an impact. Moreover, by showing that the religion of the victims of war-related violence shapes individuals’ attitudes towards MHIs through compassion, the paper also speaks to more recent literature that demonstrates that individuals’ attitudes towards refugees depend on – among other things – their religion. Against the background of a general rise of identitarian politics in many Western societies, our findings seem to be of particular relevance.