At first approach the use of the word “superstition” is such that it is impossible to apply the term strictly in the human sciences. Its connotation, that is its content, is particularly subjective and negative. And its extension, that is its area of application, is indefinite and makes of it a concept that can refer to just about anything.

Biography is a story, and a story is something that is meant to be told. It is thus quite evident that biography is the tale of a life: a life-story (Lebensgeschichte in German). But then the question arises as to what exactly is a story and how apt is it for representing life within the limits of this representation as compared to other representations of life: the painted or written portrait, the private diary, the oral or tape-recorded interview, the curriculum vitae, the anthropometric file or the epitaph, which at least has the merit of being concise.

In this essay, we consider a set of related questions concerning the role and nature of money, the working of markets, and the relationship between forms of social organization and money. Among other things, we speculate that efforts to purge the neo-classical theory of markets of the phenomenon of false trading have been misguided in the sense that they fail to grasp the dependence of a market system on the existence of some false trading.

In a work that appeared in 1967 but which has lost none of its interest today, P. Alexandre gave a list of the 51 languages of Black Africa (or homogeneous dialectical and linguistic groups) that approached or surpassed a million speakers. For each of them he evaluated available documentation, on a scale of from 1 to 6. He gave the rating 1 to languages for which the documentation was poor (outdated grammars and dictionaries, incomplete or absurd systems of unscientific transcription) and the rating 6 to languages for which works conforming to modern requirements were available (correctly noted sound systems, phonological and phonetic descriptions, annotated texts, dictionaries, stylistic and dialectological studies, audio material). Only three languages merited the rating 6 and only four were rated 5. This means that only seven languages out of about 1200 could be considered as accurately described, that is, offering all the necessary guarantees to the specialist.

It is well known that in India, over the last two thousand five hundred years or more, there has been a pervasive belief in the doctrine of Karma. Various forms and variants in which this doctrine has found expression in the multifarious texts and metaphysical systems have drawn a good deal of attention. The present paper, however, is an attempt at analysing the function of this doctrine, in the sustenance of the traditional social system, and particularly the scheme of social stratification. As we shall see, an unshakable faith in this doctrine by people belonging to all strata of society provided tremendous strength to the caste hierarchy based on birth, and ensured a secure place for the Brāhmanas and their progeny on the top of the social pyramid.

On principle, there are no language classifications which are right or wrong, but only classifications which are more or less useful or useless. This statement at the beginning of my paper is intended to indicate the teleological perspective in which I want to view the more general problems involved in the classification of African languages. I shall discuss these within a framework which I derive from the four main components of any language classification, namely:

1. 1. the aims and objectives of language classification,

2. 2. the basic units to be classified,

3. 3. the criteria of classification,

4. 4. the models of language classification.

These few pages will attempt to analyze the relationships created in the chronically delirious person between himself and his own biography, such as he knows and has experienced it, to which he attaches himself and which dominates him without his knowing it. A few remarks to clarify our vocabulary before getting into the development of this question. We prefer the expression “chronic deliria“, in the plural, to the word “psychosis”, used in the singular. The former term is clinical, and therefore empirical, whereas the second derives from theories; and, especially, the former does not immediately imply a unity of process as opposed to the effective diversity of semiotic appearances. Moreover, the nominal adjective “psychotic“ runs the risk of both clandestinely bringing in hidden presuppositions and of re-establishing the old presumed unity with mental alienation, which had, indeed, been exorcised by J. P. Falret by the middle of the nineteenth century.

Only rarely does Descartes deal with specifically political questions, and then when he does so, it is only by denial, to justify his refusal to “become involved” in politics. All the texts show that this attitude of rejecting politics is not dictated primarily by prudence, the rule in this century of intolerance, but by a concern for philosophical consistency. This denial, as we will be attempting to establish, seems conditioned by fundamental options of Cartesian philosophy. For the moment we will only examine the theoretical effects of this refusal to write about politics other than by denial; such effects seem to us to consist in the exclusion of politics outside the realm of knowledge and its problematic inclusion into that of morality. And although it has been possible to speak of a “political Descartes”, it is completely against his stated intentions. This Descartes would be political in spite of himself. In fact, such an approach can only consist in a political interpretation of this denial, in a political reading of the texts that reject, or more often pass over in silence, politics as such. Although a reading of this kind can be at best a hazardous one, we will not attempt to challenge its legitimacy, for it is certainly possible to affirm that the work of Descartes is ridden and wrought by the question of politics (just as all philosophical thought, in one way or another, must of necessity confront political reality), but it is not without importance to begin by noting that it is never touched upon other than indirectly, obliquely, through the use of theoretical devices whose finality is not political.

Certain lives are transcribed like musical scores that compose themselves in a transparent register and whose traces—memories and written works—remain present, long-lasting or eternal. In a way, biography consists in deciphering them, then recomposing them through some process—condensation, for example—in modifying chronological time into writing-reading time or in shifting, regrouping certain facts or certain parameters. In some cases we discover that they give a dynamic and structure homologous or very near to those of narratives, epics or marvelous tales. The life of Lou Andreas-Salomé belongs to these cycles that are, in some respects, exceptional.

Given the predominance of multilingualism in many countries there is great need for a new, interdisciplinary approach to the problem. Sociolinguistics—or the sociology of language—provides such an approach and can help to shed new light on a phenomenon which is often discussed in terms that tend to create more problems than they solve. In order to demonstrate how sociolinguistic theory and practice can contribute to the study of multilingualism this paper will attempt to outline briefly some of the basic premises of sociolinguistic theory which appear relevant to the understanding of the phenomenon of multilingualism and also to define multilingualism as a social behaviour in response to a contact situation.