This article criticizes a group of contemporary political theories that describe the virtues appropriate to liberal citizens, the ills that result from a waning of these virtues and the kinds of public policies that would renew the traits of character necessary to the healthy functioning of a liberal polity. While enumerations of broadly liberal virtues can seem relatively uncontroversial, these pieties provide insufficient warrant for the concrete policy recommendations made in their name. Theoretical and practical discussions of citizen virtues need to take seriously the diversity of liberal “citizenship stories,” and to consider how legitimately to conciliate these perspectives in particular cases.

This paper explores how local government structure affects policy co-ordination. It compares the delivery of economic development services in two Ontario cities. In London, a specialized agency is the lead, but lacks full functional control, while in Hamilton policy control is consolidated in a single municipal department. The findings support the hypothesis of those who argue in favour of general-purpose governments, as the municipal hierarchy in Hamilton was instrumental in achieving policy co-ordination. Proponents of specialization argue that it limits the need for co-ordination between governments but, as the London case demonstrates, this logic breaks down when there are too many players with too few responsibilities.

In “Putting Ideas in Their Place,” George Hoberg raises some important and persistent questions about the explanation of policy change. In particular, he suggests that our attempt to demonstrate the role played by ideas in changing forest policy in British Columbia using Paul Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) gives excessive weight to ideas at the expense of more traditional concerns with power and interest. Although it is unclear whether he places the blame on the ACF itself or merely on the way we have employed it, the burden of his critique is that we fail to live up to our commitment to show how ideas and interests can be combined in a more comprehensive form of explanation than one which appeals to interests alone. Worse still, by our reckless overstatement of the case for ideas, we risk creating a “straw monster,” thereby warping the judgment of an entire generation of political scientists.

Abstract. Why did most central banks continue to purchase dollar reserves during the 2000s even though they suffered mounting financial losses as a result of this policy? This paper argues that domestic political considerations determine whether policy makers accumulate or dump the reserve currency. We hypothesize that central bank independence decreases support for the dollar because independent central banks reduce the political clout of exporters and increase the salience of financial performance. This argument is tested using data on countries' holdings of US Treasury securities between 2000 and 2008. The statistical results indicate that countries with independent central banks were more likely to sell and less likely to purchase US treasuries. Our findings suggest that a complete understanding of the international dollar standard requires greater attention to domestic politics and how political institutions influence the balance of power between competing interest groups.

Résumé. Pourquoi est-ce que la plupart des banques centrales ont continué à acheter des réserves de dollars au cours des années 2000, même quand ils souffraient des pertes financières en raison de cette politique? Cet article soutient que des considérations de politiques nationale déterminent si les responsables des politiques décident d'accumuler ou de vider leurs monnaie de réserve. Nous émettons l'hypothèse que l'indépendance de la banque centrale décourage le soutien pour le dollar, car les banques centrales indépendantes réduise la puissance politique des exportateurs et augmente l'importance de la performance financière. Cet argument est testé en utilisant des données sur la quantité de titres du Trésor américain possédée par pays entre 2000 et 2008. Les résultats statistiques démontrent que les pays avec des banques centrales indépendantes étaient plus susceptibles de vendre et moins susceptibles d'acheter des obligations du Trésor américain. Nos résultats suggèrent qu'une compréhension complète de l'étalon dollar international exige une plus grande attention à la politique nationale, et comment les institutions politiques influencent l'équilibre du pouvoir entre les groupes d'intérêts concurrents.

Strategic analysis is used in this article to report on a case study of candidate choice in an urban constituency. Several concepts are presented first. During a game, several agents, pursuing the objectives of a partisan organization, interact. It sometimes happens that the rules of the game do not anticipate completely the actions that ought to be advanced by the agents. There exists then a zone of uncertainty. If the agents come into conflict over the action to be taken there is a “crisis point.” Around a “crisis point” there occurs a particular play that can lead to several results. The agents have preferences regarding the results and they try, with the help of their resources, to impose their preferences on others. In order to leave nothing to chance, these rational agents establish strategies that guide their actions.

The game described in this article has at stake the choice of a candidate for legislative elections. The agents are activists (or groups of activists) of the partisan constituency association. At the outset of the study there is one aspirant to the candidature; certain activists, for diverse reasons, reject the aspirant as candidate. They form a coalition and present another candidate. The two aspirants and their organizations campaign among members of the association who will decide the choice of candidate. In the course of the campaign several “crisis points” emerge: the two rival organizations oppose each other.

Conclusions were drawn about the utility of case studies when they are made within a certain theoretical framework such as strategic analysis.

