A growing population and growing per capita consumption threaten the environment and the natural resource base. Where natural resources are at risk, the livelihoods of many are at risk as well. In May 2006 the Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group of Wageningen University organized a conference on ‘Poverty, Environment and Natural Resource Use’ with the aim of contributing to a better understanding of the links between poverty and the natural resource base. The state of the environment affects people's living conditions – and poverty affects environmental quality. Environmental policies cannot be designed and natural resources cannot be managed without appropriate consideration of local people's reactions to those policies and management decisions.

The development literature has devoted considerable attention to the commons and has ignored the wider economic context of the commons. I develop a model of two kinds of agents (naïve and sophisticated) using two kinds of assets (safe and unsafe) to illustrate the possibility of resource degradation in the commons in the absence of free riding, shirking, and general theft among members of the village and its associated commons. This model makes it possible to understand that degradation of the commons arises from factors outside of the commons rather than arising from ‘perverse’ property rights and selfish behavior within the commons. This approach suggests a needed reformulation of development assistance away from prescriptions for the commons. Instead, development assistance must be refocused on the more serious challenge of institutional incoherence in the larger economy of which the village and its commons are but a part.

This paper focuses on the interactions between local communities having at least some degree of informal claims over natural resources and firms interested in commercially exploiting such resources, explicitly allowing for interventions by third parties interested in community welfare and environmental outcomes. Integrating conflict and bargaining theories, we develop a bargaining model with endogenous inside and outside options, in which the feasibility and outcomes of a potential bargaining game depend on the unraveling of a conflict stage and vice versa. The model implies that, contrary to the conventional bargaining model, distribution and efficiency cease to be separable. We show that certain third-party interventions in the bargaining process may have unexpected and counterproductive effects.

Studies of compliance with fishing regulations have been based on fishery crimes where the offender faces a one-period decision problem of maximizing an expected utility. Moreover, the returns from the crimes are uncertain because the offender may lose them if caught. This paper extends these models by considering a fishery crime that generates a flow of returns until the offender is caught and then punished. Consequently, it incorporates into the existing model the influence of dynamic deterrence in which the discount rate affects violation levels. The predictions of the model are tested on data from an artisanal fishery in Ghana.

Cash-constrained wildlife departments must increasingly look towards revenue-generating activities such as sales of permits for hunting common species combined with fines for those caught with rare species. Pertinent to west Africa, an optimal enforcement model demonstrates the conditions under which a department with neither external budget nor tourism revenue can fully protect a rare species, and the impact on other species and local hunters' livelihoods. The department's effectiveness is shown to depend critically on the extent to which hunters can discriminate among different species. Improvements in hunting technology selectivity are therefore a substitute for increased enforcement spending.

Conservationists promote non-timber forest products (NTFP) to simultaneously alleviate poverty and conserve ecosystems. Unfortunately, little is known about how such products actually contribute to poverty alleviation, or how various complementary policies such as green marketing campaigns or cooperative management might impact resource health and users' welfare. This paper develops a simple NTFP extraction model that focuses on spatial and labor market dimensions of use in both managed and unmanaged settings. The model contrasts patterns of spatial use, resource health, and income generation under open access and community-managed institutions. We then test the conceptual model by investigating the case of xate production in the rainforest of Chiapas, Mexico, using survey work conducted over two separate periods. The empirical investigation reveals spatial patterns and labor market outcomes predicted by the model. We find NTFP use is mainly conducted by households with low opportunity costs of time and fewer income generation opportunities.

Sustainable use of humid forest resources as a source of fertile land for cultivation requires long periods of fallow and the ability to move the zone of active cultivation from one location to another over time. At the individual field level, shifting cultivation is essentially a resource extraction problem akin to a pulse fishery – a short period of intensive use of the stock of soil fertility followed by a long idle period permitting regeneration. This paper describes a spatiotemporal model of resource extraction adapted to the use of forest resources by shifting cultivators. Theoretically grounded in the spatial and household modelling literature, it is a structural simulation model of household decision-making, and includes a demonstration of the concept with a limited data set from southern Cameroon. Use of a stated preference approach to modelling decision-making identifies individual preferences and spatial path-dependency as important sources of shortened fallows and resource degradation.