This article examines the misrepresentation of American beef in the British market between c. 1890 and c. 1913. We examine the complaints voiced by British consumers, producers, and retailers and we discuss the response of the British government and the United States Department of Agriculture. A new dataset is employed to calculate the price premiums that could be earned from the misrepresentation of beef according to geographic origin. While considerable premiums could be earned by “passing-off” American beef as British in the 1890s, these premiums declined during the 1900s. Particular emphasis is placed on the inability of the British government to act unilaterally on meat marking. This article also considers origin as a means of distinguishing between categories of nonbranded goods. Yet “origin” has many dimensions. Not only does it indicate provenance, it sometimes signals quality associated with provenance while also serving as the basis for protectionist responses. This article therefore contributes to the broader debates surrounding origin marking as a commercial and legal phenomenon.

What is it to wear a uniform? Some occupations involve enforced adoption of a uniform, the police and armed services most obviously. Yet other occupations—such as management consultants—adopt styles or codes of dress that, while not enforced, have a currency and coherence such that we might think of them as a tacit uniform. Why—and to what effect—do some occupational groups voluntarily adopt tacit dress codes? This essay will explore those questions in relation to depictions of English traveling salesmen from the start of the nineteenth century to the eve of World War II. Representations of English traveling salesmen (“commercial travelers” in British parlance, the usage that will be adopted hereafter) frequently highlighted their physical appearance and in particular their modes of dress, showing remarkable continuity, certainly across the greater part of the period covered here.

Historians have become increasingly interested in networks as an analytical tool for eighteenth-century commerce. In much of the historiography these networks are treated as inherently beneficial for the wider economy and the actors themselves. Recently, however, historians have started to problematize networks and to complicate our understanding of them. Indeed, the quote above stresses that a network is not simply the actors within it, but the relationships between them. Realizing this facilitates an understanding of how such networks function.

The thesis applies a political economy approach to the study of how institutions and geography explain the development of a commodity chain. Focusing on the Brazilian Amazon from 1870 to 1910, the analysis develops a new theoretical framework constructed by combining standard trade models with institutions and economic geography. There are two levels of analysis: interactions among and within different nodes of the commodity chain. A quantitative-driven analysis from macroeconomic data supports inferences from microeconomic behavior. The thesis provides new information on rubber prices and exports, trader ledgers, estate accounts, newspapers, traveler accounts, and official documents.

The research develops a demand- and supply-side analysis of the history of rubber, from tappers to manufacturers. It features the main rubber manufacturing countries, Britain and the U.S.A., and shows how competition prevailed along the chain, translating into a struggle for rubber supply. Rubber was not a homogeneous product. Due to a combination of quantity and quality, the Brazilian Amazon possessed significant market power, market power that shaped the rubber chain. In this light, the thesis investigates how the Brazilian rubber supply chain was organized and how agents profited from its monopolistic position. It also shows that taxation increased the regional welfare and allowed the government to support two related activities: telegraphs and shipping.

The thesis proves that violence and coercion were not necessary features of rubber production, as argued by much of the literature. Through a game theoretic approach, the thesis demonstrates conditions under which production could have occurred without exploitation. In a context of high price inelasticity of demand and rising prices, production was driven by market forces. Inelasticity of demand was indeed one of the main features of the rubber boom. It shaped production, bargaining power between different nodes of the chain and competition within them, defining the distribution of profits along the rubber chain.

The Good Consumer offers a historical account of consumer credit reporting in the United States, from its nineteenth-century antecedents in commercial credit reporting through its professionalization and transformation into a key communication infrastructure during the first half of the twentieth century. While describing the technical and institutional development of the modern credit bureau, The Good Consumer draws special attention to one of the most consequential effects of credit reporting: the invention of financial identity. Formalized systems of credit evaluation produced their own categories of social reality and fostered new forms of economic objectification. The title refers to the “goodness” of credit consumers in several contexts: as prompt paying customers, trustworthy and morally upright citizens, profitable target markets, and collectively as a vital force behind the growth of the twentiethcentury American economy.