This article analyzes the effect of procedural rule change on the dynamics of parliamentary speeches in the Canadian House of Commons between 1901 and 2015. During this period, several new rules were introduced to reduce the opportunities for private members to speak during the debates so that the government could get its business done within an acceptable amount of time. Our analysis looks at the impact of these rule changes on the content and orientation of all individual speeches made by members of Parliament. The results indicate that parliamentary rules had an important effect on the topic and duration of debates. Our findings also confirm that procedural changes contributed to a heightening of partisan polarization in the Canadian Parliament over time and disproportionately reduced the influence of government backbenchers in the legislative process.

Abstract. Despite the confidence convention's central part in Canadian parliamentary government, little attention has been paid to what exactly constitutes a vote of confidence. This uncertainty was highlighted in May 2005, when the opposition parties in the House of Commons passed a motion which they claimed was a confidence motion but the government did not. This paper examines the episode, and the motion at the heart of the controversy, to determine whether it should have been considered a confidence vote. Historical precedents from 1926 to 2005 provide the context for the analysis and conclusions about what signifies a test of confidence.

Résumé. Malgré le rôle central de la convention de confiance dans le système parlementaire canadien, peu d'attention a été accordée à définir ce que constitue exactement un vote de confiance. Cette imprécision a été mise en évidence en mai 2005 lors du vote officiel sur une motion contre le gouvernement, lorsqu'il y a eu désaccord sur ce qui représentait une “ défaite ” du gouvernement dans la législature. Cet article examine les événements autour de cette motion, afin de déterminer si cette dernière a réellement constitué un vote de confiance. Quelques conclusions concernant ce que signifie un test de confiance sont tirées à partir d'une analyse des précédents historiques de 1926 à 2005.

Discussing the economic backwardness of Ireland in the late seventeenth century, Sir William Petty delivered himself of an apt, if indelicately worded, opinion. “Their Lazing,” he wrote of the Irish, “seems to me to proceed rather from want of Imployment and Encouragement to Work, than from the natural abundance of Flegm in their Bowels and Blood.” He continued this somewhat unorthodox analysis by listing the factors which destroyed or frustrated the incentives to increase production in Ireland; and, in the process, he succeeded in anticipating more than one modern idea on the subject. He even dealt with visible and disguised unemployment, and recommended, along lines fashionable today, that the surplus labour be employed in the creation of capital: improving rivers and constructing roads, bridges and buildings–“works,” as he succinctly put it, “of much labour and little art.”

Although this article concerns neither Petty nor Ireland directly, the former's observations on the latter provide a useful introduction to its principal topic–the historical nature of economic underdevelopment. If we study the earlier history of today's highly developed economies, what sort of economic and social landscape do we find, and how does it compare with the structure of preindustrial economies in the mid twentieth century?

“If we introduce overmuch idealism into explaining the formation of either of the North American polities, the record of mankind is against us. So is our own history. The thirteen colonies came together not primarily because of the joy in making a great free American community, but because disintegration stared them in the face and men of substance saw in union salvation for their fortunes. It is no reflection on British North Americans that they too made their union under duresse.”

The establishment of a wider Canadian union had been discussed for a number of decades before Confederation but the motivation in a common allegiance to Great Britain and in intermittent flashes of national sentiment had proven wholly inadequate to overcome the obstacles of provincial particularism and cultural differences, of paucity of communication and contact among the colonies, and of the contrasting economic orientation of central Canada and the Maritime region. In the years immediately prior to Confederation these divisive elements were finally outweighed by the mounting pressures of political dead-lock, economic uncertainty, and fear and jealousy of the United States. The leaders of the Confederation movement variously gave expression to these pressures. National sentiment was still a distinctly secondary factor, however, and only a few of the leaders betrayed in their speeches evidence of a broad vision of Canadian nationhood.

This paper is an attempt to offer a functional theory of the mass media, and to suggest criteria for evaluating the media which emerge from it—criteria which are not taken from other disciplines or from the technology of the media. First, the present stage of communications research is considered; second, the contributions of Marx and Freud; and third, an alternative hypothesis is suggested.

Urban sociologists ought to be parties to any discussion of the mass media, for it is difficult to imagine anything more symbolically urban than the mass circulation daily newspaper, the car radio, or the TV antenna. Yet judging from books on urban sociology interest in this aspect of urban life has, in recent years, dwindled to almost nothing. Neglect here is matched by the peculiar evasion in communications research of the urban context. Comparisons are routinely made between rural and urban populations with respect to readership, audiences and programme preferences, but these tabulations are not weighted any differently from comparisons along such dimensions as marital status, sex, education, and others in our standard repertoire. The two bodies of knowledge, then, have developed independently of each other despite the common-sense observation that they are inextricably related.

