I DO not think that it is at all generally known that among the Egyptian antiquities given by Grant Bey to the Museum at Aberdeen there are a considerable number of papyrus fragments, Greek, Coptic,1 Hieratic, Demotic, and even Latin and Arabic, which except for an inspection by Prof. Sayce and a passing visit of Dr. Grenfell have up till now been left unexamined. That indeed is my only reason for trespassing in a branch of Palaeography with which I am quite unfamiliar; and it is in the hope of inciting some experienced papyrologist to turn his attention to them that I publish the following fragments. In the case of the Greek fragments lack of time combined with a mistrust of my powers of deciphering the more illegible non-literary hands forbade me do more than select the most promising literary fragments. Among these Homer naturally predominates; but the gem of the collection is a lyric fragment, which may fairly certainly be ascribed to Alcaeus, though Dr. Grenfell who first noticed it attributed it to Sappho. A fragment of Demosthenes, a fragment of Dioscorides, and a vellum fragment of a Latin Bible, were the only others which I succeeded in identifying; but these, with the few tragic, comic, and medical fragments which I also reproduce, are, I think, first-fruits sufficient to show that the crop would not be barren, if it found a competent gleaner.

To ensnare the sophist of the Sophist in a definition disclosing him as a purveyor of images and falsehoods Plato must block the sophistical defence that image and falsehood are self-contradictory in concept, for they both embody the proposition proscribed by Parmenides — ‘What is not, is’. It has been assumed that Plato regards this defence as depending on a reading of ‘what is not’ (to mē on) in its very strongest sense, where it is equivalent to ‘what is not in any way’ (to mēdamōs on) or ‘nothing’. Likewise, the initial paradoxes of not-being (237b–239c) are seen as requiring that to mē on be understood in this way, that later designated by Plato (257b, 258e–259a) as the opposite of to on or ‘being’. On this interpretation, Plato's counter-strategy is to recognise a use of to mē on which is not opposed in this strict sense to being, but is indeed a part of it and is ‘being other than’.

In a stimulating article, R. W. Jordan challenges this account. I shall briefly attempt to show that his objections are not decisive and that his own interpretation is open to question.

Jordan makes the interesting suggestion (p. 120) that a distinction between two senses of not-being, where one is equivalent to nothing and one is not, dates from the middle dialogues — particularly from Republic V, where objects of agnoia are mēdamē onta and objects of doxa are both onta and mē onta. He concludes (p. 121), ‘Malcolm's view, then, seems to amount to this: that Plato is now extending the moral he draws about objects of belief (i.e. particulars) in the Republic to cover forms. Forms too now are seen to be both being and notbeing.’

In the 50s b.c. the Roman republic faced serious challenges, not least among them the related problems of electoral bribery and provincial extortion. The year 54 b.c., which this article takes as a case study, witnessed both the worst electoral scandal Rome had ever seen and the high-profile extortion trial of M. Aemilius Scaurus. These events defy analysis in terms of the political allegiances and prosopographical connections usually tracked. It is more helpful to think of problems and (attempted) solutions, in which the younger M. Porcius Cato played a leading role. Scaurus’ prosecutor summed up a vicious circle: governors who had engaged in extortion would buy the consulship with the money they had stolen and go on to plunder other provinces. Cato countered from both sides: in the Senate, he proposed a new form of process to combat electoral corruption; as president of the extortion court, he allowed the prosecution to hurry through a case that was as much about ambitus as repetundae. These initiatives, while not immediately successful, helped lay the groundwork for future reforms.

Ever since Ph. Kohlmann in his Teubner edition of the Thebaid (1884) asserted that he had used cod. Parisinus 13046, one of the MSS. formerly of St. Germain des Prés, this MS. has been known by reputation to his successors and other students of Statian textual problems, and, designed by the letter S, it is alluded to and cited in the edition of Garrod (Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis 1906) and in the newer Teubner of Klotz, which appeared in 1908. The two later editors confessed that they themselves had not examined the MS., but were relying upon the information accessible in Kohlmann's edition. Doubts having been cast from more than one source upon Kohlmann's accuracy and the soundness of his reports, while at the same time the importance of S as a member of the ω group was emphasized by Mr. Garrod and Dr. Klotz in spite of the incomplete evidence at their disposal, it seemed worth while to the writer to examine the MS. for himself and to make a thorough collation of it. This has been done in the summer of 1932.

