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Fishing regulations, individual discount rate, and fisherman behaviour in a developing country fishery

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 2008

WISDOM AKPALU
WISDOM AKPALU*
Affiliation:
Center for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa (CEEPA), Department of Agricultural Economics, Extension and Rural Development, University of Pretoria, 0002 Pretoria, South Africa. Email: [email protected]; [email protected]
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Abstract

Studies of compliance with fishing regulations have been based on fishery crimes where the offender faces a one-period decision problem of maximizing an expected utility. Moreover, the returns from the crimes are uncertain because the offender may lose them if caught. This paper extends these models by considering a fishery crime that generates a flow of returns until the offender is caught and then punished. Consequently, it incorporates into the existing model the influence of dynamic deterrence in which the discount rate affects violation levels. The predictions of the model are tested on data from an artisanal fishery in Ghana.

Type
Research Article
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 13 , Issue 5: THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY, ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCE USE , October 2008 , pp. 591 - 606
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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