This article studies the strategy developed by the Benedictine Community at the Monastery of Montserrat to conceal their patrimony through the constitution of a public limited company. The singularity of this case lies in the opacity that the Benedictines created regarding their properties in the eyes of the government and in the fact that the public limited company was, rather than just a simple mechanism to conceal the Community's assets, a real tool for business management. This instrumental character included a strategy for the enlargement of the patrimony, a line of improvement in the use of rented estates and services, and the execution of the Community's decisions concerning its assets. The business analysis of Larsa is focused on the development of the firm compared to that of its geographical environment, Catalonia, so as to show the similarities and differences between the Benedictine public limited company, managed by members of a religious order, and those run by laymen. Larsa's strategy was based, as that of similar firms, on organic growth and a low level of indebtedness, although a break occurred in that strategy as the result of an exogenous shock (the October 1934 Revolution) that forced the company to modify its objectives from longevity and solvency to profit maximization, dividend distribution, and even business decapitalization.

During 1870–1914, business actors were concerned about the increasing uncertainty and occasional cheating in commercial relationships. In such situations, economic actors seek to improve the information they have, so as to benefit from strong comparative advantages over their competitors. This essay analyzes the acquisition and circulation of information and the actors and rules involved between 1870 and 1914, through a comparative approach (France and Italy). It considers individual trading firms, professional associations, information intermediating agencies, and state offices. We argue that these agencies (and therefore markets and institutions) acted much less as rivals than as complements in this era. Indeed, product information is different from information on the reputation of economic actors, the latter generating further distinctions between reputation for payment, respect of deadlines, and fidelity to the terms and objects of the contract. In turn, such kinds of situated micro-information differ from general statistics on market evolution and prices. We show that most economic actors were much more interested in the former (specifics) than in the latter kinds of information. To demonstrate this point, we compare the way traders, their associations, and private and state agencies intervened in the gathering, circulation, and interpretation of economic information in two countries, Italy and France, between 1870 and 1914. We argue that their opposite outcomes were not simply the result of different “mentalities” or attitudes to risk (as exogenously given), but rather can be traced to the different institutional settings and economic segmentation of the market for information in these two countries. In fact, unlike the Italian government, French ministries refused to provide their traders with micro-information on potential overseas correspondents and product characteristics. That is to say, “attitude to risk” and “animal spirits” are not exogenous and cannot be studied outside a given historical and institutional context.

In 1906, a writer declared that it remained an “unsolved problem whether the automobile is to prove a fad like the bicycle, or a lasting factor in the industry of the country.” A few years later, concerned with the possibility of overproduction and market saturation, auto executives and other commentators were writing articles for the advertising trade press with titles like “Why Auto Production Must Be Curtailed” and “The Fading of the Automobile Rainbow.” Considering that by the early twenty-first century, the United States had a population of nearly 300 million people and an average of 2.1 registered motor vehicles per household, it is difficult to appreciate how uncertain the industry’s status seemed in its early years. Yet although contemporary observers may not have known it, in many ways by the end of 1908 the foundation stoneswere already in place for a hundred years of automotive economic and cultural preeminence in the United States. Two events from that year are well known as harbingers of the industry’s future. In September, General Motors was established, and in October, Ford introduced its Model T to the nation's auto dealers. In time, these developments had a profound impact on American automobile manufacture and management.

This article is a study in the strength of shared strategic beliefs amongst leading British clearing bankers in the years following World War II and how those common beliefs may have inhibited potential for market growth. The subject of the study is the performance of large British deposit bankswith respect to the financing of industry. This behavior has long been criticized by economic historians as suboptimal and, depending on the commentator, has been presented variously as evidence of entrepreneurial failure, the gentrification of the City, social schism amongst the economic and social elite, the political influence of City institutions, the external orientation of capital markets, or institutional sclerosis. However, in earlier studies we have offered a rational economic explanation of the banks' behavior and practices in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Naval shipbuilding was one of the most ambitious industrial undertakings of World War II. A marginal business, in 1939 employing only twelve shipyards, it expanded over the course of the war into a massive network of shipbuilding firms, engineering works, steel mills, and specialty producers that built the world's largest fleet. At its peak in 1944, warship building employed one million shipyard workers, a million others in collateral industries, and consumed one-fifth of the nation's steel output in the construction of aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and thousands of smaller combatants.

