A growing population and growing per capita consumption threaten the environment and the natural resource base. Where natural resources are at risk, the livelihoods of many are at risk as well. In May 2006 the Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group of Wageningen University organized a conference on ‘Poverty, Environment and Natural Resource Use’ with the aim of contributing to a better understanding of the links between poverty and the natural resource base. The state of the environment affects people's living conditions – and poverty affects environmental quality. Environmental policies cannot be designed and natural resources cannot be managed without appropriate consideration of local people's reactions to those policies and management decisions.

This paper analyzes behavioral change spurred by better common property forest management (CPFM), with a focus on on-farm tree planting. Results from our theoretical household model suggest that on-farm trees, which provide products that can substitute for those from common forests, should be stimulated by better CPFM systems. We test this finding using data from a household survey conducted in the Bolivian Andes in 2000. We find that better CPFM at its highest level of aggregation is positively correlated with more and higher quality on-farm trees. In terms of less aggregated indices, relatively few variables are significant, though two particularly important aspects of forest property rights – access clarity and the existence of formal penalties for overuse – actually reduce on-farm tree planting. We therefore conclude that in general synergies between individual CPFM components are most critical for behavioral change, but improvement of property rights aspects of CPFM may give counter-intuitive results.

It is now generally agreed that the prediction of long-run development has to include natural resource use. To focus on the long run is, however, not equivalent to the use of balanced growth assumptions. It should be kept in mind that reaching a long-run equilibrium might take considerable time. Transition phases often exhibit characteristics which differ from the long-run state of the economy, but are important for its nature.

We discuss a number of different drivers that govern the transition to the steady state, including the development of stocks, substitution possibilities, savings decisions, and institutions. Based on this theoretical evaluation, we discuss five contributions of the conference on sustainable resource use and economic dynamics (SURED 2006) included in this special issue.

Paying for the provision of environmental services is a recent policy innovation attracting much attention in both developed and developing countries. This innovation, referred to as ‘payments for ecosystem services’ (when the emphasis is on enhancing ‘nature’ services) or ‘payments for environmental services’ (when amenities provided by the built environment are also included) is referred to here as PES. PES programs aim to harness market forces to obtain more efficient environmental outcomes. Since so many opportunities for PES programs could involve farmers in poor regions, international aid agencies and private donors, looking for a double dividend, increasingly consider using PES programs as a potential way of meeting both social and environmental objectives.

This paper analyzes the fair division of common property resources when monetary compensations are feasible. A prominent example is the fair division of the atmosphere's limited absorptive capacity for greenhouse gases. I propose a solution that is Pareto efficient and satisfies the axiomatic fair division criteria of individual rationality, stand-alone upper bound, and a version of envy-freeness. The latter criterion is adapted to problems where monetary compensations can be used to facilitate the fair division of the common resource. Applied to climate change, the solution implies that developing countries should participate in emission reduction efforts, but should be fully compensated for their incremental abatement costs.

This paper gives an ecologist's overview of the deteriorating environmental situation. It then describes areas where the activities of ecological economists seem appropriate (e.g., ecosystem service valuation, trade) and others requiring more attention (e.g., definitions of utility, social discounting, preserving population diversity, global toxification, the epidemiological environment, overpopulation, overconsumption, the economic impacts of nuclear explosions, and the equilibration of opportunity costs when attempting to solve global dilemmas). A general problem is the failure of ecological economists adequately to communicate their results and concerns to the general public and to decision makers. In view of the demonstrable failure of traditional economics to focus its attention on what will be the central issues of the twenty-first century, it is clear that ecological economics is in a position to become the central subdiscipline of economics. In order to do so, it is important for ecological economists to always keep the ‘big picture’ in view.

This paper explains the puzzling fact that in organizing the management of surface water, village leaders have provided incentives to canal managers in some areas, but not in all. Our study indicates that the optimal contractual choice depends on the relative abilities of the leader and the manager, the design of the cultivated land, the characteristics of the canal system and the opportunity costs of the leader and the pool of managerial candidates. The unifying mechanism is the relative change in the ability of the leader and manager to perform the unmarketable activities that are needed to provide irrigation services.

