as Denniston pointed out in his note on the passage, ‘is difficult’. Various suggestions have been made to explain it, from Kvicala's emendation on the analogy of Medea 923, to Parmentier's note, ‘la joue blanche ou claire, c'est-à-dire en sa fleur de jeunesse’; but none is altogether convincing or satisfactory. May one, then, advance the idea of retaining as the Oxford recension does, not on the ground of faute de mieux, but for the sake of the very striking image it contains?

There is more than enough evidence to show that cock-fighting, quail-fighting, and even partridge-fighting were favourite sports among the Greeks (young and old alike), no matter what part of the mediterranean world they inhabited. Whether Romans ever shared these passions is another question altogether. When Saglio contributed his article on cock-fighting to the Dictionnaire des antiquitis grecques et romaines, he limited himself to the transports it caused the Greeks. For this he was reprimanded, obliquely, by Schneider, asserting—but neglecting to support the assertion in detail—that Romans also took a keen interest in Hahnenkämpfe. Subsequently, Magaldi set out to prove the existence of formal ludi gallinarii at Pompeii, while Jennison mustered such evidence as could be found for all three forms of avian combat in Rome. Hence, apparently, it has become the communis opinio that Romans shared the Greeks' taste for these ‘raffish’ amusements.

In the Severan period the proconsulship of Africa or Asia was normally held some 15 to 17 years after die consulship. Although there are comparatively few consuls in this period whose ages can be firmly established, what evidencethere is suggests that the consulship was normally held in the early forties, on occasions as early as the mid thirties: a consularis could, therefore, hope to attain a premier proconsulship aged about 60. Thus the future emperor P.Helvius Pertinax, who was born on 1st August 126, held the proconsulship of Africa, probably in 188/9, at the age of 62. M. Didius Julianus, the imperial successor to Pertinax, also succeeded him in Africa aged about 56. C. Vettius Sabinianus was born before 136 and his proconsulship fell about 192/37 whenhe was at least 56 years old.

This would be admirably clear and would give excellent sense, but it does entail the deletion of as an interpolation before Marshall is aware that is a word that is not likely to be used by an interpolator, but still feels able to propose its deletion and gives a detailed account of the way in which an interpolator might have approached the sentence. When one attempts to read the mind of an ancient scribe, all sorts of possibilities are opened up; in this instance, it seems equally possible that a reader who, as Marshall suggests, was faced with … and was not able to understand the sentence because he failed to separate from and to see that was to be taken in the second clause, would have been inclined first at least to see whether sense could be obtained by separating from rather than to conjure up the word

In their mangled versions of this poem Baehrens and Housman have both anticipated the first of these changes whilst lines 19–20 are placed as I suggest by Housman and Postgate and lines 21–4 are placed before line 39 by Scaliger, Housman, Butler, and others. Nevertheless I recall these transpositions here, primarily because my third change is intelligible only through them, but also because their correctness has been generally neglected amid the confusing assortment of wholly unnecessary transpositions that this poem has suffered. My reasons for recommending the above changes are these.

The purpose of the present paper is to examine one way in which divine being or divine existence was expressed in the Ancient World, and to see how in late antiquity the expression of some aspects of divine existence was abandoned, while others survived. The inquiry therefore seeks to contribute to the discussion on change and continuity, and, more specifically, to the problem of what may be understood by conversion from paganism to Christianity in late antiquity.

Robin George Colling Wood (1889–1943) was a Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Pembroke College, Oxford, from 1912 to 1935. During this period he published or prepared his most important philosophical and historical works.

At the beginning of the dog's trial the prosecution state the charge and the penalty they propose. It seems to me that there may be a more complicated joke here than is generally realized. The penalty of a collar is appropriate for a dog and in real life was sometimes imposed on a slave or a prisoner (Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 11). The epithet applied to the collar is usually translated ‘of figwood’ and taken to be a pun on . Commentators see the same pun earlier in the play at 145, although in that passage the sense may be adequate without the pun; the adjective does not necessarily constitute a joke in itself but is perhaps chosen deliberately to lead into the joke.

The interpretation of these words is important for understanding the meaning of in Aristotle. For here, exceptionally, it has been taken to refer to sense-perceptions rather than images.

I quote the Oxford translation of 462a15–24 (by J. I. Beare): ‘From all this, then, the conclusion to be drawn is that the dream is a sort of presentation (), and, more particularly, one which occurs in sleep; since the phantoms just mentioned are not dreams, nor is any other a dream which presents itself when the sense-perceptions are in a state of freedom. Nor is every presentation which occurs in sleep necessarily a dream.

