Welcome to Volume 25, No. 4 of Enterprise & Society. By tradition, this issue carries the presidential address delivered at the annual meeting of the Business History Conference. Sharon Murphy delivered a compelling talk on the topic “Doing Business in the Public Interest,” intermixing sharp reflections with personal family history. We are delighted to present Sharon’s fine essay here. Also, by tradition, this issue carries summaries of the dissertations shortlisted for the Krooss Prize at the annual meeting in the spring. This year four finalists presented their work to the conference. The four finalists were Manuel Bautista-González, Liane Hewitt, Jordan Howell, and Ellen Nye. This year’s winner of the Herman E. Krooss Prize for Best Dissertation in Business History was Ellen Nye. Unfortunately, personal circumstances have prevented Dr. Bautista-González from completing his summary in time for this issue, but we look forward to publishing his contribution as soon as possible.

The theme of the 2024 Business History Conference was “doing business in the public interest,” but what does it actually mean to “do business in the public interest?” This presidential address challenges the idea of shareholder primacy as the main purpose of business enterprises historically and examines various ways that business historians might approach the idea of businesses acting in a public interest. In particular, it analyzes instances in which corporations made a decision in the public interest without clear evidence that it would benefit their bottom line; cases where it would demonstrably hurt their bottom line to prioritize the public; corporations that made a decision allegedly in the public interest that actually turned out to be bad for the public interest; and corporations that made a decision that was bad for the public interest that also turned out to be bad for their own bottom line.

“Imperial Crucible” tells the story of the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) from the company’s founding in Pittsburgh in 1888 through the 1950s. Although scholars have long contended that American multinational corporations played a pivotal role in the industrialization of the United States, the building of a global working class, and the transformation of European empires, they have tended to see these stories as distinct, rather than interconnected. In contrast, Imperial Crucible focuses on a single firm to draw together the political-economic, working-class, and imperial history of American business. What the industrialists behind Alcoa built, I argue, was not a multinational but a transimperial corporation.

Cartels today are illegal and illegitimate across the globe. Yet until the end of World War II, cartels were legal, ubiquitous, and popular—especially in Europe. How, then, did cartels become bad, if they had been considered a positive force for capitalist stabilization and peace in the first half of the 20th century? That is the question this dissertation poses. By the 1930s, over 1,000 monopolistic agreements regulated nearly half of world trade. International cartels governed the interwar world economy, setting prices and output quotas, dividing world markets, regulating trade flows, and even controlling the transfer of patents across firms and sovereign state borders. I conceptualize this regime as “cartel capitalism.” Most cartels were headquartered in industrial Europe. First, I trace how a surprising consensus in interwar Europe—comprising national governments; international organizations like the League of Nations; industrialists, led by the International Chamber of Commerce; federalists; and even socialists—backed cartels as a panacea to the problems of reconstruction after 1918, namely the quest for peace and stable markets. However, in the wake of 1945, most countries in Western Europe—along with the new supranational European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951) and European Economic Community (EEC)—started prohibiting cartels. My project illuminates the causes and consequences of this great reversal. Monopoly Menace reveals, for the first time, how Europe’s transnational reckoning with the shocks of the Great Depression, fascism, and total war produced a genuine anticartel revolution that rewrote the rules of the modern European and global economy. Monopoly Menace ends by illuminating how American, British, French, and West German postwar planners designed new national welfare states, the Bretton Woods Order, and the European Union on the neglected foundation of anti-cartel policies.

During the 1690s, both the English and Ottoman states developed new institutions for longer-term borrowing and reformed their imperial monetary systems. These synchronous but divergent developments present a puzzle that has not been answered by rigidly separate English and Ottoman historiographies. “Empires of Obligation” follows merchants trading between England and the Ottoman Empire to understand how both states responded differently to the challenges of global trade and fiscal crisis. At this time, English merchants were the most powerful European traders in the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman Empire represented England’s greatest single market for its woolen textiles, its largest industry. As Levant Company merchants swapped woolens for silk, they also blended international private credit with domestic public finance. They were the largest merchant investors relative to the size of their trade in the Bank of England and helped facilitate Ottoman longer-term public borrowing through the mālikāne system. From within England’s bureaucracy, they also worked to ease global trade through an “intrinsic value” theory of money, the idea that coins represented a government commitment to provide a fixed amount of precious metal. At the same time, the Ottoman state sought to redefine money as an instrument of the state, not a tool of trade. Following merchants who themselves bridged two empires that are rarely compared shows interconnected but divergent responses to the challenges of making money work both within and between states at the end of the seventeenth century.