We analyze a two-sector growth model with directed technical change where man-made capital and exhaustible resources are essential for production. The relative profitability of factor-specific innovations endogenously determines whether technical progress will be capital- or resource-augmenting. We show that any balanced growth equilibrium features purely resource-augmenting technical change. This result is compatible with alternative specifications of preferences and innovation technologies, as it hinges on the interplay between productive efficiency in the final sector, and the Hotelling rule characterizing the efficient depletion path for the exhaustible resource. Our result provides sound micro-foundations for the broad class of models of exogenous/endogenous growth where resource-augmenting progress is required to sustain consumption in the long run, contradicting the view that these models are conceptually biased in favor of sustainability.

Paul Ehrlich has written a wonderful article with the purpose to convince economists to switch their research interests to what he calls ecological economics. His argument is twofold. If our intellectual capacity is not geared towards these issues, humanity may be heading for a big disaster. Secondly, it gives tremendous opportunities for economists: the ones who switch will end up in the centre of the profession, because society will be in big need of their expertise.

The development literature has devoted considerable attention to the commons and has ignored the wider economic context of the commons. I develop a model of two kinds of agents (naïve and sophisticated) using two kinds of assets (safe and unsafe) to illustrate the possibility of resource degradation in the commons in the absence of free riding, shirking, and general theft among members of the village and its associated commons. This model makes it possible to understand that degradation of the commons arises from factors outside of the commons rather than arising from ‘perverse’ property rights and selfish behavior within the commons. This approach suggests a needed reformulation of development assistance away from prescriptions for the commons. Instead, development assistance must be refocused on the more serious challenge of institutional incoherence in the larger economy of which the village and its commons are but a part.

The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis holds that economic growth leads to increases in pollution in early stages of development, but is a significant driver of environmental improvements as income levels increase. Most empirical applications have focused on estimating a reduced form equation in which the measure of environmental degradation is posited as a non-linear function of income. In this paper we develop a structural production model based on an output distance function to investigate the EKC hypothesis for CO2 in a panel of industrialized countries from 1971 to 2000. This structural approach allows for the decomposition of the observed emission changes into the scale, composition, and productivity effects, thus providing additional insight into the interlinked processes of economic growth and environmental change. The findings from our preferred model indicate that for most countries, the CO2-saving productivity effect is not large enough to offset the CO2-producing scale effect.

Since modification of agricultural production choices in developing countries often provides positive environmental externalities to people in developed countries, payment for environmental services (PES) has become an important topic in the context of economic development and poverty reduction. We consider two broad categories of PES programs, land-diversion programs, where lands are diverted from agriculture to other uses, and working-land programs, where agricultural production activities are modified to achieve environmental objectives. PES programs are generally good for landowners. The distribution of land and land quality is critical in determining poverty impacts. Where ES and agricultural productivity are negatively correlated and the poor own lands of low agricultural quality, they stand to gain from PES programs. Consumers and wage laborers may lose where food supply is inelastic and programs reduce labor demand. Working-land programs may have better distributional effects than diversion programs.

Paul Ehrlich has a clear message for the economics profession: humanity faces a number of serious environmental problems and economists have a central role to play if we are to successfully address them. The article lays out an important research agenda for economists, which includes climate change, loss of biodiversity, release of toxic substances, epidemiological concerns, population, and over-consumption. Even if one disagrees with some of the particulars, and my guess is that many economists who read the article will, the big ideas contained in this article and the main messages are worthy of close attention. Rather than being on the periphery of the economics profession, those of us in economics who focus on environmental issues, whether called ecological economists, environmental economists or resource economists, should be at the heart of an economics profession focused on the most important and relevant issues facing society.

The effective labor possibilities frontier (ELPF) is defined as the set of statically efficient allocations of labor inputs in the competing tasks of production and R&D. It is concave if labor is heterogeneous. In an R&D-based growth model with an essential non-renewable natural resource, the shape of the ELPF affects the optimal speed of the transition. If resource endowment is poor, transition is slower and involves a smaller R&D effort, and slower growth in per capita consumption, in the case of a heterogeneous labor force as compared to a homogeneous one. Policies that modify the distribution of skills in the population imply shifts of the ELPF. We provide a taxonomy of possible shifts of the ELPF, and link them to education policy or demographic trends.