Through an investigation into the origins of American food marketing, this dissertation reveals how branding—specifically, the centennial brands Quaker Oats, Coca-Cola, and Crisco—came to underpin much of today's market-driven economy. In a manner akin to alchemy, the entrepreneurs behind these three firms recognized the inherent value of an agricultural Eden, then found ways to convert common, low-cost agricultural goods—oats, sugar, and cottonseed oil—into appealing, high-revenue branded food products. In the process, these ventures devised new demand-driven business models that exploited technology and communications advances, enabling them to tap a nascent consumer culture. Their pioneering efforts generated unprecedented profits, laid the foundation for iconic billion-dollar brands, and fundamentally changed how Americans make daily food choices.

The 1960s proved to be a crucial decade for the emergent Italian fashion industry. In these pages, we seek to demonstrate that in Italy, an evolution of demand took place, structurally different from the Fifties, causing fundamental changes which impacted upon supply. This was a decisive change in the path which led Italy to complete the establishment of an authentic fashion system.

Interest in the question is two-fold. The formalization of relations between players in the Italian fashion industry using systematic logic facilitated the positioning of the made in Italy brand at the pinnacle of the world market: understanding the underlying mechanism of this process is useful for the identification of the characteristics of an Italian model, distinct from those of other countries which make up the history of the fashion industry. Analyses of the reference settings and development methods of the Italian fashion system can represent a further key to understanding the characteristics and the context in which the social transformation of post-war Italy took place.

The article presents some new evidence concerning the conversion program in Socialist Hungary that constituted an exceptional case not only in the Socialist Bloc, but also in the early period of the Cold War. The Hungarian military industry—step by step—was reintegrated into the civil economy between 1953 and 1961. The war plants developed a dual production structure, which helped them stand the storms of the lengthy transitional period. Companies with a double profile diversified their production with a wide scale of civilian goods, new constructional and R&D departments were established. The article examines at the firm level the strategies, the changes in behaviours of the top-managers, and the consequences—what did the switch-over have for Hungarian society, to what extent contributed the increase in consumer goods to political stabilization of the system.

This essay argues that American printers motivated by a deep commercial interest in fast and effective communication worked to overturn the British imperial postal service in 1774 and 1775. Printers enlisted merchants and members of the revolutionary elite, who also relied on long-distance communication through the post office for their own commercial and political purposes, to provide financial and political support. In making their case, printers mobilized a broad array of political ideology and imagery already familiar to colonists during the decade-long imperial crisis, emphasizing the political necessity of replacing the imperial institution. At the same time, they uncontroversially asserted that a new American post office would safeguard their precarious commercial ventures. The essay therefore demonstrates that printers were not “mere mechanics” but actively shaped the political debates leading to the American Revolution as part of a process that scholars have recently highlighted in a work on the economic and commercial influences on the Revolution. Furthermore, it grants the post office its due as part of the Habermasian public sphere; although understudied, the post office—both as a physical space and as a network through which information could travel—was a crucial means by which Americans developed a national infrastructure for political communications. Exploring the overthrow of the British post office, and the creation of an American post office, reveals an understudied but crucial episode to explain the symbiosis between politics and commerce during the American Revolutionary era.

Unlike its automobile or electronics industries, Japan's pharmaceutical industry did not become a global leader. Japan remains a net importer of pharmaceuticals and has introduced few global blockbuster drugs. Alfred Chandler argued that Japan's pharmaceutical firms remained relatively weak because Western firms enjoyed an insurmountable first first-mover advantage. However, this case study of the anticancer drug sector illustrates that Chandler's explanation is incomplete. Japanese medical culture, government policy, and research environment also played a substantial role in shaping the industry. In the 1970s and 1980s, these factors encouraged firms to develop little few effective drugs with low side effects, and profit from Japan's domestic market. But, these drugs were unsuitable to foreign markets with more demanding efficacy standards. As a result, Japan not only lost more than a decade in developing ineffective drugs, but also neglected to create the infrastructure necessary to develop innovative drugs and build a stronger pharmaceutical industry.