This paper examines how the British South Africa Company (BSAC; the Company), the founding administrator of Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, navigated the creation of a fiscal system of the colony from 1890 to 1922 and how the fiscal system shaped political decisions regarding the colony’s administrative structure. It casts light on the early efforts of the colonial state-making process under the BSAC and how it established its administrative structure. Once occupation was completed, the Company’s ability to finance the cost of governance and administration was the most critical factor facing it. Whereas earlier scholarship has discussed various aspects of Southern Rhodesia’s early economic endeavors and political evolution, this paper demonstrates the significance of the fiscal system in shaping both the economic and political trajectories of the early administration. Through analyzing the Company’s revenue collection and expenditure patterns, the paper reconstructs the contours of shifting notions of what constituted the Company’s commercial and administrative revenue. It argues that the BSAC’s fiscal and budgetary administration approach was gradual, experimental, and sometimes ad hoc, resulting in continuous conflicts between the Company administration and the settlers. The paper relies on a wide range of sources that include the BSAC annual reports, historical manuscripts, Legislative Council debates, newspapers, and other political pamphlets to unpack the tensions between the Company government and white settlers over the fiscal and administrative evolution of the colony.

How may elites experience a symbolic fall from grace? Elite scholarship has typically described how symbolic structures contribute to consecrate and reinforce existing power relations. Processes of deconsecration are, however, less well described. Deconsecration as a social process is distinct from déclassement, as well as from cultural or juridical processes of exclusion. It is the loss of the very status as “elite.” We address the question of deconsecration through a historical case study of the exclusion of elite groups from the Danish Who’s Who and professional bodies in the wake of the liberation after the German occupation of Denmark 1940–1945.

This article examines the nationwide campaign by financial reformers in the 1910s to convince businesses across the United States to abandon established commercial credit practices and use trade acceptances—the quintessential “real bill”—in their stead. The creation of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) and the outbreak of World War I offered a powerful coalition of campaigners the opportunity to forcefully argue that by capitalizing open account credit, trade acceptances fostered good business practices and stabilized the banking and financial systems. These campaigners relied on trade associations to disseminate, and the federal government to legitimize, their message. While some firms obliged, many businesses and banks criticized the campaigners’ arguments, casting trade acceptances as a means of financial centralization and as being contrary to the American culture of credit. Trade acceptances did not supplant promissory notes or trade in the open market and were rarely used by banks to access Fed liquidity. Instead, their legacy lies in their adoption by finance companies in the hope of securing financing for the distribution and mass consumption of consumer durables.

This article documents how business lobbying groups, corporate leaders, and even some members of the Nixon administration drew on futurist discourse and rhetoric to defeat the Burke-Hartke bill, proposed legislation that would have imposed new taxes on multinational corporations. For several years, self-described futurologists had reconceptualized multinational corporations as ideal institutions for securing world peace and, more broadly, meeting society’s needs, thereby taking over some of the government’s functions. These ideas allowed business interests to invoke a utopian vision of the multinational corporation while working toward the more concrete goal of building a global economy defined by free trade and fending off unwanted regulation.

By providing fresh insights into the development of Egyptian corporate networks and business groups between the early 1920s and late 1940s, this article extends the geographical ambit of an expanding field of study. Data from contemporaneous sources were analyzed through social network analysis techniques, in the search for an improved understanding of both the nature of and motivations behind networking in Egypt. In conducting this exercise, this article assesses the success with which the state acted to stimulate local entrepreneurship in its search for greater economic independence. By linking the Egyptian case to a wider literature on corporate networks, the article reveals similarities with other cases of how developing economies responded to the challenges of that era.

This article investigates how Chinese apparel companies have been able to acquire and upgrade knowledge over the last four decades. Based on a broad range of published sources and official data, it identifies the dominant firms that enabled the industry’s dramatic expansion during two distinct phases: export oriented in 1980–2005 and domestic market oriented in 2005–2020. Using the global value chains model, we analyze the varieties of knowledge needed during these two periods and how firms acquired it to boost their competitiveness.

This article analyzes the AFL-CIO’s international economic policy activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s within the context of the collapse of Bretton Woods monetary system. It shows that AFL-CIO economists developed a far-reaching critique of multinational corporations that encompassed not only concerns about import competition and capital flight but also charges that multinational firms contributed to the United States’ balance of payments woes. Fighting charges that union wages drove inflation, labor leaders maintained that private capital outflows and intracompany transactions exacerbated U.S. payments deficits. They therefore advocated for capital controls and import restrictions as alternatives to fiscal and monetary restraint. Their efforts to preserve the expansionary policies underpinning postwar liberalism, however, ultimately failed. By calling attention to the AFL-CIO’s failed activism in international monetary politics, the article offers a new vantage point for understanding organized labor’s declining influence in the last third of the twentieth century.