The problems of present-day Brazil are the travail of a people in the midst of a three-dimensional renovation. Their economy, politics, and social structure are changing simultaneously, but at different speeds. Much the fastest transformation is the economic. Political alterations are slower. Social reconstruction is the slowest. The purpose of this paper is to analyse some of the contradictions that exist within the state when the economy propels it forward while the social order holds it back. What happens in politics when reform of government must be adjusted to a fast rate of economic change and a slow rate of social change? And can such reform be accomplished when foreign examples are invoked to displace ingrained traditions?

The character of Brazilian government is curiously akin to that of the new buildings which abound in the Copacabana suburb of Rio and elsewhere. The architect, a master of the modern idiom, has designed an imposing elevation to the street and an entrance of striking beauty. But, as one enters, much will be found in the finish of the interior, and in the services and maintenance, that conflicts with the external view. For periods of varying length, water will cease to flow from the faucets; electricity will be cut off; street drains may be inadequate to carry off rain and sewage; and, sooner or later, the bichos will find their way in. A building may look a thing of beauty, but without the necessary utilities it will not be a joy forever to live in.

The purpose of this paper is to describe the way in which policy decisions have been made by the government of Metropolitan Toronto during its first twelve years of operation, and to set policy-making in the broader context of interest-group and electoral politics in the Toronto area. I begin with some comments on the structure of Metro government and on the current debate over Metro’s successes and failures.

The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto was a major breakthrough in the post-war drive for reorganization of local governments in metropolitan areas. As the inability of small, autonomous local governments to deal with metropolitan problems became apparent, most North American metropolitan areas began considering various devices for meeting region-wide needs. Metro Toronto, created in 1953 by an act of the Ontario legislature, is the oldest example of what has become known as the metropolitan federation plan, a device subsequently adopted for the Miami and Winnipeg metropolitan areas.

The 1953 provincial statute setting up Metro brought the City of Toronto and twelve suburbs under the umbrella of a new regional government, but did not alter any municipal boundaries in the area. A few powers were shifted to the Metro level, a few were left solely with the municipalities. A majority of powers, however, were to be shared by both levels of government. Metro was dominant in the fields of public transportation, property assessment, capital borrowing, highway construction, and the construction of water and sewer facilities; the municipalities were dominant in the fields of zoning, housing, welfare, police, fire, licensing, and traffic control. The only major change in this 1953 division of powers occurred in 1956, when policing and licensing functions were amalgamated–that is, shifted from the municipal to the Metro level.

The present paper is intended as the background to a more detailed discussion of the facts of agricultural debt adjustment. I propose to discuss briefly the nature and objectives of our machinery of agricultural debt adjustment, the background against which it works, and some of the more important difficulties encountered in practice. The observations are based largely upon experience acquired in the West, although the setting concerns the country as a whole.

Problems of debt adjustment are primarily problems in the economics of distribution. Measures taken in this direction affect transfers of income between individuals, groups, and sections of the country. Their chief objective is to relieve the pressure on exposed groups and to allay the tensions created thereby. They constitute a part of the machinery of adjustment so essential in an economy subject to extreme variation of income and afflicted with rigidities which obstruct or divert forces tending to equilibrium. The tendency has been to concentrate upon the economics of the long run and to ignore obstacles to the free play of such forces. The importance of these obstacles is most manifest in the lower phases of the business cycle, and the presence of corrective or compensatory measures is in large part due to the cumulative effects of the inflexibility characteristic of a continental type of development and to the difficulty of planning for an economy in which variability is so marked. The results are seen in a wide range of expedients of which debt adjustment is an example. Difficulties arise owing to the failure to distinguish between social and pecuniary costs, to the widely different interpretations of what the term “justice” implies, and to differences in points of view which range from an insistence upon a strictly legal interpretation of rights and obligations to demands for debt reductions upon the basis of present income.

A comparison of international capital flows which are occurring today to economically undeveloped areas, with similar international investment in economic development which occurred prior to World War I is almost inevitable and indeed has often been made more or less explicitly. The obvious differences between the two periods lie in the proportion of private capital in the total of international investment in undeveloped areas, and in the pace of economic development then and now. Capital flowing to undeveloped areas today is preponderantly from public bodies: various agencies of the United States Government, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or the United Nations. By contrast, international capital invested in economic development prior to World War I was exclusively from private sources. Then, too, the areas which were developed prior to 1914 experienced within a decade tremendous increases in population of 30 to 50 per cent and increases in the output of their major industries of 200 to 400 per cent. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of private enterprise and initiative in the international investment in undeveloped areas in the period from 1875 to 1914 and the reasons for the relatively unimportant position of private international capital in economic development today.