Based on observations from all three tropical continents, there is good reason to believe that poor service providers can broadly gain access to payment for environmental services (PES) schemes, and generally become better off from that participation, in both income and non-income terms. However, poverty effects need to be analysed in a conceptual framework looking not only at poor service providers, but also at poor service users and non-participants. Effects on service users are positive if environmental goals are achieved, while those on non-participants can be positive or negative. The various participation filters of a PES scheme contain both pro-poor and anti-poor selection biases. Quantitative welfare effects are bound to remain small-scale, compared to national poverty-alleviation goals. Some pro-poor interventions are possible, but increasing regulations excessively could curb PES efficiency and implementation scale, which could eventually harm the poor. Prime focus of PES should thus remain on the environment, not on poverty.

A number of studies show that climatic shocks have significant economic impacts in several regions of the world, especially in, but not limited to, developing economies. In this paper we focus on a drought-related indicator of well-being and emergency spending in the Brazilian semi-arid zone – rainfed corn market – and estimate aggregate behavioral and forecast models for this market conditional on local climate determinants. We find encouraging evidence that our approach can help policy makers buy time to help them prepare for drought mitigating actions. The analysis is applicable to economies elsewhere in the world and climatic impacts other than those caused by droughts.

This paper focuses on the interactions between local communities having at least some degree of informal claims over natural resources and firms interested in commercially exploiting such resources, explicitly allowing for interventions by third parties interested in community welfare and environmental outcomes. Integrating conflict and bargaining theories, we develop a bargaining model with endogenous inside and outside options, in which the feasibility and outcomes of a potential bargaining game depend on the unraveling of a conflict stage and vice versa. The model implies that, contrary to the conventional bargaining model, distribution and efficiency cease to be separable. We show that certain third-party interventions in the bargaining process may have unexpected and counterproductive effects.

The costs of living with wildlife are assessed using Namibian subsistence farmers' willingness to pay (WTP) for deterrents to attacks on crops and livestock. A utility-theoretic approach jointly estimates household WTP for deterrent programs in two ‘currencies’: maize and cash. This has a double payoff. Use of a non-cash staple increases respondent comprehension and provides more information about preferences, improving the accuracy of results. The household shadow value of maize is also identified. Significant costs from living with elephants and other types of wildlife are demonstrated. Compensation for farmers may be warranted on equity and efficiency grounds. Uncontrolled domestic cattle generate even higher costs to farmers than wildlife, highlighting the need to clarify property rights among these farmers.

This paper examines how natural resource revenues interact with growth and welfare in an overlapping generations model with altruism. The revenues are allocated between public productive services and direct transfers to members of society by spending policies. We analyze how these policies influence the dynamics, and how the dynamics are influenced by the revenue. Abundant revenues may harm growth, but growth and welfare can be oppositely affected. We also provide the social planner solution under which revenues enhance growth. Overall, the analysis suggests that variation in the strength of altruism and in spending policies may be part of the reason why natural resources seem to affect economic performance across nations differently.

The following paper is concerned with water sharing of the Ganges River between India and Bangladesh, with possible augmentation through water transfers from Nepal. We analyzed the case when water from Nepal can be transferred to Bangladesh through the upstream country, India, as the local geography only permits such water transfer. A game theoretic model is formulated to determine the optimal share of water diverted to Bangladesh by India, and the optimal amount of water transfer from Nepal. India may gain positive externalities from such water transfer. The positive externalities generated from water transfer from Nepal may influence the water share of both India and Bangladesh. In the absence of altruism, India would allow less water flow to Bangladesh than in the case when there is no provision to buy water from Nepal. We also explored whether positive externalities could induce India to buy water jointly with Bangladesh, and such a case will only occur if the countries possess altruistic concerns and share water according to an agreement.