This article uses Statoil (Equinor since 2018) as a prism to explore some key features and concerns of Western oil companies’ evolving human rights awareness from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. This period saw the first human rights lawsuits brought against oil companies and a gradual change in their human rights awareness. The article uses insights from the business history literature and new archival material from the oil industry to explain why business ethicists and legal scholars are wrong to argue that the relationship between business and social responsibility, on the one hand, and business and human rights, on the other, are inherently problematic and profoundly disparate due to their divergent historical origins. In so doing, the article offers a historical take on the so-called debate between business human rights (BHR) and corporate social responsibility (CSR), and it repudiates the argument that a so-called minimal understanding of human rights has hindered business from undertaking proactive human rights initiatives. Mapping onto both the business history literature and the BHR–CSR debate, the article aims for a richer understanding of the experiences and ideas that incentivized oil companies to “get serious” about human rights.

Property-as-real-estate emerged in Bombay at least by the turn of the nineteenth century. Real estate is historicized through previously unexplored archival sources (qualitative and quantitative) by analyzing how property was transacted in a colonial port, and how it became embedded in global circuits of commerce and the accumulation strategies of locals and the English East India Company. The paper demonstrates the existence by this time of legal institutions of publicity and property registration, specialized intermediaries, price-finding mechanisms such as auctions, and imaginaries of a property market as an abstract entity marked by general trends and values. Contrary to the literature that sees prices in this period as erratic and inconsistent, a systematic analysis of prices suggests a rationalized and standardized property market. These findings push back the timeline usually associated with the development of real estate in India.

This article brings agency to discussions on financialization and financial education in Sweden by zooming in on two barely examined actors and arenas: civil society and public schools, respectively. The civil society organization Aktiespararna (Swedish Shareholders’ Association, founded in 1966) attempted to access and impact school education starting with its launch of youth efforts in the 1980s. Aktiespararna was joined in these efforts by Unga Aktiesparare (Swedish Young Shareholders’ Association), founded in 1990. This study describes the organizational strategies—tools, techniques, and discursive approaches—to reach Swedish upper-secondary school students. The result shows a crucial transition on how young Swedes were expected to relate to investing in stocks: from a special interest to pursue as either side activity or profession, to an inevitable part of everyday consumer life. The Swedish example is especially illuminating because it is general in its overall development from welfare state to market orientation. Yet, it emerges as distinctive in its pace and character. Apart from the apparent brisk, straightforward march from social-democratic hegemony, and one of the most regulated national economies in the mid-1900s, to a highly marketized and financialized society in the 2000s, Sweden holds a sociocultural history of strong popular movements and civil society associations. The article demonstrates important links between this aspect of collective engagement for individual progress and the financialization process.

In the early 2000s, California-based Guayakí popularized the caffeinated drink, yerba mate, among young people and creative types. With revenues of $100 million, Guayakí dominates the U.S. market where it is synonymous with yerba mate. This essay explores how Guayakí transformed a foreign product with deep local meaning, widespread popularity, and a long history in southern South America from a shared beverage and social practice into a healthy energy drink. Typically, localization entails multinational companies and local consumers adapting and giving new meanings to an exotic foreign product or brand. In contrast, local entrepreneurs radically changed yerba mate while preserving part of its narrative. Guayakí promotes product authenticity based on a narrative of South American Indigenous origins, stimulating qualities, and health benefits that fits with superfoods, while a narrative of green capitalism promotes brand authenticity. But that was not enough to popularize yerba mate. The product had to be adapted to consumer taste preferences and values that challenge the foundational ideas of superfoods and green capitalism. As a result of consumer input acquired through grassroots marketing, Guayakí transformed a shared infusion into something closer to a soft drink—a pre-prepared, individual-sized beverage served in a single-use bottle or can with flavoring and sugar levels tailored to U.S. consumers. The essay exposes the role of local entrepreneurs and consumers in shaping product development and localization. It complicates our understanding of product authenticity and brand authenticity while exposing the limitations of green capitalism, ethical consumerism, and activist entrepreneurship.

From the 1940s to the 1970s, British governments steered manufacturing businesses to peripheral regions designated as needing more employment. This approach was delivered through a Regional Policy that deployed industrial location controls and financial incentives. Effectiveness varied over time but was dramatic in the mid-1940s, when it boosted the regional stock of secondary manufacturing to the extent that its legacy remains visible today. The literature describes how this Regional Policy was a peacetime policy, albeit one formulated during the war. This article, however, proposes that the most successful phase of Regional Policy was an extension of wartime policies governing regional manufacturing businesses producing munitions. It uses a case study of Wales to make two arguments. One is that the Regional Policy associated with the postwar period began to be implemented before the war had ended. The other is that the Board of Trade pursued the policy through repurposed wartime governance mechanisms within an economy that remained subject to onerous state controls. The case outlines a short but consequential burst of assertive state involvement that shaped business activity throughout much of regional Britain, echoing Philip Scranton and Patrick Fridenson’s arguments concerning “the state always being in” given its role in shaping markets, business behavior, and regulations.