S'il est un point que les réflexions contemporaines sur le temps ont mis en relief et inscrit profondément dans notre conscience, c'est que l'avenir qu'on espère dépend directement du présent qu'on réalise. Telle est notre attitude en face du présent, telle elle sera inéluctablement en face de l'avenir; et donc l'avenir lui-même, puisque ce dernier n'est rien sinon un présent caché encore, au cœur d'un présent déjà actuel, et explicite. Il est en effet de l'essence même de notre condition humaine d'avoir un présent structuré et comme stratifié. Certes on peut imaginer le présent comme un point sans épaisseur, comme la limite évanescente entre un segment de ligne qui marque le passé à jamais révolu, et l'avenir qui se meut vers nous pour basculer inexorablement vers le non-être en franchissant ce présent. Mais cette image, utile pour bien des tâches, ne correspond d'aucune manière à la réalité vivante de la conscience humaine et des activités qui lui sont propres. Nous sommes dans le présent ce que nous sommes et ce que, en un sens, nous croyons pouvoir dire que nous avons été. Une grande partie de ce que nous appelons le passé, notre passé personnel et sans doute notre passé spécifique, est présent, non seulement à titre de souvenir, pouvant être, ou non, évoqué, mais à titre de schéma dynamique modifiant notre être-au-monde, notre présente réaction au réel le plus réel, à la situation où nous avons à déployer notre activité.

In a recent discussion of the notion of substance Miss Anscombe points out that the following three doctrines are very closely associated: the doctrine that proper names lack all connotation, are mere labels, the view that there is nothing essential to the individual, and the doctrine that individuals are bare particulars with no properties in and of themselves. In this article as well as in other writings she rejects all three of these doctrines. And, along with P. T. Geach, whose position on this matter I take to be identical to hers, she defends a doctrine of proper names that is based upon this rejection. She is quite right in supposing that the notion of individuality embodied in these three doctrines is not a straw man. E. B. Allaire has recently defended the doctrine that there are bare particulars along with its corollaries about names and the nominal essence of individuals. He even thinks the doctrine can be defended on “common sense” grounds, independently of dialectical considerations. In this paper I wish to examine one of his arguments in defence of bare particulars.

In this paper I am using the word ‘logic’ in an extended sense. If anyone finds my use objectionable, he will at least find that nothing hangs on it; and if the word as used in this context conveys no information to any person, he will not be the poorer, because as he reads on, he will soon see the class of questions with which the paper deals.

Some of the points I will make will be familiar enough, but I think I do also break some new ground; and anyway I think there is an advantage in bringing these considerations together so as to produce a relatively full discussion in a short space.

There is a widespread belief, more often implied than explicitly asserted, that Hume considered all necessary propositions to be analytic.

Of course Hume did not use the analytic-synthetic distinction explicitly. This only come to the forefront with Kant; and it is Kant who is probably the main source of the above-mentioned belief. Kant ascribed to Hume the view that mathematical propositions are, in his (Kant's) terminology, analytic. If this is correct, then since mathematics was for Hume the paradigm of a body of necessary truths, it is plausible to infer that he considered necessary propositions to be one and all analytic. The absence in Hume's writings of the analytic-synthetic terminology is by no means decisive: though he did not have the terms he may well have possessed the concepts, as evidenced by his use of them.

Hume states that a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature. Anyone reporting the occurrence of a miraculous event commits himself to the proposition that the event runs counter to the laws of nature. It is, Hume points out, not enough that the reported event fail to be “conformable” to our experience for us, licitly, to accept the report as of a miraculous event or—if we are the witnesses and reporters—to judge that what we have witnessed is miraculous.

To use one of Hume's examples: the Indian from a warm climate is surprised to discover that water freezes. His previous experience has never been such that he could be prepared for this contingency; the freezing is not conformable to his experience but neither is it miraculous since it is not contrary to that experience.

In 1938, four years before his death, Collingwood characterized his life as “in the main an attempt to bring about a rapprochement between philosophy and history” (Autobiography, 77). Collingwood's success in this matter has been a subject of much debate. The majority of his critics have argued, following the leadership of T. A. Knox, that the alleged rapprochement was a failure. In the early writings, such as Religion and Philosophy and Speculum Mentis, it is simply obscure. In An Essay on Philosophical Method it emerges more clearly but with a definite bias in favour of philosophy. Sometime between 1936 and 1938, however, Collingwood underwent a radical conversion to the historicist doctrine, typical of the thought of Croce, that philosophy is a branch of history. The result, according to the Knox thesis, was an explicit repudiation, in the Autobiography (1938) and An Essay on Metaphysics (1939), of Collingwood's earlier belief in the priority and autonomy of philosophy.

C'est Paul Vignaux le grand médiéviste de la Sorbonne, qui a préfacé le livre du P. Camille Bérubé, O.F.M., Cap., l'un de ses collègues de l'Institut d'Études Médiévales de Montréal, sur La Connaissance de l'individuel au Moyen Age. Tout en présentant l'ouvrage aux lecteurs non médiévistes, il se plaît à louer l'érudition, le sens de la synthèse et la liberté d'esprit du chercheur patient et objectif qu'est le P. Bérubé.

Sans être nous-même médiéviste, il nous semble qu'il s'agit ici d'une œuvre qui fait honneur à la recherche canadienne en ce domaine. Nous l'avons lu, en tout cas, comme on lit un roman d'aventures, en nous demandant dès le début et en souhaitant de plus en plus vivement, au fur et à mesure que nous progressions, ce que la suite allait nous révéler.