“The confusion of a logical with a real predicate,” according to the Critique of Pure Reason, “is almost beyond correction” (A598/B626). Kant did not assert that existence is no predicate, but that it is only a “logical” one, and not a “real” one. Much the same thing has been said about identity, although Kant himself thought it is real and not logical. We have long lacked a rigorous criterion to distinguish real from logical predicates, and hence have not been able to say why the difference matters. This paper has two objects. First it provides a demarcation between real and logical predicates that confirms Kant's dictum that existence is only “logical.” Secondly it states the theory of a “logical” (but not “real”) relation of identity. Perhaps this is not the only identity relation. I show only that once it has been precisely defined in the right setting, there are definite answers to a number of disputed questions about identity. Maybe there are other concepts of identity for which different answers are to be given, but I shall not discuss that disagreeable prospect here. A third application concerns the ontological argument.

That's what I reckon morality is all about — how to preach, not how to act. My aim is not to answer this question of how to preach (except in the broadest outlines). I want to defend the claim that it is the, or at least a, central problem of ethics: that it is in fact the problem of what moral principles to accept.

My argument consists of an account of what is involved in accepting a moral principle. By a moral principle I mean a kind of principle about how people should act. Moral principles are not the only principles you can have about how people should act. There are principles of prudence, or rational self-interest. There are aesthetic principles, such as might be expressed in a remark like “you shouldn't put a magenta cushion on a scarlet sofa”. There are principles of etiquette. And no doubt there are others. I develop my account of morality by asking what distinguishes moral principles from the rest.

As a philosopher working in the area of education, I believe Samuel Bowles’ and Herbert Gintis’ recent book, Schooling in Capitalist America1 to be an important work. I believe it to be important first of all for the concrete ideas it raises about education in the history and present reality of American society. Secondly, it serves as an excellent example in a lesson in what philosophy, both philosophy of education, and philosophy generally, ought to become. In particular, by contrasting this work in its conclusions and methods with other works in mainstream contemporary philosophy of education, I believe we can see more clearly certain defects in contemporary philosophy of education, which apply also to other fields in philosophy. To accomplish this goal, I would like first of all to summarize the book itself.

The aim of Schooling in Capitalist America is to expose many of those self-deceptions which our society has about itself and its educational system.

Depuis que le structuralisme a franchi le seuil de Ia mode et que l'on parle maintenant volontiers d’ une ère post-structuraliste, le moment se prête davantage à une réflexion philosophique et critique sur ce type d'épistémè qui a pratiquement envahi tout le champ des sciences humaines. Quoique le structuralisme ait été une mode, et une mode qui a réussi, selon l'expression de Raymond Boudon,1 il reste toutefois encore difficile d'apprécier ses succès dans des travaux comme ceux de Foucault, d'Aithusser, de Barthes ou de Lacan. Là où cependant le succès est le plus évident c'est du côté des sciences sociales, en particulier du côté de Ia linguistique et de l'anthropologie.

Locke often writes that our knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. For example, he refers to “our Knowledge consisting in the perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of any two Ideas” in the second chapter of the Essay's book on knowledge (4.2.15). Similarly, at the beginning of this book he characterizes knowledge as “the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas” (4.1.2). Since commentators remark on this formula so frequently, one would expect that major questions about its interpretation would have been settled long ago. But not so. Controversy still prevails about Locke's intent, and especially about his assumption that the knowledge of the existence of real things counts as an instance of the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas (4.1.3,7).

Scholars have put forward two sorts of problems about the attempted assimilation of knowledge of real existence to Locke's formula.

A little-discussed aspect of the “conservative” position on abortion involves the claim that human beings exist at all stages of gestation — that even the human fertilized ovum (zygote) is a human being. There are good reasons of both a practical and theoretical nature why this particular idea has received so little attention in the abortion controversy. On the practical side there is the fact that zygotes are rarely if ever the subjects of abortion decisions; and on the theoretical side, there is the prima facie implausibility of the idea itself — an implausibility stemming from the fact that human zygotes possess none of the features that distinguish clear-cut examples of human beings from other living things.

I would like to suggest, however, that there are good reasons — again both practical and theoretical — for examining with some care the idea that human zygotes are human beings. For even if this idea is not central to the abortion controversy, it has clear relevance to the morality of using intrauterine devices (I.U.D.'s) as a means of procreation control.

Many recent discussions of the identity and individuation of actions focus on attempts to find satisfactory answers to questions like, “When, if ever, is a shooting (stabbing, poisoning, etc.) a killing?” Those who attempt to answer such questions divide themselves, on the whole, into two opposing groups. I. Thalberg has conveniently labelled the members of one group ‘unifiers’, and the members of the other group ‘multipliers’.

The unifier account is commonly attributed to philosophers such as G. E. M. Anscombe and Donald Davidson. Proponents of this account characteristically believe that many non-basic actions (where ‘basic’ is defined in terms of bodily movements) such as shootings, killings, etc., are identical with those basic actions by means of which the non-basic ones are performed. This position is indicated in the following remarks:

A great deal of philosophical consideration has been given in recent years to the issue of justice. In large measure this effort has focused upon justice in . relation to social institutions, to the distributive question of disbursing social benefits on the one hand or punishments and burdens on the other hand. Essentially we may view justice as having two basic requirements. In the first place we need conditions assuring impartial treatment of individuals and, in the second place, conditions for reasonable treatment of individuals — as injustice may arise either if relevantly similar persons are accorded dissimilar treatment or if they receive similar but unreasonable treatment.

In this article I shall examine a number of devices which have been proposed to meet the first requirement — that of impartiality. Social theorists have pursued impartiality with strategies ranging from the disinterested Ideal Observer of many utilitarians to the ‘veil of ignorance’ conditions in John Rawls's revitalized contract theory. I shall demonstrate that the preoccupation with impartiality in social institututions has had an unfortunate consequence. It has obscured the original motive for impartiality and led to a misunderstanding of the concept.

Philosophical logic has its problem-children; and among these the Principle of Substitutivity of codesignating expressions — the linguistic spawn of Leibniz's law—has achieved a place of prominence. It has become increasingly apparent that a certain style of linguistic analysis, which seeks to impose formal regimentation ruled by the constraints of classical quantification theory, does not yield results with the kind of uniformity and elegance one should hope for from a satisfyi.ng theory. The root of the difficulty, I believe, bears upon the answers to fundamental questions concerning the nature of cognitive agents and the purposes which their use of language is designed to further. If this is the case, one might expect to find some of the trouble surfacing at precisely those points where the language is used to convey information about the cognitive activities associated with the use of language by such agents. So it is.

The central problem of this essay is the interpretation of referential expressions in statements involving propositional attitudes, with the focus on belief contexts. But I shall begin by placing the discussion within a broader theoretical framework.