The setting of this epigram is the komos sequence explored by Copley in his important book. The speaker is about to set forth in the dark, since he requires some means of lighting his way. A companion offers him a torch. It is refused as unnecessary because of the flame of love which burns in his breast.

So far as I know, the manuscripts' fraternis in Prop. 2. 34. 52 ‘aut cur fraternis Luna laboret equis’ has never been doubted. I offer an emendation of it in this note.

Luna laboret ought to allude to lunar eclipse, but you cannot see it through the fog of fraternis equis. In C.Q.xliii (1949), 26–7, Shackleton Bailey dealt with the traditional claim for it, that the moon is eclipsed, not by the sun, by the presence of her brother's horses, but by their absence, just as in Virgil the sea and Ixion's wheel stand still when the winds' presence is no longer felt: ‘cum placidum ventis staret mare’ (Ecl. 2. 26), ‘Ixioni vento rota constitit orbis’ (G. 4. 484.). Simply, he saw no parallel between the unambiguous absence of those winds’ blasts and the alleged absence of the sun's horses here.

Most modern editors adopt one or other of two readings: (1) quot gradibus domus ista Remi se sustulit! olim / unus erat etc.; (2) qua gradibus domus ista Remi se sustulit, olim / unus erat etc. It is true that a large number of steps leading up to a temple is an indicationof its magnificence; cf. Ovid, Pont. 3. 2. 49 f. templa manent hodie vastis innixa columnis, / perque quater denos itur in ilia gradus. Nevertheless in this context qua is more probable than quot, in view of the local relative clauses in line 1 (quamaxima Roma est) and line 3 (ubi Navali slant sacra Palatia Phoebo).

The most popular emendation has been Heinsius's somnia sunt. I find the tone of this misplaced (cf. F. Leo, Ausg. Kl. Sckriften, ii. 118–19). Thepoet has since 66 laboriously catalogued variant aetiologies of Scylla monstrum. It is inappropriate that he should immediately follow this with the statement that all of them were ‘fancy’ or ‘nonsense’. For a start, we may note that the summation quidquid et ut quisque … presumably includes the version of Homer (66), to whose authority the poet had appealed (62) in the case of the erroneous contamination of the two Scyllas. Next, I suppose that if Scylla monstrum had been the subject of his poem, the poet might have wanted to say that some of the versions were wrong—or at least of less good authority, or less attractive than others for one reason or another. But Scylla monstrum is not the subject of his poem. He confutes, because it is his concern, the contamination; the listing of the rest, variants in a story not his subject, issues largely from an ‘Alexandrian’ delight in such learned display. It calls for no estimation of their lightness or wrongness: neither relative to one another—and certainly not absolutely.

In the introductory remarks to his Mulierum Virtutes, Plutarch notes the value of comparisons for establishing the diverse manifestations of the same virtue: ‘Achilles was brave in one way, Ajax in another; and the intelligence of Odysseus differed from that of Nestor, nor were Cato and Agesilaus just in the same way, nor was Irene loving of her husband () as Alcestis was, nor Cornelia high-minded in the manner of Olympias’ (243d). All the examples are well known, and quite apposite, except for Irene (). Who is this paragon of wifely love? A search through encyclopedias and mythological handbooks proves fruitless. Wyttenbach in his note ad loc. suggested the courtesan friend of a minor Ptolemy killed at Ephesus (Athen. 13. 593 a-b), yet this extremely obscure figure hardly merits mention in the same breath with Alcestis. The name must be corrupt.

Alexander is arguing that our responsibility for what we do () is grounded in the fact that a man is the of his own actions (cf. Aristotle, E.N. 3. 1111a21, 1112b31, etc.). The opponents of this view, he says, hold that nothing performed by a man is such that at the time when he does something he also has the possibility of not doing it, (190. 24–6). One who believes this, he argues, cannot make any moral judgements or do any of the things ‘which ought reasonably to be brought about by those who have believed the possibility also of doing each of the things which they do’. My translation has, I hope, shown the need for a negative in the last clause: ‘the possibility also of not doing’ is the point needed; so insert between and . For omission of the negative elsewhere in De fato cf. 165. 1; 179. 21; 189. 6; 195. 26; 202. 12; 207. 19; 211. 18.