Plutarch's Moralia mentions that Theophrastus twice delivered his native city from tyrants (1097B, 1126F), a detail that has been difficult to make coherent with our existing understanding of Theophrastus’ life. Theophrastus seems to be in the wrong place at the wrong time for this to have been possible, or to have been too undemocratic and scholastic a philosopher to have wanted to participate in these struggles in the first place. By more closely examining the nature of Plutarch's comment and the evidence for Theophrastus’ political orientation and character, this article argues that there are, however, grounds on which to take Plutarch's report seriously. It presents a case for Theophrastus’ participation in two liberation struggles in 334 and 332, without complicating the trajectory of his accompanying Aristotle to both Macedonia and Athens during this period.

There is one nautical term which has been neglected by those who have written about the Greek ship—for the very good reason that it had ceased to be used literally by the time our records, literary and epigraphic, begin. This is a pity, since the silence of experts has resulted in an absurdity, or at least obscurity, appearing in the dictionaries. An unattested original meaning ‘under-rower’ has been universally assumed for the word ujnjpenjs (e.g. Boisacq, ‘rameur en sous-ordre’; L. & S., ‘under-rower’). This assumption not merely requires proof but is in sore need of explanation. What is an ‘under-rower’? And why did the term pass out of use in that sense?

A treatise on rhetorical tropes is attributed in manuscripts to the first-century grammarian Trypho: this article considers for the first time a fifteenth-century manuscript of this work (Leiden, BPG 74G), which turns out to be the only complete witness of its hitherto unknown original version; this version (very fragmentarily transmitted by a fifth-century papyrus scrap) is also partly found in another fifteenth-century manuscript now kept in Olomouc (M 79). Four interesting poetic fragments are quoted in this newly discovered, fuller version of Ps.-Trypho's De Tropis: some lines from Callimachus’ fifth and fourth Iambi (23–9 and 90–2 respectively: a radically new light is shed by this new witness on the parallel papyrus fragments carrying Callimachus’ text), an epigram dubiously attributed to Simonides (FGE 44 Page, probably to be dated to the Hellenistic period: the text can be now restored to its complete form), and some enigmatic lines of “Hesiod”'s Wedding of Keyx, which the new witness finally makes fully understandable.

So Hall and Geldart's text and critical note. The latter needs a correction and an addition: R gives (so, too, ΣR, which has ; γ is found only in B and the Aldine edition, R and V omit it.

What is the object of Van Leeuwen says ‘mente suppl.xwhich seems to me inconsequent if not nonsensical. Starkie, printing a dash after the word, notes ‘as the sentence is interrupted by Philocleon, it is impossible to know what was meant to be the object of this verb’. This does not seem very satisfactory. Rogers apparently takes the verb as used absolutely and translates ‘you'll strike by and by’. Coulon, not unnaturally dissatisfied with these explanations, reads and translates ‘tu vas te faire lapider’, adding a note ‘on jetait des pierres aux fous; cf. Otseaux 524’. Starkie also mentions this possibility and attributes its origin to the scholiast—wrongly, for the gloss shows that the scholiast did not take as meaning ‘will be pelted as a madman’. In any case all this is very far-fetched. And there is a further point: the strange future active, is found elsewhere only at line 222 of this same play and nowhere else in Greek. It is therefore rash to postulate an entirely unparalleled middle form of this, and that, too, in a passive sense. Had he intended this meaning Aristophanes would surely have written.

Burnet's text at Pl. Ti. 55c7–d6 is at least questionable, and opting for a different reading at 55d5 (θεός instead of θεόν) would shed light on an intriguing argumentative aspect of Plato's cosmological account: God confirms the metaphysical reasons why there is just one perfect world.

A Distinction of four species of tragedy and epic poetry is laid down, though not explained at length, in two passages of the Poetics (18, I455b32–56a3 and 24, I459b7–16), and, as I hope to show, mentioned in another (12, ). At the end of the treatise, Aristotle positively says that he has given an explanation of both the species and the component parts of tragedy and epic poetry (l462bl6–l8 ).

On November 8, 1894, I read before the Cambridge Philological Society a paper in which the reading and the interpretation of this passage were discussed at length. A brief report of the paper was published in the Proceedings of the Society, Nos. 37–39, p. 16; and the cardinal correction (in v. 274) was received into the text of the Fasti which Professor G. A. Davies published in the Corpus Poetarum Latinorum. The Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society are indeed now among the periodical publications of which the Bibliotheca Philologica Classica takes account: but an acquaintance with their earlier numbers is the privilege of the elect, and the sole mention of the correction that I have seen is an entry in the diligent summary of Ovidian literature in the Jahresbericht vol. 109 p. 282 which runs as follows ‘VI 247 ut tangat ( = Text; st. et t. unnötig).’ Whether the correction is ‘needless’ is not for me to say; but there is excuse for thinking that those who wish to form a judgment on its character will not deem it needless to have the evidence before them.