It is the intention in this paper to conduct an inquiry into the relations between general equilibrium analysis and public policy by the indirect method of examining the place of such analysis in the solution of a definite economic problem. The problem selected is the possibility of raising wages without raising prices. Traditional partial equilibrium theory made the solution of this problem a fairly simple one, but modern general equilibrium considerations, dynamic qualifications on these, and institutional changes in the organization of business and labour have opened up such areas of indeterminateness in the formation of prices that we may no longer trust the answers given by the simpler generalizations.

In the development of ideas during this paper, the term “degree of monopoly” will be employed rather frequently. The term will be used in Professor Lerner's sense of the ratio between the excess of price over marginal cost and price itself. In terms of Figure 1, this is the ratio RP/MP. This definition has limitations but it is retained as the simplest to which analysis may be referred and sufficient for the particular purposes for which it is required here.

The idea that the rise of wages in relation to prices may have consequences for the levels of employment and national income is, of course, based upon the Keynesian hypothesis that larger wage incomes in relation to national income as a whole tend to mean a lower level of savings, and the corollary that a lower level of net new investment will be needed to maintain a given level of employment and income where the wage share is higher. There is also some opinion that changes in the degree of monopoly during the business cycle are such as to aggravate the operation of the disequilibrating forces. For example, Dr. M. Kalecki in an article published in Econometrica in April, 1938, suggests that the Keynesian analysis respecting the relation between wages and prices requires emendation and expansion because it appears from his statistical and theoretical analysis that the degree of monopoly increases with recessions of the business cycle and decreases with its upward phase. If this be so, Dr. Kalecki points out that the cyclical redistribution of income carries with it the necessity of attaching a larger quantity of new investment to any given level of national income as the level of national income recedes, though this reasoning is qualified for effects of falling wages on the foreign balance.

The practice of criticizing political institutions on the basis of their efficiency as pieces of machinery is so widespread in political science today that it is sometimes difficult to remember that institutions may be as important for what they are as for what they do. An elected legislature, in its scrutiny of governmental affairs, not only represents the dominant sections of the electorate that returned it; it also reveals, through the nature of its own organization, their attitudes towards the elected legislature and its place in their society. An appraisal of the capacities and incapacities of a legislature would be at best incomplete if it paid no attention to the beliefs and traditions reflected therein, for it would ignore the obvious truth that the quality of the legislature's work was conditioned by its social environment. In the paragraphs that follow, the emphasis is not upon performance, although that is not overlooked, but upon the legislature as a social entity, as a mirror in which one can see an important part of a community.

The Canadian House of Commons during its early years offered the unusual and interesting spectacle of a legislature engaged in threshing out great issues while the legislative machinery itself was still under construction. Debates on important matters concerning the country at large ran parallel with acrimonious discussions about the nature and function of the House of Commons and its organization, and the government frequently tried (by providing, for instance, that each province was to obtain its due proportion of Commons' clerkships) to make the House a significant factor in the settling of disputes. Many institutions of the House (the speakership, the Hansard, and the Library, to name but a few) took their initial form as a result of forces which often bore little relation to legislation and debate.

The Nobel prizewinner F. A. Hayek has spent his long career defending classical liberalism and the free market from those wishing to introduce planning and greater “rationality” into social life. As this study tries to show, Hayek's defence of market liberalism is predicated on his theory of social knowledge and how liberal principles and processes are best suited to cope with our limited ability to utilize this knowledge. He argues that we can cope best with our ignorance by resisting the temptations to set up centralized decision-making mechanisms and by accepting the discovery procedure of the market mechanism. Unlike other attempts to defend classical liberalism, Hayek offers a radically new knowledge-based foundation. If Marx's work could be labelled an economically-based sociology, Hayek's work could be labelled an epistemologically-based politics. But is his epistemological defence simply an ideological move to defend against attacks levelled at capitalism, or has he provided an indisputable foundation to justify the maintenance of liberal orders?

After indicating that no rigorous political theory of groups exists, chiefly because interest groups are not genuine groups in the sense of “real collective units,” the author examines the disadvantages and advantages of using the systems analysis approach for the study of political parties and interest groups. Three correctives are suggested to systems theory, as it has been developed by a number of authors and more especially by David Easton, to make it better suited for the analysis of parties and interest groups. First, the environment must be made operational by the introduction, in addition to the political system, of a social system, providing constraints on the analyst comparable to those of the political system itself, and by the identification within both systems of a social and a political dynamic. Second, greater attention must be given to the way in which parties and interest groups, inasmuch as they act as input mechanisms, permit interactions between the social and the political systems. Third, a sharper focus must be put on the way the input function of political systems throws light on the life of groups.