This paper analyzes cooperative enterprises' networks in the Italian economy, in accordance with recent economic theory, to throw light on the causes of their success of in the last 30 years. We reference the vast literature about business networks to identify some interpretative lines that can be transferred to the cooperative world. On this basis, a typology of the Italian cooperative networks is offered, in order to evaluate the competitive advantages of each type of net, their governance methods, their evolution, and their impact on the recent flourishing of Italian cooperatives. Our conclusion is that the use of networks by co-ops has been very intensive and can still be strengthened, if Italian co-op umbrella organizations will merge. Building large cooperative corporations was often the result of networking, as was the creation of joint stock companies owned by cooperatives.

Capitalist development involves ongoing technological changes in which a series of innovations develop and diffuse.Wars and other discontinuities periodically break the process, thwarting some innovations and generating others. Wartime experience hence illuminates the question of whether innovation responds to the changing economic environment or maintains earlier directions. The paper examines the roles of peacetime factors and wartime dislocations in the development of three Civil War innovations, firearms, shoe mechanization, and petroleum. Using patent data, government procurement records, and selected firm records to compare antebellum and wartime activities, I argue for the continuity of innovation in its content and in the occupation, network status, and location of patentees. Wartime innovation evolved out of antebellum firms, networks, and inventors. It drew on machinists, engineers, and applied scientists to transfer critical antebellum capabilities into innovating sectors. The war accelerated innovations in firearms and shoe mechanization and may have slowed petroleum innovation. Whereas the North continued antebellum innovation processes during the war, the South, with little capability in any of the sectors, was unable to innovate successfully even when military need was strong.

The geometric pattern of Amsterdam's canals was iconic of its nineteenth-century social order. The spider's web of canals fanned out along the Amstel river in concentric rings, its barge traffic linking the city to its hinterland, the province of Holland, and to the wider Netherlands of which it is the nominal capital. These canals divided the “Venice of the North” into ninety islands linked by more than a thousand bridges. Imposing aristocratic and merchant houses stretched along the innermost canal ring, the Golden Curve of the Gentleman's Canal. At the center of the web lay de Dam, the 200 m long market square built on the first medieval dike protecting the city from the encroaching sea. The three pillars of the Dutch state framed the market square: the Royal Palace of the Merchant King, the Dutch Reformed New Church, and in the nineteenth century, the Amsterdam stock market, the world's oldest exchange.

The article reconstructs the history of the Italian state-owned holding Finmeccanica, which since its birth in 1948 lived through a number of corporate reorganizations (shipyards, automobiles with Alfa Romeo, energy) and is now one of the leading European companies in aerospace and defence. With reference to the history of the Italian state entrepreneurship, this case may be paradigmatic of the advent of a new era, characterized by partially privatized enterprises in sectors considered strategic which are successful in the international arena (Finmeccanica, ENI). The article shows that the aeronautics, space and electronics divisions began in the 1950s and as a result of their technological characteristics were kept relatively free from political interference, with a strong propensity to pursue internationalization and thus competitiveness. The conclusion is that, under certain conditions, state ownership may result effective in ensuring not only adequate financial resources, but also a proper managerial governance.

This article analyzes the long-term strategies employed by multinational oil corporations in a late industrializing country with powerful business groups when faced with economic nationalism. I study the case of Royal Dutch-Shell in Chile from 1913 to 2005, where two oil multinationals controlled 100 percent of the Chilean market until forced by the government to accept a domestic private company, COPEC, into a new three-member cartel. The multinationals accepted this arrangement reluctantly, but in the long term it proved beneficial. COPEC's involvement in Chilean business groups protected the multinationals from hostile actions by the government and gave legitimacy to the cartel. These benefits ended when Chile abandoned its import substitution industrialization strategy in the 1970s.