Textual difficulties as well as problems of content are sometimes prone to being overlooked in famous passages, because their very familiarity tends to stifle reflection on their actual meaning. orandum est, ut sit mens sana in corpore sano (Juv. 10.356) escaped detection as an interpolation until 1970. In di, coeptis (nam uos mutastis et illa) | aspirate meis (Ov. Met. 1.2–3), the reading illas has held its place against the correct illa until 1976.

When the death-cry of Agamemnon is heard, the Chorus talks, but does nothing. This is the locus classicus of a Chorus which, in a situation that seems to demand effective intervention, is debarred from intervening by the necessity of remaining a Chorus. Did Aeschylus and his audience feel a difficulty here? No, says Professor G. Thomson; it is merely that modern taste is influenced by ‘the crude realism of the Elizabethan drama’. But this will not do, for it is Aeschylus himself, through the Chorus, who raises the issue of their entering or not entering the palace, which they discuss in the most realistic way. Assuming that a technical difficulty exists, with what skill and success did the dramatist handle it? Criticism has on the whole been adverse.

The appearance of P. Oxy. 2080 makes possible the solution of an old puzzle in the περ συντάξεωσ of Apollonius Dyscolus. Speaking of the inadmissibility of the definite article with λλήλων, Apollonius says (p. 60, Uhlig): κα προϕανέσ στιν κ τσ παρ πσι χρήσεωσ κα το συμπαρεπομένου λόγου. μετ ῥματοσ γρ διαβατικν προσώπων διάθεσιν σημαίνει,

λλήλουσ τρώσητε (Od. τ 12)

λλήλουσ δ' λήϊσαν

λλήλωѵ λεείνοντεσ βέλεα στονόεντα (Il. P 374).

In his commentary on Bacchae 439, lemma γελῶν, E.R. Dodds writes: ‘the actor who plays the Stranger no doubt wore a smiling mask throughout’. In addition to this passage, Dodds cites Bacch. 380 (γελάσαι) and Hymn. Hom. Bacch. 14 (μειδιάων). Referring to Bacch. 1021 (προσώπῳ γελῶντι), he expands: ‘it is an ambiguous smile—here the smile of a martyr, afterwards the smile of the destroyer.’ The idea seems to originate either from Dodds himself (whose commentary was first published in 1944) or from R.P. Winnington-Ingram, whose Euripides and Dionysus (published in 1948) cites the smile as well. Winnington-Ingram's book, according to the Preface, was substantially complete by 1938, and he and Dodds were in close contact at the time of writing, so the idea could have come from either one or the other, or from their conversations. Whatever its source, the smiling mask is taken as fact by both, and through their works entered the mainstream of post-war scholarship on Bacchae.

The construction of ἄν with the future has been hotly denied as impossible, so far as Attic Greek and indeed post-Homeric Greek generally are concerned. The opponents of the construction have had among their number such scholars as Dawes and Cobet; and of late, it seems, editors of texts generally. The view of Cobet is given on p. 469 of his Miscellanea Critica, with reference to Demosth. 9. 70 (128) πάλαι τις ⋯δέως ἂν ἴσως ⋯ρωτήσων κάθηται. Cobet, who has been followed by later editors, altered ⋯ρωτήσων (the universal reading of the codd.) to ⋯ρωτήσας, commenting ‘ubi semel Constiterit ⋯δέως ἂν ⋯ρωτήσω, ⋯δέως ἂν πεύσομαɩ aut simile quid pro ⋯ρωτήσαιμι vel πυθοίμην recte dici, turn demum librorum lectioni acquiescemus. quod equidem nunquam futurum esse satis scio.’ This view, which must of course be understood as excepting Homer from its scope, is nothing more than a blank denial of the possibility of the construction. We see more of an argument in Kühner-Gerth (Griech. Gramm. ii. 1. 209), where it is remarked that the construction, frequent in Homer, was later given up because ἃν with the optative was sufficient to express a future possibility; and that possibly emenders have done right to alter passages in Attic which contain it. This is not expressed with any great certainty. Nevertheless it has become to such an extent the prevailing view among editors that in modern texts it is extremely rare to find the construction allowed to remain.