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Exploitation and Rational Choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 November 2011

Loren King
Loren King*
Affiliation:
Wilfrid Laurier University
*
Loren King, Department of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University, 75 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, CanadaN2L 3C5, [email protected]
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Abstract

Abstract. Critics fault rational choice theory for dubious assumptions and limited explanatory power. The aims of rational choice are, however, as much normative as explanatory, and I argue that an abiding concern of political thought—the wrong of exploitation—gives moral weight to some of the more substantive assumptions underlying many rational choice prescriptions.

Résumé. Les critiques reprochent à la théorie du choix rationnel d'avancer des hypothèses douteuses et d'offrir des explications restreintes. Les objectifs du choix rationnel sont, cependant, aussi bien normatifs qu'explicatifs. J'affirme qu'une préoccupation centrale de la pensée politique – le mal de l'exploitation – donne une signification morale à certains postulats du choix rationnel.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , September 2011 , pp. 635 - 661
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 2011

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